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NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

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DIPLOMATS DISCUSS CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11 Aug 87 p 6

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi and Samih 'Abdallah]

[Text] Egypt's relations with the Eastern Bloc countries are currently experiencing "relative detente" in the wake of the deterioration--or, as diplomats like to call it, the stagnation--which caused these relations to decline to their lowest level since the Egyptians began extensively cooperating with the eastern bloc countries. Numerous observers note that the current situation is the result of balanced Egyptian relations with the East and the West, whereas other observers view it as maneuvers with distant and indirect objectives.

In an endeavor to find out the dimensions of the current detente and its future horizons, AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI interviewed Mahmud Amin Fathi, the director of the Foreign Ministry's East and Europe desk and the ambassador in charge of relations with the Eastern Bloc countries. He said:

I wish to begin by stressing that our relations with Eastern Europe experienced stagnation at one time, and that this stagnation had its impact on certain aspects of the relations with these countries. However, this does not mean that relations were paralyzed during that period because political, economic, and cultural cooperation continued. We have now overcome this stagnation, and have begun to revitalize relations with this bloc and the Soviet Union to restore them to their past conditions. During this recent period, a tendency has been seen on the part of both sides to restore normalcy to the relations. This tendency is manifested in visits by socialist countries' officials to Egypt, and in the conclusion of numerous agreements.

The Debt Problem

[Question] Do you think that the latest agreement with the Soviet Union on rescheduling the Egyptian debts will help to open new horizons of cooperation between the two countries?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we appreciate this agreement with the Soviet Union, which we concluded after four rounds of negotiations, and we appreciate the agreement's understanding of our economic conditions. This agreement will reflect positively on the future development of relations in all areas.

[Question] What are the reasons for Egypt's relations with the eastern bloc countries to deteriorate after long years of prosperity?

[Answer] The stagnation began with the Soviet experts' smooth departure in the early 1970's, with the issue of intervention in internal affairs, with the subsequent withdrawal of the Soviet ambassador from Cairo and with the tension that followed. However, all these problems have been overcome now.

Political Problems

[Question] Are there any political problems between Egypt and the socialist countries at present?

[Answer] Politically, there are no problems because there is harmony in many of the positions we take on international issues, especially the Palestine issue, holding the international conference, ending the Iraq-Iran war, ending the Lebanese problem and the need for withdrawing foreign forces from Lebanon.

[Question] Does this mean total agreement between the bloc countries and Egypt on the various political issues of common interest?

[Answer] There may be disagreement on some issues, such as Afghanistan. This is normal in relations between countries but "differences of opinion should not ruin the cause of friendship."

[Question] In light of the current detente in the relations between Egypt and the socialist countries, how does his excellency the ambassador view the current relations in comparison with those of the 1960's?

[Answer] It cannot be said that economic relations with the socialist countries have reached their 1960's level. But with the efforts being made by both sides, we are on our way to reaching this level.

Reopening the Consulates

[Question] At the peak of the tension which marred Egypt's relations with eastern bloc countries, Egypt closed a number of consulates and cultural centers belonging to several countries in this bloc. In light of the current detente, has any progress been made to reopen these consulates and centers?

[Answer] A study is currently underway on reopening the closed consulates and cultural centers.

[Question] What efforts is the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs making to bolster cooperation with the bloc countries?

[Answer] The ministry is the link between these countries, represented in their embassies in Cairo, and the various state agencies. We spare no effort to do all that can be done to help bolster these relations. We recommend whatever is likely to improve them and present our recommendations to the various ministries. Moreover, socialist countries' firms are currently participating in a number of projects. We have Polish archaeological missions in Aswan, Cairo, Luxor, and Alexandria. Hungary is the country which carried out the latest renovations in Cairo Stadium. It is possible that these efforts are not tangible but they really do exist. Some people exaggerate the problems and allege that our relations with the bloc are frozen. Actually, these relations have never been suspended.

[Question] Mr Ambassador, there are people who like to compare the aid which the socialist countries gave Egypt with the current American aid. What is your excellency's opinion?

[Answer] The Soviets did a lot in the 1960's. But we are not about to make comparisons with others, because we cooperate with everyone for the sake of the national interest.

Military Cooperation

[Question] To this very moment, the Egyptian armed forces continue to be fundamentally reliant on eastern weapons. Do the current relations with the bloc nations permit meeting the Egyptian army's needs for eastern spare parts without problems?

[Answer] We have embraced the policy of diversifying the weapon sources and insuring availability of the spare parts needed for the weapons, whether by cooperating with Eastern Europe or with other nations. We are also making great strides to produce a number of weapons and most of the spare parts we need.

[Question] A final question. Mr Ambassador, observers note at present a number of endeavors to restore political relations between the eastern bloc countries and Israel. What is Egypt's position on these endeavors?

[Answer] We deal with independent countries which make their own decisions in terms of their own interests. Just as we do not like anybody to interfere in our internal affairs, we should not interfere in anybody's decision. Whoever makes a decision must shoulder the responsibility for his decision in the light of his assessment of his interests.

The Other Side

Czechoslovakia was the first European country to supply Egypt with military hardware in support of the first Egyptian decision to break the weapon monopoly in 1955. Czechoslovakia is also the country which refused to supply us with weapon spare parts during the "stagnation period" in the 1970's. Therefore, learning the level of the relations with Czechoslovakia provides an indicator of the level of the relations with the Eastern Bloc nations.

Ambassador Milos Vesely asserts that relations between the two nations are currently expanding, adding that, "Our foreign minister, who is visiting Cairo currently, will complete discussing these relations with the Egyptian foreign minister."

Economically, the ambassador asserts that discussions are currently underway to increase the trade volume between the two countries to \$200 million annually.

The ambassador has also stressed that it is possible to escalate the military cooperation and that this depends on the Egyptians. He has further stressed that the fluctuation in the level of the relations is due to what is known in international politics as fluctuation between the two blocs.

The ambassador said that Dr Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, has told him that Egypt is inclined to restore balance to its relations between the two "super blocs." He added that Czechoslovakia would be happy to reopen the consulates and cultural centers which were closed during the period of tension.

Special Relations With the United States

On the other hand, relations with the United States and Western Europe, especially economic and political relations, have attained a notable level of cooperation, and Western Europe has come to have an important and necessary role in establishing peace and holding the international conference.

Ambassador Faruq Shalabayah, the head of the United States desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was asked:

[Question] What is the nature of the current special U.S.-Egyptian relations? To what extent do they influence the balance in Egypt's international relations, and what is their role in establishing peace in the area?

[Shalabayah] To begin, the skillful Egyptian political leadership demands that the superpowers be dealt with based on the national interest.

During President 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration, relations fluctuated and Israel was able to drive a wedge between us and the United States, thus isolating it. Israel played a smart game and reaped great benefits from this policy, with Egypt paying an exorbitant price.

Egypt has strategic, technological, and cultural relations with the United States. As for the economic aid, the United States either facilitate or hamper the credits and loans which we need. In the wake of the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States, the United States came to have a direct presence in Rafah on the Egyptian border. This presence became closer to Egypt than the Soviet Union, although it is geographically closer to Egypt.

What underlines the Egyptian political leadership's skill is that our relations with the United States do not come at the expense of our relations with the other countries.

Our relations can be characterized as comprehensive in more than one way, because they cover numerous issues and affairs.

The debt problem, represented in \$4.5 billion, does not influence our relations. Meanwhile, we get economic aid amounting to \$230 million in the form of soft 40-year loans to purchase wheat, as well as \$815 million in economic grants and \$1.3 billion in nonrefundable military aid. The ambassador asserts that the issue of (establishing) military bases influences the relations but that this issue is rejected.

Egyptian Diplomacy in Europe

Regarding Egyptian activity in Europe and the issues on which Egyptian diplomacy focuses, Ambassador Hasan 'Abd-al-Samad, the head of the Western Europe desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, says that these relations are strong and firm, especially with the countries that grant loans. We are in the process of concluding similar agreements with Portugal and Austria. Moreover, the European countries have a significant role in establishing peace in the area and in holding the international peace conference, especially in the wake of the Venice declaration and the declarations by the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers Council which underline the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Our activity in Europe seeks to urge the European countries to force Israel, especially the radical Israeli elements, to accept the idea of holding the conference. Egyptian diplomacy is also trying to overcome the contradictions existing within the European Community, and to urge this community to recognize the PLO.

Moreover, Egypt seeks to refute the terrorism accusation leveled against the Arabs, taking advantage of the European appreciation of Egypt, especially since Mubarak submitted an initiative to the European Parliament to hold an international conference to develop means to prevent terrorism.

Egypt and the International Blocs

International blocs and organizations are considered one of the important spheres of the Egyptian diplomacy's international activity. According to a veteran politician, the offices of these blocs and organizations coordinate the activities and relations of their members so as to implement the common policies and objectives of the member-states.

Egypt's relations with these organizations deteriorated not long ago, at a time when Egypt was absent, due to numerous circumstances, from the Islamic Conference Organization and when Egypt's role was weakened in the Nonaligned Movement and the OAU. Matters have now returned, or nearly returned, to normal, and Egypt has regained its position in the Islamic Organization and resumed its vanguard role in the Nonaligned Movement and the OAU.

In the current and coming period, how do we assess Egypt's current role, and what is the future of its relations and coordination with these international organizations? What are the most significant issues raised among their members? To put it simply, has Egypt resumed its vanguard role as a founder of these organizations, and what are Egypt's modes of operation in them?

Modes of Operation for Egyptian Diplomacy in International Organizations

In reply, Dr 'Amr Musa, the ambassador heading the International Organizations desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, says: "First of all, Egypt's return to the Islamic Conference has been as complete as possible and its role in the Nonaligned Movement has never declined at any time."

The ambassador stresses that the relations with these groups have continued uninterrupted. There is coordination with the nonaligned countries on problems found in the world, such as the debt problem, development programs, north-south cooperation, and the wars in which members of the organization are involved, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the Chad-Libya war.

Egyptian policy has a major role in solving these problems, according to Ambassador 'Amr Musa, who added: "A careful observer is aware of Egypt's role in political and economic fields." The ambassador further added: "Regarding Africa, we have definite positions on the problems in South Africa and on the racial discrimination policy. We also support Namibia's independence. Moreover, we have our positions on the issue of a new international economic system."

Regarding Islamic affairs, Egyptian diplomacy is currently actively trying to use Egypt's return to the Islamic Conference Organization and the increased cooperation that Egypt has enjoyed to implement what was

brought up at the conference, especially the proposal President Mubarak presented in his speech on the Islamic world's security and on non-aggression between the Islamic countries. These ideas must be studied from a strategic perspective at this time.

Our policy toward the international organizations is founded on several principles, including the principle that we are a part of the nonaligned world, the developing world, and the Islamic and African worlds.

Egypt and the Islamic World Organization

Egypt's relations with the Islamic nations were shaken. Subsequently, Egypt's membership in the Islamic Conference Organization was suspended. Pakistan and Guinea played a major role in restoring this membership. How did the relations worsen, and how were they restored? What is the future of cooperation within the organization, in light of Egypt's being a mainstay of the organization?

Mamadou Salion Sylla, Guinea's ambassador in Cairo, stresses that his country's bilateral relations with Egypt are more than excellent in all areas, and that these relations were affected by the signing of the Camp David treaty because this was an internal matter which only concerned Egypt.

"We are embarking on a new phase in our relations," the ambassador asserts. "We are discussing future areas of cooperation with Egypt; the discussions focus on resuming economic dealings in accordance with the barter system which was abolished in 1970 and at which time cooperation reached the zero level. We also appeal to Egypt and its businessmen to invest in utilizing our country's mineral resources in a manner beneficial to both countries."

In the Future: Nuclear Cooperation Between Egypt and Pakistan

Iqbal Khan, the Pakistani ambassador, asserts that "the current relations with Egypt are strong relations governed by religion, culture, history, and a number of bilateral cooperation agreements in all fields. Our relations have developed recently, and we have signed a bilateral agreement to combat the drug trade. A number of branches of the Pakistan National Bank have been opened.

"Our relations with Egypt are very special, regardless of what disagreements may crop up. It is on this basis that President Mubarak intervenes, unasked, by telephone and calls Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi whenever something happens which threatens our area's security.

The Pakistani ambassador asserts that Egypt is a country with which cooperation can be established regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an area in which Pakistan has achieved considerable progress.

Joint Committee to Assess Egyptian-Indian Relations in All Areas

As for the Nonaligned Movement, AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI has interviewed Sudarshan Kumar, India's ambassador in Cairo, to determine the level of current relations between the two countries in their capacity as a good criterion for determining Egypt's current relations with the movement.

Some observers speak of a relative decline in Egyptian-Indian relations. When asked how true this is, the ambassador said:

"The lack of relations in a certain area does not mean that relations have declined overall. In any case, our relations are good. A joint committee was formed recently to examine the two countries' relations in all areas. The committee is currently assessing the relations and defining the horizons of future cooperation."

Politically, Egypt and India agree on numerous issues of common interest.

As for India's refusal to supply Egypt with weapons and al-Sadat's denunciation of this position in 1978, the ambassador asserted: "The request was refused because our agreement with the Soviet Union does not permit India to reexport the weapons; otherwise we would lose our credibility in the world. But contrary to what many people believe, the situation did not assume the dimensions of a crisis."

The ambassador asserted that the Nonaligned Movement continues because it was established to fight polarization.

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PRESIDENT OF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ON CURRENT PROBLEMS

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 29 Jul 87 pp 21-23

[Interview with Dr 'Ali Lutfi, president of Consultative Council, by Wafa' al-Shishini: "The Politician's Other Side"; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] This is an attempt to discover the other side of Dr 'Ali Lutfi, president of the Consultative Council and the Higher Press Council, through a nonpolitical conversation with a politician away from the responsibilities of the job. For his part, he hid nothing and put forward his other side: the intellectual, fond of reading and artistic and cultural interests. This is the side people do not see and which is not in the spotlight. And now, what does 'Ali Lutfi say?

To begin, Dr 'Ali Lutfi is a rich personality. He unites the loftiness of the profession of university professor, its consecration to science and its importance in our life, and the responsibility of the educator who influences young people in the most critical years of their lives, forming their consciousness and minds so that they may have greater experience and knowledge in preparation to carry forward the future course of Egypt and its culture...To this his personality unites the sharpness of the politician who has moved between various political offices: minister of finance, the Consultative Council, the prime ministry, and the presidency of the Consultative Council. He can therefore say from practical experience, "Offices do not create men; men create them and give them their value. When an individual moves through different posts, it gives him experience that makes him able to serve in any area, as long as his fundamental desire is to serve the country."

The first item of note occurred before the interview, when Lutfi's office manager said:

"Please be on time. He is very precise about his appointments and holds them in great regard. He refuses to deal with anyone who does not know the value of time."

The meeting with 'Ali Lutfi, the man and the politician, took place in his office; [I saw] a broad smile, a serious face, and a ready and burning mind.

The conversation began with my saying:

"We want an untraditional conversation. Any question you feel embarrassment answering, don't answer; but don't give me a traditional answer. The basic point of this article is to become acquainted with the other side of the politician: his view of life, general problems, art, women, and the youth crisis. Naturally, that does not exclude our desire to ask a question or two about politics, since the latter is a part of your life and personality that cannot be overlooked, even when we write about the other side. Agreed?"

He said, "Agreed. Let us begin."

[Question] It is said that intellectuals are the conscience of the community and that they precede us into the future, trying to impel society to develop. Can we say that Egypt's intellectuals are performing this role?

[Answer] In fact, Egypt's intellectuals are performing an important role in urging society to move forward. They are the class that is aware, that reads, and that analyzes. However, many circumstances prevent their influence on the movement of society from being as powerful as would be expected of them. Among these circumstances is the fact that many people do not read, or are illiterate. Many educated people read the headlines, without going deeply into what they read, and this is another disaster, because it has to do with the cultural consciousness that must be disseminated among the members of the people for them to know that by reading and knowing what is going on around them in Egypt and the world, they can defend their rights and choose, by consciousness and understanding, the political current that carries out their demands and accords with their actual condition.

Because of everything I have mentioned, the influence of intellectuals on the ordinary man in the street is weak. Therefore, we do not easily find any ordinary Egyptian who says, "By God, I am convinced by the point of view of writer so-and-so and will therefore vote for the political current that agrees with his ideas." Of course, we hope for the arrival of that day.

As for the problem of the intellectual himself, it is the unavailability of all the resources that would help him perform his intellectual role. This includes the high price of local books. Despite the efforts of the Ministry of Culture to make these books available at reasonable prices, their price is increasing as a result of the rise in the price of paper. The same holds true of foreign books and magazines, whose prices have gone up tremendously because of the rise in the exchange rate of the dollar. Without them, and without acquaintance with foreign cultures, the intellectual drowns in local matters; this limits his thinking and makes him incapable of perceiving the different solutions to the problems of our society.

Intellectuals and Political Activity

To be honest, we must say that within the last 5 years full freedom of expression has been granted to the word. Newspaper censorship has been lifted; opposition newspapers have been allowed to write on every subject and criticize what they want without fear. This has helped intellectuals perform

their role and announce their opinions about all our circumstances frankly. This, in turn, has helped the people to know everything.

[Question] But how do you explain the general lack of participation by intellectuals in political activity, and particularly their lack of participation in the elections?

[Answer] Indeed, the intellectuals of Egypt are not participating in political activity. This is a sad fact, but one we must admit. In the recent elections, only 15 percent of Cairo's population went to the ballot boxes--and Cairo includes the greatest number of Egypt's intellectuals. I trace this situation to a number of reasons: For one thing, all the political parties in Egypt have existed for a short time; some of them are not on a level that would encourage intellectuals to participate politically or vote; others, as a result of past experience, have lost confidence in elections. However, I say that we enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the judiciary that encourage any individual to participate, engage in activity, and announce his opinion without fear. What then prevents anyone from participating in the events of his country? This is an unacceptable reluctance.

[Question] They say that politics is the art of the possible, meaning that many international, economic, and social factors--which ordinary people may not understand--control the politician and may direct his decisions. From your activity in various positions, have you felt that people far from authority do not understand its dimensions and the circumstances that control it, and that they therefore misjudge particular decisions?

[Answer] An outsider's view of the world of politics differs radically from the actual activities and circumstances which one encounters, which you may not notice at a distance. From my political activity over 10 years, since I was appointed finance minister in 1978, then as an active member of the NDP, chairman of the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, prime minister, and finally president of the Consultative Assembly, I have learned many things. Among them are the following:

It is utterly insufficient for a man to be a scholar and distinguished man in his field; he must understand the effect of every decision on the life of the people. That is, he must understand its political aspects. For example, if we have to implement an economic decision which we think--from a scientific and legal standpoint--will solve some problem, before carrying it out we must consider its social dimensions related, for example, to customs and traditions and its effect on the life of the people. We cannot take any law from the book and apply it directly to the people without looking into its various results. Otherwise, people will be given a shock.

I have also learned that what is right for one nation may not be right for another, or that what is right in a nation at one time may not be repeatable at other times. Conditions change, people change, the age changes; the past cannot be brought back or repeated; it is against the law of nature.

Second, mixing with citizens in a variety of positions is much more important than reading reports. Reports can be dry and scientific, but the life of the

people is something else. For example, when I was prime minister, I used to read the files and form a particular opinion in preparation for implementing it. However, in the course of circumstances I would naturally meet with citizens and discuss with them their problems that might be affected by the decision, and I thus found myself changing my decision in light of the actual situation. Therefore, every official, whether in a corporation, factory, or newspaper, must go down to the ordinary people, listen to them, and place between them and himself no obstacle such as sometimes shields impractical personalities from actual contact.

My Experience in Political Offices

[Question] Should a single individual's movement between political posts be considered a good thing, or is it the result of the small number of people fit to perform the important roles in the state?

[Answer] I think it is an advantage. It would be unthinkable to choose an incompetent man to take over another position and repeat his failure. This would be against the interest of the country and the government that chooses him.

As for the large number of my political posts, they have increased my experience and given me a wider field for understanding the problems of my country. To give some examples:

My work as minister of finance placed all the country's imports and expenditures before me and enabled me to rationalize them.

My work as member of the Consultative Council enabled me to listen to the discussions of the people's representatives concerning various issues, which gave me a clear general picture of what people were thinking.

My work as chairman of the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs (we call it "the economic workshop") made me understand the size of our economic problems.

My work as prime minister gave me a complete picture of what was taking place in all the ministries, and of Egypt's problems in general.

My work as president of the Consultative Council taught me how to be a good listener, to manage sessions, listen to debate, and respect other opinions. As you see, with any person who holds a number of political offices, each office adds experience, realism, knowledge, and ability to the other office which would not be available in a person who remains in his post a long time.

Women: Between Work and Home

[Question] I think politics has taken up part of our time. Let us move to the other side of your life. Could you give us your opinion about women working in politics, and about the call for women to return to the house or work half time for half a salary?

[Answer] I have no objection at all to women carrying on political activity. They are half of society and must defend and express this half. I am not speaking theoretically; based on my contact with some of the women deputies in the Consultative Council, I find them more enthusiastic and committed than many of the men. For example, there is Dr Farkhundah Hasan, Dr Zaynab Radwan, Dr Injil Butrus, and Dr Shafiqah Nasir. They head committees at the highest level and, along with this, maintain their positions with ability, awareness, and understanding. To anyone who wonders about women's place in politics, I ask what is the problem that prevents women from carrying on political activity. Do they lack knowledge? Acuity? Experience? If they lack any qualification for politics, it may also be lacking in men.

One may be incapable of political activity, not because one is a man or a woman, but because certain characteristics are present or lacking. I do not think it at all unlikely that the day will come when, given the qualifications, a lady will head the government. In that case, I would follow her with full esteem and respect.

As for the call for women to return to the home, I will not discuss it, except insofar as women must have time for their children until kindergarten or school age, a child's most critical years, when its habits, character, and morals are formed and at which stage it needs the mother's constant presence. After this period, however, she has the right to work however she wants.

[Question] Does your wife work?

[Answer] Yes, she works as a professor at al-Sadat Academy and is studying for the doctorate.

[Question] Didn't you object to her continuing to work, particularly after you assumed the office of minister?

[Answer] I did not object at all. Why should I object? Is working a crime to be gotten rid of when we assume public office? I am honored that my wife is a working woman and has undertaken advanced studies. Knowledge increases a woman's standing and makes her more in tune with her husband's responsibility.

The Problem of Young People: They Want To Understand

[Question] As a university professor under whose hands many generations have been educated and who has been in touch with many different kinds of young people, can we say that family, state, and society have performed their role in protecting young people from falling into the morass of extremism and terrorism? Can one acknowledge that despair about a tomorrow that will not realize their modest dreams is the reason for the regrettable incidents that have occurred in the family and the nation?

[Answer] Twenty-five classes passed through my hands. The percentage of extremism and deviance in them was small. However, I admit that we all are responsible and have fallen short when it comes to young people. Some people are exploiting the circumstances of their confusion and anxiety to align them with extremism and terrorism. As a university professor, my job is not just

to comment on the text, but to comment on life, too. All the subjects that confuse young people must be discussed, so that they do not fall into the snare of deviants.

I remember one day I was explaining to business-school students why the state was raising prices. Did it want "to make life difficult" for people? No, it needed increased revenues, which in turn would lead to a decline of the deficit, and that would lead to a drop in prices. On that day, the students wanted to go out and demonstrate for raising prices. It would have been the strangest demonstration ever to come out of the university!

(He said it laughing, then continued.)

The problem is that young people do not understand that they are being taken advantage of; and we are responsible for that. The role of education is important, but it is not doing its job. I used to say that the minds of young people are made in two factories: schools and universities, and television and various media. I admit they have not taken sufficient care. We have therefore called for a national conference on education and the media, so that they can do their job in attracting young people, listening to them, and solving their problems. If, however, we call out and perform our role with them, and some of them still become extremists or deviants, we will take a serious and stern attitude toward them.

[Question] And the despair? Don't you admit there is something called frustration? Young people say about themselves that they were born in a hard time: the housing crisis, the job crisis. As a university professor, how do you see the solution to the youth problem?

[Answer] First, I would like to say that I am by nature an optimist. If pessimism enters any person's life, especially a young person's, it will be impossible for him to work or realize any dream for himself. We start from today: don't you agree with me that it is better than yesterday and that yesterday was better than what preceded it? And as a natural result of the development of things, tomorrow will be better, God permitting. I am not speaking theoretically, but from the actuality of figures and reports. However, young people must be bold with their solutions and views. Why do young people wait for the government to appoint them to jobs, make no efforts, and then say, "The salary is not enough for me."? Haven't they asked themselves why it is not enough? Having assumed the responsibility of appointing every [university] graduate to a job, the government cannot raise salaries. If things changed and the number of enterprises increased, as we are doing today, it would be possible to raise salaries by creating many new job opportunities. And young people hold on to [government] employment! Why do they want to live in Cairo? There are new cities, the deserts, the projects for young people which the state is financing with loans on easy terms. These are all new paths, but they need a youthful spirit capable of ambition and risk. But if a young person does not work boldly at the beginning of his life, when will he understand it?

Of course, I do not deny that young people have special problems, particularly as regards housing. According to studies, we need 100,000 housing units built

annually and 150,000 feddans of land reclaimed annually. I had the honor of beginning to lay down a program of economic reform now being overseen by Dr 'Atif Sidqi. It is giving us great hope. But the state can do nothing by itself; everyone must participate and work in order to be confident about tomorrow. The sky does not rain gold and silver; men's arms turn dirt to gold and silver.

The Man in the Street, and True Information

[Question] Media studies say that not every society can confront all the facts. This capacity varies according to the degree of education and culture, and it is therefore not advisable to report every fact in a society whose majority consists of illiterate people who are easy to control and arouse. What do you say about this opinion?

[Answer] I support confronting the people with all the facts so that they can know the reasons for every decision that is made. Of course, a 50 percent illiteracy rate can be considered an obstacle to the realization of democracy. However, if we hide any information from the people, they will look elsewhere. The information may be brought to them distorted or incomplete, and this will do more harm than the harm of facing the truth.

History has taught us that the Egyptian people have been aware at all stages of their political history, and that, when necessary, people all stand together to protect the community from anything. I say again that, given the existence of education and political consciousness, we can convince the people of all the facts in a simplified manner, so that they can participate in solving the country's problems.

I respect the right of the man in the street to know, but without exaggeration, alarmism, or agitation. Say everything, but rationally. Let us give each event its real weight, so that we do not cause the people to be confused and lose confidence in everything.

Cleanliness and the Worship of Work

[Question] You spent part of your life in the West, studying at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland to obtain your master's degree and then your doctorate. What qualities in Western society do you hope will become part of Egyptian society?

[Answer] Cleanliness, and again cleanliness. Although our religion tells us that cleanliness is part of faith, many of us do not pay attention to this appeal. Also, respect for appointments and time. Here, time has no value. This is a waste of something very valuable that has influenced us in different areas.

The thing we really need is their worship of work and production. The worker abroad goes to his job happy, with a smile on his face as if he were going to an amusement park. One of our workers, on the other hand, goes to his work as if he had been hit on the head. He wants the hours of work to end quickly,

even if he has not done anything, so that he can return home and sleep-- without any goal or work.

[Question] Can we not trace that to the high wages overseas and the comfortable conditions under which they work?

[Answer] Do you want the real reason, honestly and without equivocation? It is inevitable because whoever does not work seriously and capably is fired immediately. Here we cannot fire any worker. There are no strict penalties for anyone who neglects his work and causes serious loss to the company or factory in which he works. Also, bonuses are given to everyone, regardless of each person's competence. What then encourages productivity? Who is going to stop the person who is too lazy to make an effort? Positive incentives and penalties are needed, so that we give everyone his due. That is human nature. Even God has told us that there is heaven and hell. How is it that we do not apply this in the area of work?

(Dr 'Ali Lutfi's enthusiasm reached its peak when he was talking about work, production, and incentives. I said to him:)

[Question] We have agreed to be frank, right? So I will allow myself to ask a question that may be sensitive, but which occupies the mind of many. People say that we worship offices and rally around any office holder; but when a person loses his office, they leave him, look for the next person, and begin to rally around the new star. Did this happen to you after you left the prime ministry?

[Answer] Some people did this, yes. Not only to me, but to any person who leaves his field of work. But I personally gave no one an opportunity to change his behavior, because I put on no airs toward anyone and did not change my behavior toward anyone in the course of my holding various offices, even the prime ministry, whether the person was the doorman of the building or my closest friends. My reputation is well known: I gave no exceptions or services to anyone. So, none of those profit seekers rushed at me. Thus, I felt no change in general. If someone puts on airs toward people when he is at the top, people abandon him when he is weak. Thank God, I did not put on airs and have not become weak. I am still ready to serve my country from the highest or the lowest office.

12937
CSO: 45040298

LATEST ECONOMIC RESOLUTIONS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 June 87 p 6

[Article by Dr. Ali Muhaylabah under the "Economic Mail" rubric: "A Letter to Managers of the Economy: Beware the Wave of Delusion"]

[Text] Undoubtedly, the latest economic resolutions restored our hope after it was almost gone. Initial indications increase the hope that the experiment will succeed. However, we must be cautious and not let go of our fears. One setback in this pioneer experiment would inflict damages we cannot withstand. There are only two groups which are the source of all our fears and which aim at destroying this wonderful experiment. These groups are:

1. Drug dealers
2. Profiteering companies

The third danger is exploitation of the loopholes in the resolutions and laws. This last danger can be eliminated through more realistic action and decisiveness in taking appropriate measures.

If the country spends 250 Egyptian pounds yearly to combat smuggling, why cannot we double that amount for one year and spend the extra amount on incentives? The original amount could be used to provide humanitarian medical care and treatment for addicts and poison victims. All those who subsequently return to addiction would suffer a disastrous penalty.

The first and most important point concerns the profiteering companies. Our aim is not to attack or defend them; this is not the issue or main point. No doubt some of them are sincere and some are not; however, all of them will unintentionally (or deliberately) drive the first nail into the coffin of these resolutions which are the source of much hope that the country's economic stability will be restored. These companies (without getting into their conduct, background or their true motives) payout equal or nearly equal dividends!! Even more astonishing is the fact that they give the same rate of interest to the Egyptian pound and foreign currencies. If they were genuinely concerned about investors capital, and if their actions were realistic, foreign currencies would earn 15 percent less which is the average difference in value between the two currencies.

Most of these companies, I do not say all of them, are suspicious.

Where are the budgets of these companies?

How much is paid in taxes, considering that the amount of deposits they have certainly exceeds 20 billion pounds and that they pay dividends amounting to more than 30 percent? Hence, the commercial and industrial taxes will not by any means be less than 2 billion pounds!!! Nonetheless, our aim is not to call them to account. Rather let us support them: first to spare what can be redeemed, and secondly to prevent the attempt to destroy this experiment.

Let us all deal briefly with reality:

1- These companies must stop amassing savings in foreign currencies except within the limits of their actual needs which they must declare and which must be subject to accountability.

2- These companies must define their position regarding previous deposits within a specific time frame, and with the agreement of the depositors. They have two options: First, profits in free currencies must be 15 percent less than profits in Egyptian currency. Secondly, these savings must be converted to Egyptian pounds at the official rate.

Let us be realistic and let bygones be bygones, and deal firmly with all reckless behavior now and in future.

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CSO: 4504/266

BRIEFS

BROTHERHOOD SETS CONDITIONS FOR JOINING NDP--"Papers from the Opposition" has learned that intensive unannounced talks have taken place during the past few days, between the NDP and a parliamentary figure representing the religious movement. The religious leadership set four conditions for their joining the NDP. They are: that they function as religious counselor to the president; that special measures actually be taken to implement Islamic shari'ah; that religious reform take place within the NDP; and that the religious leadership occupy a leadership position in the NDP at the same level which it currently holds in one of the opposition parties. The religious leadership, holds a representative position in one of the opposition parties and in the past was an axis for a number of journalists from various national and party newspapers due to its victory in the last parliamentary elections in the capital constituencies. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 18 May 87 p 48] 13558/12951

CSO: 4504/266

CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES DISCIPLINE IN IDF

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew No 42, 22 Jul 87 p 5

[Report by Doron Rosenblum and Ilan Yitzhaik: "No Breakdowns on the Way"]

[Text] At the beginning of the week the IDF General Staff approved a series of measures designed to enhance discipline in the army. In an interview to IDF Radio, Chief of Staff General Dan Shomron talked about his views on the significance of discipline. BAMAHANE carries some of the chief of staff's statements as they were broadcast.

"Discipline is the main factor that maintains the capability of the military apparatus to function under the difficult conditions in which it may have to work. There exists a great mistake, according to which, as I read in the papers, discipline is the barber or the tailor, as if that were genuine discipline. As I see it, discipline is primarily the entire capability to activate the units in precise orchestration according to needs; even if some of the commanding officers may not know why or when a certain order was given, they will carry it out to the letter in the conviction that an order is to be carried out also out of trust that their superior officers had sufficiently serious considerations to issue it.

"I must emphasize that the topic of discipline is not something new. We do not currently have a discipline campaign. It has always been a serious issue, but it recently become acute in the wake of a report by the state comptroller, which focused on IDF discipline and cited data tracing the path of an order from its issue by the general staff, or even the chief of staff, through all the levels and ranks down to its implementation in the field; the data pointed to more than a few snags between the order and its intent, and its implementation. Needless to say, such a thing is a serious flaw in the strength of the army. Commanding officers in the field may sometimes receive orders that are decidedly inconvenient from their viewpoint--such as, for example, transferring a secondary unit to another unit, or, in time of war, switching important artillery support from one's own unit to another unit. The consequences may be difficult and even dangerous. Nevertheless, the commanding officer, who was trained to obey such orders, must carry out the order with the understanding that from the viewpoint of the general picture, the correct thing to do is to transfer the respective unit. Consequently, the order must be carried out precisely at the exact time and place. Commanding

officers may often have local interests to delay, alter, or partially implement an order. When such an order is not carried out at the precise time and place, that constitutes a serious and clear breach.

"After the Yom Kippur war, for example, commanding officers boasted of the amazing "improvisation talents" they demonstrated by halting a supply or ammunition convoy earmarked for another unit and appropriating it for their own unit. In my opinion, this is an embodiment of lack of discipline and the type of behavior which can pose a great threat to the army.

"We can compare this to an example from the area of mechanics, namely water transparency. Any ray of light should in theory go through to the bottom as it is, since the water is transparent. In practice, however, each layer of water breaks the angle of the ray, and what gets through to the bottom is a weak light, or perhaps none at all. We in the army must convey the ray of light intact from the top to the bottom of the echelon, without 'breakdowns' on the way.

"And speaking of commanding officers: I do not think that the problem of discipline is a problem of soldiers. Soldiers generally follow instructions. However, if a soldier sees that some orders are more important than others and that his commanding officer does not carry out some of them, I suppose that in time he too may not follow them. Discipline is in point of fact a matter of the commanding officers and their understanding of the need for discipline.

"The reverse side of the coin--and one of the greatest fears when one deals with discipline--is that officers who carry out orders precisely and to the letter may lose their initiative. Perhaps we are throwing the baby out with the bath water. But that is not so. Every commanding officer, in his field of responsibility, must use his judgment and initiative in order to best capitalize on the means available for carrying out his mission. I am convinced and I know from my own experience that the spirit of initiative is not impaired.

"As an example of judgment, I want to cite the business of abandoning a military installation which was recently in the news. The number of reservists that the commanding officer had in the area was, to his mind, insufficient to fulfill all the missions he had. He deliberated and decided that the respective installation should remain closed down, without the benefit of physical oversight. In my opinion, his judgment was correct. The IDF's complaint against him was of a different nature--namely, he did not report to the higher command on his decision. Personal judgment is also important for the military apparatus. Discipline and initiative are complementary factors.

"As far as uniform discipline is concerned, the uniform is simply a part of the culture of military life, which reflects order and discipline. One cannot take orders or regulations and choose to follow some, but not others. If I go to the pharmacy and find that the pharmacist is dirty, wrinkled, and unkempt, that will be the last time I go to that particular pharmacy. An army must radiate order and discipline in the eyes of the civilian population."

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12782

ARI'EL SHARON SEEKS TO IMPROVE IMAGE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jul 87 p 9

[Article by Yoel Marcus]

[Text]

Arieli Sharon is undergoing some interesting changes these days. He suddenly learned, for example, that mistakes can be admitted. He admits to having committed an error of judgment when he tried to set up and head a political body in his party's Central Committee, against Shamir's will. He admits that he overdid his "sulkings" and in his all-out war against the media, and he is now returning to a state of normalization in his relations with the press. I don't mind criticism, but they should get the facts right, he says. For him, facts are also a matter of outlook. However, there is no denying that his name has the same effect as that of the villain Haman: its mere mention is enough to unleash a furor. This at least is his feeling.

He admits that his well-known thesis on the establishment of a Palestinian state has a weak link, namely, that Jordan has a king. Because of this, Sharon understands, every time he adduces this thesis, particularly to an American audience, they wonder whether under its guise he is not devising evil plots against Hussein. However, in his opinion, their fears are groundless, there is no need to devise plots against an existing situation, namely, that Jordan is a state of the Palestinians and not of any dynasty.

He admits he was wrong to hold oral discussions with Shamir: the latter has a record of failing to remember. He "didn't remember" the GSS affair, he "didn't remember" the international conference topic. He "didn't remember" agreements and understandings between them. He "didn't remember" having attacked Levy. Henceforth Sharon will take minutes in every conversation between them. With such a man it's best to deal via documents.

By contrast, Sharon does not say that the bulldozer at Avnei Liefetz was a mistake. Because there was no mistake there. It was a planned maneuver by him to take the wind out of Tehiya's early-elections momentum. This reporter is not engaged in guesswork but writes out of knowledge. By chance, a day or two before the incident, I happened to sit at his table at breakfast in a Tel Aviv

hotel (he has lately adopted a strict diet of fruit and a spoon of honey with hot water) and asked him whether Tchiya's move was liable to topple the government. His opinion was that Shamir made a mistake in the way he dealt with Tchiya. "But as industry minister I discovered that I have authority to set up an industrial settlement in Gaza (sic), which has also been approved by the Alignment, so I will send a tractor to demonstrate our presence a little." (He doesn't like the word "bulldozer" and always talks only about a "tractor.") He spoke in full earnest but his eyes were laughing. I believe he assumed in advance that the tractor would be removed. But in the meantime it would make it easier for Tchiya to climb down off its high horse.

After the incident one paper wrote that the entire maneuver was coordinated in advance between Rabin and Sharon -- Sharon would get the tractor there and Rabin would kick it out, and thus the two would attain their goal: preventing early elections. I find it hard to believe there was such prior agreement. Still, mutual esteem exists between Rabin and Sharon, a kind of esprit de corps of two veterans who don't need a dialogue to understand each other.

The odd affinity is not only with Rabin but also with Shimon Peres. Moshe Dayan used to rile his fellow party members by saying "I'm closer to Begin than to (the late Mapam leader Meir) Ya'ari." Sharon could easily say today that he is closer to Rabin and Peres than to Shamir. It's not ideology that's involved here but modus operandi. Sharon is deeply disappointed with Shamir. He doesn't lead, doesn't stake out the road. Shamir's "sit back and do nothing" is dangerous for the state and impossible in our region -- in this at least he is closer to Peres and Rabin than to Shamir. He is concerned with the way Israeli Arabs are being handled -- the territories can be dumped in a situation of distress, but Israel's Arabs are part of us, inside us. Sharon maintains that there are ways to advance towards peace and that Israel must do the initiating, not sit with folded hands. In his view, the government in its present makeup could do a lot more for peace than the nothing-peg on which it has hung itself.

Not long ago, according to a man whose information is impeccable, a secret meeting took place between Sharon and Peres. Sharon didn't exactly confirm it and didn't exactly deny it, whereas Peres's office, after clarifying the matter with Peres himself, issued a total denial. Two days later something strange happened: Peres's chef de bureau called me, "just out of plain curiosity," and asked whether Sharon was claiming the meeting had actually taken place. If there was no meeting, I wondered, why was Peres so curious to know what Sharon was saying unless they had agreed on secrecy? My guess: there was a meeting.

Let us not forget that it was in a secret talk at the Savyon home of Azriel Einav that Peres and Sharon wrapped up the whole national unity government business as soon as the election results were in -- at the price of bringing Sharon in from the cold to which he'd been relegated by Begin to take a key government portfolio. In May, prior to the Inner Cabinet discussion on the international conference issue, Peres sent emissaries to Sharon. "Did they believe that I'd defect and vote against the Likud?" After all, he does want to be numero uno in the Likud. But it's instructive to analyze his approach of wanting to prevent Peres's humiliation while being very active in looking for a way that Shamir and Peres could move together in Hussein's direction. Sharon

was taken aback by Shamir's intransigence, nor does he fully comprehend it. Sharon doesn't want a rift in the government that would produce early elections and keep Shamir in the driver's seat for four more years.

For Sharon the Industry Ministry is only a way station, although you'll hear only good things there about his performance. He's engaged in a state of self-revision and of feeling his way. In view of the stalemated situation in Israel, Washington is increasingly hearing from Israel, half in jest and half in earnest, that he is the only person capable of leading the country in the direction of peace and concessions. Maybe it's not so funny at that -- without Sharon it's doubtful whether Begin would have yielded on the Yomit District settlements. Sharon is the humpty-dumpty of Israeli politics. In this and in a series of subjects the similarity between him and Dayan is striking. Both of them had steep ups and downs. Sharon like Dayan is more of a pragmatist than an ideological fanatic. Sharon like Dayan is always spinning off original ideas, some of them incomplete, some of them bad, but with him there's never zilch. Sharon like Dayan is gifted with charisma -- like Dayan when Sharon enters a public place there is what Ben-Gurion called electricity in the air.

The difference between the two is that Dayan didn't want to be prime minister while Sharon does. Dayan had plenty of charismatic and strong personalities as rivals, from Sapir to Golda Meir and Menachem Begin, while Sharon is facing a vacuum devoid of "charismatics" or "gifted prodigies" or "strongmen," a vacuum into which he's being drawn in the direction of up. What's the phrase? Time is on his side?

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LOCAL ECCENTRIC STARTS NEWSPAPER, 'DESIRED SCANDAL' FOLLOWS

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew No 243, 29 Jul 87 p 7

[Article by Moshe Horowitz: "Shim'on 'Asur and his War on the Kibbutzim"]

[Text] People like him can get this kind of attention only in small provincial towns and in development towns; in the big city they would pass unnoticed. Shim'on 'Asur could have made such a name for himself only in Qiryat Shemona.

The article that appeared at the end of the past week in the last issue of MABAT LAQIRYA, founded and edited by Shim'on 'Asur, managed to create the desired scandal. Shim'on 'Asur, with his knitted skullcap and beard, loves to be at the center of things and to have a hand in all the possible local storms, some of which may exist only in his imagination. Also, the accusatory article in question was based on some comprehensive regional program born somewhere in 'Asur's brain.

Kibbutz 'Amir, located a few kilometers east of Qiryat Shemona, manufactures and sells tricot shirts and sweaters. Recently, the kibbutz members have been considering opening a store to the public in an old amphitheater near the kibbutz. 'Asur connected this business to the kayak and canoe sailing organized by the kibbutzim Sede Nehemya and Kefar Blum. In his nightmares, the kibbutzim were already building huge shopping malls contrived to ruin the town. 'Asur also pictured the construction of a pitch-black road serving to divert thousands of tourists, travellers, and soldiers from passing through the town. His article described a program that none of the area's leaders has heard of, accompanied by explanations and notes. Thus, for example, the title warned: "The Final Solution: Closing Down Qiryat Shemona." The article itself spoke of "the destruction program of the kibbutzim," and added: "The kibbutzim, having taken over the entire wholesale trade of the town and invaded retail trade, have decided to take over all commercial and leisure activities, while destroying those of Qiryat Shemona," and "The terrorists that tried to destroy the town in the past, failed, but what they did not manage to do, the neighboring kibbutzim will." "Do they want to inherit from their own victim?" asked the article, then continued: "But if anyone is coming to kill you, you better beat him to it and kill him," and similar admonitions.

Shim'on 'Asur, who found religion at the age of 30, for years knocked about Qiryat Shemona disatisfied and restless. He could not find self-expression.

All his endeavors failed. On the eve of the 1983 elections for the local authorities he announced the establishment of ZALASH--Young People for Qiryat Shemona--as a candidate in the election. The masses did not break down his door. 'Asur pledged his support to the town hall winner, Likud candidate Professor 'Azran. Then came the turmoil of the Knesset elections. Once again, a big opportunity for people like 'Asur to put a little color in their drab lives. He attended the meetings of various parties, and at each one of them he requested the guest politician to reveal what he planned to do for Qiryat Shemona. When the head of Yahad, Ezer Weizman, came to town, 'Asur addressed him "as one graduate of the Real School to another." He then initiated the appearance of Lisa Perez on the Likud's election broadcasts. The Likud thought they had a winner there. When the newspapers found out the story about Lisa's mother, Ehud Olmert was furious with 'Asur, who had been responsible for the Likud broadcasts.

Prisoners of the Jewish underground will be pleased to hear that one of the first persons to come out in their support was Shim'on 'Asur. Shortly after their detention an announcement appeared in the town's weekly newspaper, calling for contributions in behalf of good friends in trouble. The announcement invited readers to send their donations to Post Office Box Number One in Qiryat Shemona. What aborted that fund raising campaign was that the post office box belonged to city hall.

'Asur, who at the time worked in the social services department of the city, was soon put in his place, and the underground prisoners had to look to other sources for help. Shortly after that, the mayor was once again required to deal with 'Asur's initiatives. That was after 'Asur had informed newsmen who were surveying the town that from then on he was the city hall's spokesman. But the appointment existed only in his head. He had always been attracted to the press and media, and he had taken a class in public relations. At that time he was not yet city spokesman. The job was given to him anyway, about a year later.

The many articles that he had written over the years for the older MEYDA SHEMONA had failed to evoke the desired sentiment. About 6 months ago, 'Asur did the deed. He established his own newspaper. One of the writers for the new paper, Yhi'el Za'afrani, had already mentioned Kibbutz Sede Nehemya's sailing projects in its pages. "Canoes, flies, and dogs," he had penned. There had been reactions, but only local ones, which was not enough. On another occasion, 'Asur used his newspaper as a vehicle for a campaign of signatures for a petition to totally exempt the inhabitants of Qiryat Shemona from income tax. He explained to the readers that in fact they were entitled to it. This also failed to elicit reactions from the outside. And so he came to the "final solution," "terrorists," and "if one is coming to kill you." This time 'Asur's newspaper decided to hit hard. The media did well by him, including a long report on Mabat.

The article about the plots of the kibbutzim was not signed. That perhaps made it easier for the mayor of Qiryat Shemona to say what he thought about its author. "He is mad", 'Azran said.

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12782

NEW PUMPING STATION AT DEAD SEA**Haifa INNOVATION in English No 141, Aug 87 pp 7-8****[Text]**

Sdom - The Dead Sea works will shortly build a new pumping station, in order to bring an adequate supply of brine to its extensive evaporation pans. Nearly \$ 12m. are to be invested in the venture.

This step has been made necessary by the continuing decline in the Dead Sea's level. During the last decade the lake's surface has dropped by 56cm (about 22 inches) a year, on the average; because of drought conditions, the drop has been even more rapid in recent years.

Many observers believe that this trend is the result of human intervention. During the last few decades most of the water in the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers has been diverted to irrigation projects in Israel and in Jordan, sharply reducing the volume of runoff that finally reaches the Dead Sea. Still, some scientists doubt whether that is the right or the only explanation: evidence found along the Dead Sea

shore indicates that the water level moves up and down periodically over the centuries.

Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that most of the Dead Sea's shallow southern basin is now high and dry. No open water is left anywhere south of the Lissan "tongue", still shown on most maps as a peninsula that nearly bisects the lake. The mineral rich brine is now only to be found in the large northern basin, which is up to 400 meters deep.

Some years ago the Dead Sea Works already set up a pumping station on the shore of that northern basin, and built a canal that connects it to its evaporation ponds and processing plant. Now those pumps are to be replaced, because their output no longer suffices for the company's increased production of potash, and mainly because of the dropping lake surface. The project is to be completed within twenty months.

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CSO: 4400/0268

HIZBALLAH STATEMENT DECLARES 'MILITARY OPTION' AGAINST 'U.S. REGIME'

Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 11 Jul 87 p 1

[Article: "Hizballah: True Salvation Is Through Decision Against America's Regime in Lebanon"]

[Text] "We hope for true salvation only by adopting the option of a military settlement against America's regime in Lebanon."

This is what Hizballah announced in the statement it issued and in which it held that continued vacillation toward the Maronite-Zionist escalation and disregard of the causes of the "starving out" could lead to irreparable loss.

The statement said:

"Muslims and oppressed people, members of the Hizballah community:

"In the midst of this delicate and sensitive stage through which the Lebanese scene is passing while waiting for the parties to settle their choices, the heroic Islamic confrontation with the Zionist foe and its agents in the valley of the martyrs in South Lebanon's Kafra-Yatir region comes to confirm by the blood of mujahidin that the correct option that will unify the oppressed, terrify the foe, and lead to liberating the land from the occupation and its agents is the option of Islamic resistance that our masses have embraced, affirming their readiness to sacrifice everything on its basis.

"As we salute the stand of these heroic mujahidin of Islam in Hizballah and their brothers and families in resistance, who in recent days showed unprecedented bravery and courage in confronting the Israelis and Lahd's forces, we call on everyone to imitate our people and translate their slogans and statements into practical actions in the holy war and heroism in the field.

"We assert that continued vacillation toward the Maronite-Zionist escalation and disregard of the abominable methods they are using to starve out and besiege our people and threaten its daily bread with the

aim of forcing it to bend could lead to irreparable loss on the political, military, or economic level.

"Therefore, we hope for true salvation only by adopting the option of a military settlement against America's regime in Lebanon and against the "Zionizing" Phalangist gangs domestically, precisely as commitment was made to the option of resistance against the Israeli foe itself.

"We insist that this option is not subject to the availability of resources and circumstances; it is subject to the availability of free volition and unequivocal determination.

"The political and organizational fronts and frameworks on behalf of which everyone on the side hostile to Maronism-Zionism is striving will remain meager in content and useless, as long as they do not adopt the option we have indicated.

"If they do so, our mujahidin will be in the vanguard of those who embark on overthrowing this American regime and its "Zionizing" tools. The time has come for all to announce that they have failed to achieve coexistence with such a regime and such gangs.

"Our people have begun to cry out from hunger. We will not allow the conspiracy to bleed our people dry and exhaust its power to resist. We want us all to begin serious and decisive action to destroy the conspiracy from its roots. 'O believers, if you help God, He will help you, and confirm your feet' [Qur'an 47:7]; and, 'If God helps you, none can overcome you' [Qur'an 3:160]."

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AL-HUSS EXPLORES CAUSE OF CRISIS, DEFINES SOLUTION

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 30 Jul 87 p 11

[Article by Dr Salim al-Huss: "Let Us Look for a Winner and a Loser"]

[Text] The events of 1958 ended with the slogan, "No winner and no loser," and since that time the belief has been prevalent that no struggle in Lebanon can end with a victor and a vanquished. The argument for this is that the fabric of Lebanese society, based on an extremely delicate sectarian equilibrium, does not allow a state of winner-and-loser to arise among the divisions of Lebanon's people without exposing the unity of the country to collapse, and hence exposing its existence to extinction.

Thus, any victory of one group over another in a struggle that breaks out among the Lebanese groups, especially if the struggle is tinged with a sectarian or quasi-sectarian coloration, remains unlikely, even impossible, as long as the decisionmaking controlling the will of the contending parties revolves in the sphere of preserving the unity of Lebanon--as long, that is, as the decisionmaking is committed to the line of maintaining Lebanon's existence as a country, society, and state.

This proposition may seem self-evident; even more, it may seem like explaining water after struggling with water. Were it not for the resolve to preserve Lebanon's existence, or if the decision required that Lebanon cease to exist, would the victory of one group over another be mentioned in any civil war that sweeps through this small country?

The answer is that victory in that case would by the very nature of the case be emptied of its meaning; for how could anyone be in any sense victorious over anyone else in Lebanon if Lebanon ceased to exist? After Lebanon disappeared, who would be the winner in a battle for Lebanon? Things may end with each group as firm master in its region and with its groups of people. The conflict, that is to say, may reach a conclusion wherein each group withdraws into itself, sits in its corner, and entrenches itself in its isolation; however, none of them will have triumphed or have won Lebanon, because Lebanon, which must be one or not exist at all, would in that case no longer be in existence as

a country, society, or state in which there might be victor and vanquished.

All this is correct: In the context of maintaining the unity of Lebanon, and hence its existence, there is no question of winner and loser among the Lebanese groups; and if Lebanon ceases to exist, it is self-evident that there can be no winner or loser. But the conflict is a reality whose existence cannot be denied. What is its explanation? Why the struggle, if the gate of victory is closed? Why do the parties embark upon a battle, if they know in advance that it will be futile?

Merely raising the question in this way suggests that there is more to the matter than what is self-evident. The problem involves points that may have critical significance: If we grant the futility of the conflict in Lebanon and the impossibility of its ending with one group's victory over another, does that mean there is no place for conflict--for any conflict--in Lebanon? More explicitly, does that mean there are no reasons, justifications, or causes for the struggle raging in Lebanon?

If the answer to this question is affirmative--that there is no room for conflict in this country, and that therefore the struggle transpiring on its stage is not in fact linked to any reasons, justifications, or causes--the matter is of great significance. This means, in fact, that Lebanon is a structure resting on bases subject to collapse at any moment without preliminaries or causes. A disease whose causes are unknown cannot be treated or prevented.

Does this mean, if it is true, that whatever we do and however the Lebanon war ends, there is no way to prevent a similar war, perhaps more violent and more catastrophic, from breaking out at some future time without intelligible cause?

We utterly discount this possibility, because it is virtually a death sentence for Lebanon, something we insist in all events upon ruling out of our account.

We attach no weight to the possibility that the Lebanon war broke out without a cause. In no society of the world does a war like the one Lebanon is witnessing flare up without known causes. Individual judgments and viewpoints on understanding the real reasons for the Lebanese war, explaining its causes, or assigning relative importance to each cause may differ, but what is indisputable is that war has its causes. One can therefore say that ending the war is possible by ending its causes. Also, the possible outbreak of a similar war in the future can be prevented by anticipating its causes.

If we grant this truth as self-evident, namely that the war has its causes, how can the conflict end unless its causes are treated? As for the statement that the conflict in Lebanon will not end with a winner and loser, does it not mean that it will end, under the best of

possibilities, only with a return to the circumstances that preceded the outbreak of the conflict, circumstances that in fact led to the eruption of the conflict? Does this mean, in other words, that the continuation of the conflict, uninterruptedly or intermittently, is an inescapable fate? If this is so; if, that is, we grant the inevitable linkage between Lebanon's existence and the conflict in Lebanon, does this not mean finally that this country is condemned to death: If there is a winner or a loser, that means the end of Lebanon's unity and hence of its existence and being; if there is no winner and no loser, that means a return to the circumstances that caused the conflict to break out and hence its renewal. The conflict would thus be a corollary to the existence of this country and therefore a virtual death sentence upon it.

The reply to part of what we are saying may be that the conflict in Lebanon indeed has its causes, but those causes are not internal. As some people have asserted, they are connected to the armed Palestinian presence that led to the establishment of a state within the state, which led to the explosion of the situation. Or as others have asserted, the causes are related to the Palestinian human presence, which led to disturbance of the delicate sectarian balance in the structure of Lebanese society. Thus, according to what both the former and the latter assert, the reasons for the crisis or its continuance will disappear with the disappearance of the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. In either case, the causes of the conflict are not internal. This argument is not satisfying; it offers no explanation for why the conflict is taking place between Lebanese groups or why it is accompanied by a broad and diverse contest concerning domestic subjects involving the regime, its activity, and its reform. We are under no compulsion to accept the empty battle slogans raised by the party that adheres tenaciously to the reality of a rotten political system, slogans based on obscuring the real causes of the conflict, that start from an oversimplification of the problem and then accuse others of dual loyalty or cast aspersions on their national loyalty in order to hold them responsible for all the troubles and liabilities of the period. Let us look for the real causes.

If it is true that the conflict is connected to the armed Palestinian presence, as they allege, there is a need to explain the growth of this phenomenon under the shadow of the Lebanese state. To the extent that this phenomenon was incompatible with the Lebanese national interest, as they portray it, and to the extent that its development contradicted the Lebanese national will, it indicates--if it indicates anything--the inability of the Lebanese state to prevent the emergence of this phenomenon before its growth, or it indicates its inability to oppose this phenomenon after it had grown. Thus, the phenomenon of an armed Palestinian presence is the other side of the phenomenon of the absence of a strong state, the latter phenomenon being one of internal defectiveness. Herein lies an indisputable refutation of any of the arguments that attribute the raging conflict exclusively to external

causes. The absence of a strong state is an indication of a serious internal defect in which we see a fundamental cause of the conflict whose scene Lebanon has been and still is. By this logic, we can say that the absence of a strong state is the real cause or one of the causes lying behind the conflict. The armed Palestinian presence and, one may add, the armed contention between political parties are results, by-products, or manifestations of that internal defect.

If one holds that the Palestinian human presence with its consequent disturbance of the Lebanese social structure is the source of the disease, this raises the same problem from another angle. To hold that a sectarian disturbance has arisen from the Palestinian human presence assumes the existence of an internal problem that manifests itself in the basing of society on a shaky or weak sectarian makeup. Had the phenomenon of the Palestinian presence been of another sort--had the problem, that is, been national, not sectarian, its provocative effect in this particular area, i.e. equilibrium within the social structure, would not have been limited to one specific sectarian group against another sectarian group. The problem would have been raised under cover of Lebanese unanimity or near unanimity. However, if unanimity or near unanimity about such a phenomenon was not given, and if separation or difference was an inescapable fate, does that not suggest that there was a basic defect that the Palestinian human presence served to stir up and perhaps to ignite but which it was not responsible for causing? Thus we find ourselves once again inquiring about the internal causes of the conflict taking place in the Lebanese arena.

From the preceding, we arrive at a number of conclusions:

First, the struggle taking place on Lebanese territory would not have broken out and developed were it not for its internal causes, even if various diverse and crucial external factors supervened and increased its violence and complexity, perhaps ultimately bringing it to a point apparently verging on intractability by the logic of purely internal treatments.

Second, treatment of the crisis by initially confronting its internal causes requires bringing about a settlement of the internal dispute between Lebanese groups. To the extent that this settlement works to the advantage of one group against another, it implies the formula of winner-and-loser among the Lebanese.

Third, the fabric of Lebanese society betrays an amount of delicacy and precariousness that does not allow one group of Lebanese to vanquish any other group without risking destruction of Lebanon's unity and hence its existence.

Fourth, the no-winner-no-loser formula will tend to return Lebanon to the circumstances that preceded and led to the great explosion. If we say no to a return to 1974, it is because we do not want to return to

1975, the year of the explosion. Furthermore, a return to the prewar circumstances means preserving the inherited system without adjustment or replacement, and this means giving victory to the group that obstinately holds to the outworn system at the cost of the group demanding reform. In other words, maintenance of the situation as it is means, in fact, ending the crisis with a formula under which there is a winner and a loser--the winner being whoever holds the keys of the existing system, the loser whoever is demanding reform of that system and fairness under it.

Therefore, it would appear at first glance from this train of argument that there is a solution to the Lebanese crisis and an end to the conflict raging in Lebanon only at the cost of Lebanon's unity and existence. This--God forbid it!--is a virtual death sentence to this country.

Of course, we utterly reject this conclusion and think it our duty to open another path to a remedy, one different from what this train of thought suggests.

In order that we not return to the prewar circumstances and hence to the circumstances that initiated the explosion, it is necessary to strive to obtain a winner-loser formula that would open the way to reform, change, and development.

Lest making one group of Lebanese winners over another group cause a split in Lebanon's unity and thus threaten its existence, the winner has to be from outside the circle of parties to the struggle. This would take place by seeking a formula to make the state itself and no one else winner over all the parties to the struggle. All the latter would be equal in defeat, and the legitimate government would be the only victor. In this way, there would be no victor and vanquished among the Lebanese to the detriment of the unity of the country, and peace would return among the fighting groups with an equilibrium of dissatisfaction among them in the shadow of a powerful state that guarantees the unity of the country and society and the elements of stability in it.

In order for the state to be powerful, it must be just. This is because a state does not exist through its force and strength, but only through the people's loyalty to it and the citizen's contentment with it. This occurs only if the state embodies an effective legitimate authority that disseminates among citizens justice and equality, the foundations of freedom, and a common life within the ranks of one people. There is no stability in a society ruled by an unjust government. Under it, the different groups of one people have divergent shares of benefits; the state seems to incline toward one group at the expense of another, and sooner or later this must generate reasons for friction between the groups and cause latent conflicts to explode, making the state a party to the conflict, weakening it, and draining its strength. Thus, one can say that a state is not powerful unless it is just. What is required is

not to make just any government the winner, but rather a powerful and just government whose power comes basically from its justice.

It remains to ask how one can reach the intended result of making the state winner over the other parties to the struggle, given knowledge that these other parties are in fact stronger in the field due to the circumstances of the war, are all benefiting from continuance of the war, and have an interest in supporting it. How shall we seek a solution from those who have no interest in it?

The answer lies in not seeking a solution from them, but in wresting one from them; hence the need for an external power, secured by international green lights, to help the legitimate government break the vicious circle fabricated by the parties to the armed conflict in what resembles joint and mutual interest. This is what is to be hoped from the Syrian role in helping to save Lebanon.

We end by saying: The causes of a war that ends with no winner and no loser remain unresolved. Therefore, the no-winner-no-loser formula for ending a civil war like the war in Lebanon is closer to a truce formula than to a peace formula.

If we seek peace and stability, we must seek to find a formula that treats the causes and seeds of the crisis; and in such a formula there must be a winner and a loswer.

Certainly, the Lebanese crisis will not end with a winner and loser among the Lebanese groups. It will end with a winner and many losers; the sole winner will be the powerful and just government; the losers will be all the parties to the Lebanese war.

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SULTAN STRESSES COMMITMENT TO ISLAM, PRAISES MILITARY MIGHT

Riyadh RIYADH DAILY in English 11 Aug 87 p 2

[Text] ABHA, Aug. 10 — Second Deputy Premier and Defense and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz reiterated today the determination of the Kingdom to adhere to the principles of Islam.

Prince Sultan, who patronized today the military parade organized by the Armed Forces units in the Southern Province, conveyed the greetings of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd to the personnel of the Armed Forces and praised the efforts being exerted by the state to develop the Armed Forces.

Prince Sultan highlighted the high standard reached by the sectors of the Armed Forces.

At the venue of the military parade, he was welcomed by the Commander of the Southern Province, Major General Abdullah Al-Tasan and a number of senior officers.

Al-Tasan praised the significant role played by Prince Sultan in promoting the Armed Forces.

The new installations of the infantry and artillery corps, inaugurated by Prince Sultan in the last two days, will add further to the great achievements accomplished by the Armed Forces, he added.

F-15 and F-5 jets participated in the military parade.

Later, Prince Sultan and the accompanying delegation made an inspection tour of King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushayt.

At the air base, he was welcomed by the acting commander of the base, Colonel Atiyyah Al-Zahrani and a number of officers.

Speaking on the occasion, Al-Zahrani noted that the Armed Forces sectors had acquired the most sophisticated military equipments.

"Our enemies used to cast doubts about the capability of the Saudi cadres in acquiring sophisticated aircraft technology. But thanks to Almighty God, the Saudi cadres are now capable of managing all kinds of planes including Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) planes," he pointed out.

"Now our air space is in full control by our brave men," he added.

He noted that the Saudi Armed Forces were capable of conducting swift strategic movements and provide comprehensive air cover.

Al-Zahrani pointed out that work was currently under way on the project of aircraft hangars at King Khaled Air Base.

He said, work was also under way to implement the project of the shield of peace at the air base.

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FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES BALANCING BUDGET

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 18 Jul 87 p 37

[Article by Fath al-Rahman Mahjub]

[Text] The government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi is about to approve a policy decision in the Constituent Assembly. Also, the Constituent Assembly has put together a general budget program for the government, which covers the period from 1 July 1987 to the end of June 1988. General, self-generated revenues in the current budget total 3905.5 million Sudanese pounds compared to 2806.3 million Sudanese pounds in the previous fiscal year (July 1986-June 1987), while general expenditures total 6790.6 million Sudanese pounds compared to 5665.5 million pounds in the previous year. This year's budget deficit is 2885.1 million Sudanese pounds, compared to last year's 2859.2 million Sudanese pounds.

While presenting the budget program to the parliamentary council for its decision, Finance Minister Dr Bashir 'Umar indicated that the only failure connected with last year's budget had to do with revenues and the doubling of commodities grants and loans estimated at 1952 million Sudanese pounds, or \$500 million, whereas their yield did not exceed 766.4 million Sudanese pounds, or \$229.1 million. The Minister of Finance attributed this to a reduction in foreign aid because of Sudan's failure to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund [IMF]. Also, the expatriates' savings during the previous budget period fell short of the estimated \$300 million, and added no more than \$80 million to the budget.

The new budget will be balanced as follows: using commodity loans and financial aid in the amount of approximately 1807 million Sudanese pounds; using payments from institutions and funds in the amount of 248.2 million Sudanese pounds; financing development projects in the amount of 572.3 million; and using funds available to self-financing units in the amount of 157.7 million. This means that the agreement with the IMF is still suspended. Dr Bashir 'Umar indicated that Sudan has called for a meeting of African finance ministers in Khartoum in mid-August to examine topics related to African foreign debts, the attainment of a unified African position on financial issues, and preparations for the annual joint meeting with the IMF and the World Bank to be held in late September in Washington. Within this context, the minister announced that Sudan's foreign debt arrears requiring

payment totalled \$2.6 billion at this year's halfway mark, in addition to its current debts totalling \$781.6 million. Despite Sudan's reassuring the world that it believes in the principle of honoring one's debts, the country's ability to do so is not at hand.

Sudan's budget expenditures for this year include current expenditures totalling 4259.7 million Sudanese pounds, development expenditures totalling 1533 million (compared to 1380.8 million Sudanese pounds in the previous year), and investment expenditures totalling 25 million. Regional development allocations increased by 65 percent over those of the previous year. Development expenditures for this year include 880 million Sudanese pounds in local currency, and the equivalent of 653 million Sudanese pounds in foreign currency. These funds were in turn distributed to central (public sector) financing units, which were allocated 803.5 million Sudanese pounds in local currency and the equivalent of 572.2 million Sudanese pounds in foreign currency, and to self-financing units (mixed, private and cooperative sectors), which were allocated 79 million Sudanese pounds in local currency and the equivalent of 81.1 million Sudanese pounds in foreign currency.

In light of the new budget program, oil prices were fixed in different parts of the country on the condition that the general treasury cover the difference in price, exempt imported seed and pesticides from customs duties, and double the capital of the Sudanese Agricultural Bank from 50 million Sudanese pounds to 100 million. These measures were taken to support agricultural production in the countryside. Also, the tax on cigarettes was doubled, and a temporary tax of 5 percent--designated the defense and security tax--was levied on all imports excluding exceptions in the draft legislation pertaining to this tax, and including a tax on luxury items. In addition, the general treasury will finance the import of necessary commodities by allocating a fixed reserve not to exceed 30 million Sudanese pounds, in order to ensure that such commodities are available in the market-place.

The disbursement for services was increased within the new budget with emphasis on security services. The latter received 31.7 percent of all general expenditures, of which 940 million Sudanese pounds went to the armed forces. The consolidated national debt totalled 1853.8 million Sudanese pounds, exceeding the previous figure by 259.1 million Sudanese pounds, of which 262 million Sudanese pounds were used to subsidize flour and wheat, 113 million were used to subsidize sugar, 250 million were used to repay loans and reduce the foreign debt, and 1149.8 million were allocated to compensate for deficits in the budgets of regional governments. The budgets of regional governments total 1338.8 million Sudanese pounds. The regions contribute 187 million Sudanese pounds from their own revenues to this figure. The central government thus has control over 86.6 percent of these budgets.

National budget figures show that general revenues were 20 percent higher than the previous year's estimates, and that regional revenues also increased by 44.1 percent. The agricultural economy registered considerable growth during the implementation of the previous year's (July 1986-June 1987) budget; a growth rate of approximately 12 percent was achieved during a single year (the minister mentioned that this growth was unprecedented). This led in turn to

an approximately 7.5 percent increase in local production in the national economy during the 1984-85 budget period. The previous budget period witnessed the export of durra following a 4-year cessation of durra exports. More than 300,000 tons were sold to European markets. A total of 600,000 tons were produced and marketed during last year's season. At the same time, a strategic durra reserve has been stored to avert the danger of famine.

13286

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SPLA CARRIES SUDANESE BROADCASTING WORKERS STRIKE DEMANDS

EA032147 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 3 Aug 87

[Excerpt] SPLA sources have furnished Radio SPLA with the list of demands that had been put to the Khartoum government by a number of public corporations which went on strike as from 20th July 1987, to back these demands. According to our sources, the broadcasting unions of Radio Omdurman and television corporations went on strike 20th July 1987 demanding:

1. -- Implementation of their financial circular and improvement of poor conditions;
2. -- The adoption of the radio and television act to avoid interference by the ruling parties in matters pertaining to these important public institutions;
3. -- Dismissal of the general manager, who was suspended and investigated following the March-April [1985] popular uprising on charges of corruption, but later reinstated because of pressure from one of the ruling parties;
4. -- The complete purge of elements loyal to the defunct May regime from the corporation;
5. -- Closing down of the illegal and unlicensed private Ummah radio broadcasting station that broadcasts from the Ummah party premises in Omdurman to the capital.

/12624
CSO: 4500/130

'ALI NASIR, SALIM SALIH DESCRIBE EXPERIENCE IN YEMEN**Ousted Leader Relates Facts**

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 15-21 Aug 87 pp 17-21

[Interview with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad by Hamidah Na'na': "Untold Chapters of Yemen's History Related in Interviews with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and Salim Salih; How al-Ghashmi was Killed and Why Salmin Was Executed;" in Addis Ababa; date of interview not specified]

[Text] AL-TADAMUN resumes publication of a series of investigative reports from Aden, San'a' and Addis Ababa. These reports by fellow journalist Hamidah Na'na' which have to do with developments in south Yemen and with the hidden sequels to them, provide indicators of the future that awaits this part of the Arab homeland. In this issue AL-TADAMUN interviews former president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and Mr Salim Salih, the assistant secretary general of the ruling party in Aden. The two men reveal unknown details about the government's experience in south Yemen. They talk about the effects that developments of this experience have had on conditions in the north, and they show how conflict between colleagues in Aden led to the death and execution of leaders. It is worth noting that these articles will soon be published in installments in one of AL-TADAMUN's reports.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad: "Salih Muslih Was behind the Booby-trapped Attache Case and Salim Rabi' Was the Scapegoat."

'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the former president of south Yemen, lives in San'a', Damascus and Addis Ababa. As he travels between these three capital cities, he carries with him the concerns of his military and civilian supporters who joined him outside Yemen.

What may be called the case of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is almost unique in the history of Arab political coups. He was the first head of state who lost a battle and managed to get out of the country with party cadres, military personnel and ordinary civilians. It was the first time something like that had happened since the language of "first communiques," "corrective movements," "uprisings," or quite simply coups d'etat and struggles over power had become familiar in the Arab world's capital cities. Here is the text of the interview I conducted with him in Addis Ababa. In it 'Ali Nasir Muhammad reveals a few secrets and unknown details about the experience in south Yemen.

[Question] It's been almost 1 year and a half since the incidents in Aden. Now that you have been living in exile for 1 and a half years, it is assumed that you now know many things which the government had not permitted you to find out about. Can you tell us what living in exile has been like?

'Ali Nasir Muhammad laughed and shook his head as though he meant to say no.

[Answer] I was talking about that subject today with some of my companions. I would like to tell you that I learned a lot from this experience. When I was in power in Aden, the people were the source of my strength. Today, the people are still the source of my strength even though I'm living far away from them. Arab and international public opinion sympathetic to our cause is also a source of strength. I understood many things when I was out of power: I found out the truth about people, and I gained a better understanding of people's essential nature. In the realm of politics I discovered that the policy I adopted in the past with the countries of the region yielded results. It had the effect of generating sympathy for our cause among political leaders in the north and among leaders in other countries as well. Honest relations with the Arab world that are based on principles are yielding results, and unambiguous relations with Ethiopia that are based on principles are also still yielding results. I discovered many things. I used to believe, for example, that some forces would stand by us, but they did not. And those elements that I believed would let us down stood by our side. Last year's journey taught me to be more patient and more steadfast; I became more understanding about people and their essential nature, and I am now accustomed to doing more and persevering more for the cause of the Yemeni people.

After the incidents I tried to re-read the history of Yemen, starting from the days that preceded the birth of Christ. I learned a lot from what I read. When I was in power, the circumstances of my job did not allow me to have the time I needed to concentrate on a methodological and ongoing reading program, even though I tried as hard as I could to make time for reading. My reading of Yemeni history led me to think about writing the history of our experience and our national movement. I have thus recorded the most important incidents we experienced till 1981. And since 1981, when I became president, I have been keeping a daily journal, and I have also been very careful about preserving documents which are related to events. I don't believe that my colleagues were interested in this matter; none of them kept a journal. After the incidents I took the trouble to record the developments we were going through, and I tried to explain our cause to Arab and international public opinion. I gave more interviews last year than I gave when I was in power.

The Physical Elimination of People

[Question] The Yemeni experiment after independence started out with the physical elimination of people. Please allow me to list names. Faysal 'Abd-al-Latif al-Sha'bi who had served as the head of Yemen's first post independence government was killed in prison; he was one of the leaders of the Arab Nationalists' Movement and had fought in the war of liberation. Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, the second man to head Yemen's government, was removed from office and accused of being a traitor and a reactionary. Someone was sent to Cairo to get rid of him there. Qahtan al-Sha'bi, the first president of your country,

died in prison. Muhammad Salih Muti', who had been accused of high treason, was assassinated. Then we had the distressing incidents of 13 January.

Why are your disputes settled in this bloodthirsty manner?

[Answer] It is my judgment that part of the conflict we experienced had nothing to do with the revolution's method or its political and intellectual course. Some of the conflicts were struggles over power; others had to do with the level of people's awareness and with the people's backward character. Undoubtedly, some of the conflicts had to do with different points of view about development and the absence of democracy. Those conflicts interfered with efforts to expand the base of actual participation in government. Some of the conflicts had to do with our country's strategic location. In general, internal conflicts cannot be isolated from the positions taken by countries in the region and in the rest of the world as well. However, the interconnectedness of these factors was not accompanied by sufficient awareness on the part of political leaders to do what was done in Cuba, for example, to preserve those who had struggled and fought for the cause. After the victory of the revolution in Cuba, Fidel Castro managed to preserve the unity of those who had struggled for the revolution. Consequently, he was able to preserve the unity of his people and keep his experiment on track. I recall that he talked with me at length about how he had handled this matter. After victory, educational courses were organized for a number of the Cuban Revolution's leaders who had struggled and fought for independence and for the revolution but whose cultural and educational standards were low. These courses were made available to raise the standard of those leaders' education and enhance their theoretical awareness. Many people completed these courses.

On the eve of independence we found ourselves in Yemen in a situation similar to that which had existed in Cuba. People who had fought in our National Front lacked theoretical education. But instead of receiving attention that would improve their standards before they were given the responsibilities of managing power and establishing the experience, these people were forced into positions of responsibility without any preparation. The real goal was to burn them out by forcing them to confront the consequences of a colonialist era which had lasted 129 years. They were forced to deal with that situation without the proper tools they needed to do the job. It is unfortunate that for some leaders the idea of "burning people out" so they can be replaced by others had become a strategy. When I was serving as governor of the islands and of Lahaj immediately after independence, I remember being asked to submit my resignation because "our time had not come yet." I was told that Qahtan and his group of people had to be given time until crises burned them out. I was told that our turn would come after they prove their inability to deal with problems, but I would have nothing to do with this way of thinking because I believed that after independence our country needed the efforts of all of us.

[Question] Why did they want to have Qahtan and his group of people burn out? What were the charges against them, or what were the arguments for that?

[Answer] The prevalent argument was that Qahtan represented the right.

[Question] Was that true?

[Answer] We disagreed with some of Qahtan's positions and efforts. As far as building an army was concerned, for example, Qahtan thought that the army should stay as it was. He wanted to keep the military personnel who had served in the army before independence. But there was another opinion whose proponents thought that all those people should be removed from the army. People who subscribed to that opinion thought the army should be disbanded and a popular army organized. That was one point, for example, about which there was disagreement. There were many other issues which came up after independence, and disagreements about them led to a series of conflicts. In my judgment too many people who had fought for the revolution were sacrificed without cause. Not all those who were eliminated and killed were agents and reactionaries. After 1980 consideration and respect were restored to many of those who had fought for the revolution.

[Question] Although the charge of being a member of the right wing has been leveled against Qahtan al-Sha'bi, it is a well-known historic fact that nationalization decrees were drafted when he was in office.

[Answer] That is true. Preparations for nationalization were made when Qahtan was in office not afterwards. But the disputes and the struggle for power brought those preparations to a standstill and interfered with the execution of the law because those who opposed Qahtan believed that if the Nationalization Act were issued while he was in power, Qahtan would become more popular and his regime would be firmly established. The task force which had been charged by Qahtan with the task of following up on the implementation of the Nationalization Act was headed by Mahmud 'Ashish, who was then minister of finance. A number of Arab and Yemeni experts served on that task force, and I recall that Muhammad Salman Hasan, who I believe is an Iraqi citizen, also served on that task force.

[Question] Qahtan was placed under mandatory house arrest, but Faysal 'Abd-al-Latif al-Sha'bi was killed in prison. Why was he killed?

[Answer] Faysal 'Abd-al-Latif was killed under very mysterious circumstances. He did not oppose socialist decrees; he did not oppose nationalization decrees; and he did not oppose agrarian reform. It was his point of view that we should be deliberate and that we should not try to cut corners. He might have stayed in prison and he might have been released later, as was the case with a number of those who had fought for the cause. Unfortunately, however, he was killed, and principles had nothing to do with the reasons why he was killed.

[Question] After that Muhammad 'Ali Haytham resigned, and an attempt to get rid of him was made in Cairo.

[Answer] Muhammad 'Ali Haytham resigned and went to Moscow to study. Then he left Moscow and went to Cairo where he sought political asylum. The attempt to get rid of him in Cairo was a mistake. After 1980 we looked for another method we could use to deal with matters. We were convinced that killing people was not the proper way for handling disputes.

Why Was Salmin Executed?

[Question] Let's go back to the question of Salmin's elimination and your observation about his experience. All of you contributed to the negative as well

as the positive aspects of that period when Salmin was in power. Why did he alone pay the price for the negative aspects?

[Answer] Quite honestly, Salmin was a leader. Regardless of his negative qualities, he had many positive ones. He handled matters in his own way, and that was why he was accused of being an autocrat. But Salmin resorted to autocratic methods and initiatives because he was surrounded by a large vacuum. 'Abd-al-Fattah, who was the secretary general of the party, that is, the number one man, was not doing his job. Salmin, who was the assistant secretary general of the party and the head of state had to fill this vacuum. As a result, 'Abd-al-Fattah lived in total isolation, and he felt that Salmin had stripped him of all his powers. We are all responsible for many of the negative characteristics of that period when Salmin was in power.

[Question] How was Salmin eliminated after his resignation?

[Answer] Salmin's elimination and the reasons for it had to do with the struggle for power. His elimination was directly related to the death of Ahmad al-Ghashmi, president of north Yemen. Salmin was a good and honest man. Salih Muslih, who was then minister of interior, managed to convince him that killing al-Ghashmi would provide an opportunity for sectors in north Yemen's army which support the south to advance toward the capital, seize power, and achieve unity. Salih Muslih thus arranged to have a booby-trapped attache case sent to San'a' with one of his relatives whose name is al-Hajj Tafarish. Salmin knew what was in the attache case. Salih Muslih is a man who is not to be trusted. After supporting Qahtan al-Sha'bi, he betrayed him. Then he joined Salmin, but he turned against him too after the failure of the operation which he had proposed and which was to achieve unity in this strange manner. Salih Muslih was supporting me till the very last moment, but then he turned against me.

Anyway, let's go back to the question of Salmin. The second day after al-Ghashmi's assassination, we held a meeting of the Political Office, and the Central Committee was invited to that meeting. Salmin was in an unenviable position, and personally, it hurt me very much to see him in such a situation because we had a very close personal relationship. Although our methods differed, those differences did not affect our friendship. He used to visit me at least three or four times a week either at home or in the office. After the meeting of the Political Office, on the evening of al-Ghashmi's assassination, we had left the meeting together and had gone to my office. Salmin asked me, "What do we do now?" That was a difficult question because there weren't many things we could do. I sympathized with him, but such a grievous incident could not be ignored. A scapegoat had to be found and the party who was responsible for what happened had to be identified. I told him, "Since matters have gone that far, I can assume responsibility for what happened. Let's announce that as prime minister I was behind the plan. I would then resign and my resignation would be the scapegoat. This will enable us to contain what happened and deal with it."

But Salmin was adamant. "You will not be the scapegoat. If anyone has to assume responsibility for what happened, let that be me."

Afterwards, Salih Muslih came along and suggested that Salmin's resignation would solve the problem. He convinced the Political Office that he could persuade Salmin to resign. We met, and at 10:30 Salih came with Salmin's resignation. It is said that the two men talked before Salmin wrote his letter of resignation, and Salmin accused Salih Muslih of standing behind the operation and turning against him afterwards. After resigning Salmin asked that he turn himself over to 'Ali 'Antar, and he did. We were meeting in al-Ma'ashiq, and I remember very well Salim al-Bayd turning to me and saying, "Abu Jamal, we have to kill Salmin because if we don't, he will do to us what Numayri did." 'Ali 'Antar agreed that Salmin was to be executed, but ibn Husayn objected. The group later decided to execute Salmin, and three officers were charged with the task of executing him. Our meeting was still in progress when the execution was carried out, and one officer came to inform us.

'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il asked, "Where did you shoot him?"

The officer replied, "In the head and the heart."

'Abd-al-Fattah asked, "Is he still moving?"

I could no longer contain myself, so I told 'Abd-al-Fattah, "You should be ashamed to ask such a question. The officer is telling you that they shot him in the head and in the heart. How can you ask if he is still alive?"

Anyway, I assumed the responsibility of head of state after Salmin's death. It was during that time that a constitutional amendment to unify the powers so as to avoid conflict in the country was proposed. 'Abd-al-Fattah sent me more than one delegation to persuade me to amend the constitution. But that meant that one person could serve as secretary general of the party and as head of state. I was not interested in the position of head of state, and I told 'Abd-al-Fattah that quite openly. But I also told him, "This is a tremendous responsibility. Salmin left behind a tremendous vacuum. You have to come out of your isolation and take action to establish relationships with the people and with institutions." A party congress was held, and elections for the Supreme People's Assembly were held. I served as chairman of the Elections Committee. 'Abd-al-Fattah was a candidate in the district of (Crater), and he was running against Sayyad. Sayyad won and 'Abd-al-Fattah lost, and we had to forge the election results. Weeks after the congress 'Abd-al-Fattah summoned Fadl Muhsin 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Qadir, Abu Bakr Badhib, Salim Salih, and Qamatah, and he told them, "We want to organize a party within the party and call it the Nucleus Party. Abu Bakr Badhib and 'Abd-al-Ghani objected to that idea and said, "How can you ask us to organize a party within the party, when we've just come out of a party congress?" It was 'Abd-al-Fattah who was behind that idea. But then 'Abd-al-Fattah did the same thing when another group that consisted of Muhsin, Qamatah, 'Abd-al-'Aziz and others met in Hungary. That group held a meeting to organize a party within the party. While we were trying to maintain the party's unity and restore consideration and respect to those who had fought for the revolution, they were trying to break up the party and create pockets of opposition within it.

[Question] But why was Salmin the only one to pay the price for al-Ghashmi's death even though, as you say, Salih Muslih was the one who had planned the operation? Wasn't it logical that he too pay the price for that operation?

[Answer] Salih Muslih is one of the smartest and most capable conspirators I know who can extricate himself from a conspiracy in which he was involved. He persuaded the Political Office and the Central Committee that he was merely carrying out Salmin's request when Salmin was head of state. He also convinced them that he had spared the country from bloodbaths when he persuaded Salmin to resign. The truth of the matter is that he was the one who had planned and carried out these operations. Both he and Jarallah 'Umar had masterminded the conspiracy that was behind the incidents of 13 January.

[Question] Was your foreign policy, specifically your relationship with the Soviet Union, one of the reasons for the bloody conflicts that have been part of your experience after independence?

[Answer] We had no disagreements over foreign policy, specifically over relations with the Soviet Union. There were no such disagreements under Qahtan, under Salmin, under 'Abd-al-Fattah, or when I was in office.

[Question] What is the story of the treaty you signed with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The friendship treaty we signed with the Soviet Union was the culmination of the relationship we've had with that country for many years before the treaty was signed. Nothing changed after the treaty was signed. Al-Imam Yahya signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets. Before our treaty was signed, similar treaties were signed with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and north Yemen. The treaty was valid for 20 years, and it was renewed for another 20 years in 1984. What I'm trying to say is that we were not the only ones who signed a treaty with the Soviets.

[Question] It's been said that you gave the Soviets bases on the island of Sumatra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden. It's also been said that you gave them an air base in the port of Aden and in al-Makla and that you also gave them other facilities on Yemeni soil. Is that true?

[Answer] That is not true. Actually, there are no permanent or mobile Soviet bases on our territory, but the Soviets did get facilities to allow them to supply their vessels and transit our waterways.

[Question] Now that I got to know you better and had a chance to hear about your personal history, I've come to realize that as a person you are not violent at all. How did matters become so violent on 13 January?

[Answer] They are the ones who are responsible for bringing the situation to a head. They are the ones who brought about the violence. The best evidence of that is what 'Ali 'Antar said to a few Arab colleagues. He told them, "We will kill 'Ali Nasir tomorrow during the meeting of the Political Office." They wanted to get rid of me, but I discovered the plot on New Year's Eve. Nevertheless, I have always said that I was willing to talk even if there were only a five percent chance that we could have a dialogue. The situation could have come to a head in 1984 or 1985 as a result of the blocs, conflicts and dissemination of weapons, but I was always trying to keep that from happening because I was concerned about the party's and the country's unity, and I wanted to spare the country from disasters.

[Question] Don't you believe that you were very idealistic in dealing with matters? Your minister of interior, Ahmad Musa'id, told me that you had a lot of information about the dissemination of weapons after April 1985, and the situation then was explosive and likely to come to a head at any moment. Why didn't you do something about it and try to collect those weapons? Why didn't you take decisive measures to prevent the battle?

[Answer] We were hoping we could have a dialogue, and we were hoping we would gain more time. We were hoping that a dialogue would enable us to set forth a democratic alternative to end the conflict. Collecting weapons would have involved us in a battle from whose consequences I was hoping I could spare the country. After the congress I made a major effort with 'Ali 'Antar and 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, who are the principal players in the conflict, and I also made a major effort with Salih Muslih and 'Ali Salim al-Bayd. I took al-Bayd with me to Sofia and Addis Ababa, and we talked at length about a formula to end the conflict. Al-Bayd wanted to become prime minister, and he wanted 'Ali 'Antar to serve as the party's assistant secretary general. I was totally convinced that distributing power in this manner would not solve the problem and that it would rather lead to new conflicts. We had organized a government that was headed by Haydar al-'Attas, and it was my opinion that al-'Attas should be given an opportunity to do his job. But al-Bayd insisted that he replace al-'Attas who had been the head of government for less than 10 months. Al-Bayd was not qualified for that position: he is not a member of the People's Assembly, and it would have been difficult to hold new elections at that time. The party's bylaws also do not provide for the position of an assistant secretary general. That is why it was difficult to accept the suggestions they made. It was then suggested that Salim Salih become secretary of foreign relations instead of 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Qadir who was then serving in the very important position of secretary of the Ideology Department. But it was my opinion that no changes be made for 1 year until these disputes settled down. Changes would then be made under normal conditions. I returned to Aden from my trip to Sofia and Addis Ababa and found that disputes over nothing more than the distribution of government positions had become quite severe.

[Question] What was the Soviets' attitude toward your disputes? They most certainly were aware of what was going on, weren't they?

[Answer] The Soviets advised the other party to be reasonable. They advised us to preserve the party's and the people's unity, and they advised us to guard and protect the experiment. The last Soviet delegation that visited Aden before the incidents met with 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il. The chairman of that delegation summarized the situation by saying, "'Abd-al-Fattah is totally and completely preoccupied with himself." The Soviets knew about the disputes, and they advised reason. What more can allies do?

[Question] There is one question that you've never answered in all your interviews. Either you did not respond to that question or you responded to it in a diplomatic manner. That question has to do with the real reasons why 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il came back from Moscow. Who was behind his return from Moscow? Were the Soviets behind it? Did it have something to do with establishing domestic balances? Or were there other reasons for his return?

[Answer] 'Abd-al-Fattah came back as a result of a decision made by the Political Office. I had the feeling that he would be used for a while to bring matters to a head against the country's legitimate leaders. Then, he would be disposed of. This is because those who called for his return were against him. Some of them used to say, "I am willing to form an alliance with 'Abd-al-Fattah against the government because he is weak and has no position." Some of them told me that more than once. They used to say, "We will use him against you." They needed a front because 'Ali 'Antar and al-Bayd were unacceptable inside the country and abroad. Thus, 'Abd-al-Fattah was used as a front in the conflict against me. He wanted to return to power, and he believed that he could use 'Ali 'Antar and rely on his strength to get rid of me. He believed he could then settle his accounts with 'Ali 'Antar and 'Ali Salim al-Bayd. I've known that since 1980. When 'Abd-al-Fattah was sent out of the country, they used to say, "It is now over for 'Abd-al-Fattah, and we must now get rid of 'Ali Nasir. I confronted them with that more than once, and I used to say, "The country needs stability after all the bloodbaths we have had. We have to pay attention to building the country." However, their aspirations for power made them unable to see anything else.

[Question] Do you think your experiment is still viable after the incidents of 13 January? Can it become the basis for the future development of a democratic Yemen?

[Answer] There is nothing wrong with the experiment itself, which has been going on since independence, but there was something wrong with our method, our practice and the nature of society's makeup which we inherited from colonialism. All this interfered with our ability to accomplish what we had hoped to accomplish. Our case is not unique in the Third World. The difficulties and obstacles we faced and which led to violence were the same ones that many socialist experiments in Africa and Asia faced. After what happened it is easy to question our experiment, although any deliberate study of our economic and social achievements and of the institutions we created would affirm that the experiment was a proper one. Such a study would affirm that questioning our experiment in the heat of those highly emotional incidents was grossly unfair. Unfortunately, the question is always asked about whether or not there is any contradiction in a Third World country between the construction and development experience and the question of democracy. The two matters are often set forth as though they were mutually exclusive. During the past 5 years we tried to present real evidence that that was not the case. We managed to maintain our socialist course and our development efforts; we gave people their democratic liberties; and we guaranteed their rights in accordance with the law and the constitution. We managed to maintain our course on socialism and development, and we gave people the freedom to express themselves in the popular and professional media and through cultural organizations as well. No one was arrested because of his opinions. Quite the contrary, Democratic Yemen became a refuge to many of those who were being persecuted in other countries because of their opinions. That is why when we talk today about going back to Aden, we don't mean using the power of the sword to do that. We want to go back to consolidate more democratic liberties for people and to strengthen the country's security. We want to provide stability for citizens because that would mean security and stability in the region in general.

When we talk about going back to Aden, we are not just talking about the return of members of the Yemeni Socialist Party who were driven out of their homes, but we are talking about the return of all honorable nationalist Yemenis who are concerned about our sovereignty and national independence and who want to ensure our people's and our country's progress.

[Question] But you are being accused of attempting to divert the experiment from its socialist course. This sidetracking attempt started with a group of economic measures which were believed to be the first step to sidetracking the experiment in Democratic Yemen and changing the country's international alliances.

[Answer] I find such accusations preposterous. All the measures that were taken were measures that were approved by the party. Those who are accusing me today of sidetracking the experiment are the same people who approved the political report and the directions of the development plan. They are also the same people who approved the documents of the General Third Congress. If a diversion did really take place, why didn't they revise the laws after the incidents of 13 January 1986? So far, they have made no changes in the domestic or foreign policy I was following. It would be easier and far more truthful for them to say that their conflict with me was one over positions of power and not over the course of the experiment. Was I sidetracking the experiment with our position on national capital and our effort to encourage expatriates to send money to their country instead of keeping their funds in foreign banks? Was I sidetracking the experiment when I encouraged farmers to use their own capital to purchase pumps so we could meet the needs of the local market instead of importing what we need from abroad? I don't think so. We managed to assemble national capital and organize its contribution to the development process in accordance with the investment law that we had all looked into, agreed to and approved of. In a country which, like ours, is hoping to build a socialist system, such steps are essential under such circumstances; they are required by objective circumstances.

I don't know what it is they wanted when they say that I tried to sidetrack the experiment. Is normalizing relations with the countries of the region on the basis of respecting each other's sovereignty a deviation from the party's principles? Is developing relations with the northern half of our country to achieve unity by peaceful means and ensure the country's security and progress a departure from the course of the experiment? Is developing relations with socialist countries and strengthening those relations in all areas a departure from our course? Is spreading democracy and liberties in our country a departure from the course? Talking about departure from the course is the excuse we use to justify our conflicts, and that is easy.

[Question] It is being said that you encouraged individuals with capital at the expense of state owned capital and that you stimulated private farms at the expense of state farms. From their point of view that damages the socialist experiment.

[Answer] In the 5 years during which I was directly in charge the state's farms were preserved, and their problems were solved. Cooperatives were also developed. But farmers who had the means were encouraged to buy pumps, dig

wells, market products, and purchase tractors, especially since the state did not have sufficient means to do that. As a result, we were able to provide primary materials in the market: we were able to provide potatoes, onions, and garlic, and all of that used to be imported from abroad. Then we encouraged expatriates to build homes. In the past our situation was such that as a state we were not able to build homes, and we did not allow citizens to build or import the materials that are necessary to do that. Hundreds of homes were built after that decision was made, and we were able to solve the housing problem. Most of the positive policies which were consolidated in recent years are now being destroyed. Personnel are being driven away, and there is an inability to make decisions. We had crises, and we tried to deal with them. Having crises is nothing to be ashamed of because even the wealthiest countries have them. It is the failure to solve those crises that is shameful.

I heard the phrase, deviate from the course, mentioned many times in their statements, and I wonder who should accuse whom of that? Who should accuse whom of deviating from the socialist experiment? Was 'Ali 'Antar more careful about the course of the experiment and more aware of it than I was? Building a socialist system in a poor country whose resources are few requires much innovation and flexibility. It requires an understanding of all the contradictions that exist in the real world, but it does not require jumping on a bandwagon of meaningless slogans. Our experiment was facing many challenges, and the simplest of them was being surrounded by countries where the standard of living is very high. Yemeni expatriates live in those countries, and they compare life there with life in Yemen as they travel back and forth. We had to be very well aware of that, so we tried to make it attractive for expatriates to invest their capital in development. Did the rebels who are in Aden today want us to keep the expatriate's capital out of the country and instead borrow money from the IBRD and from other countries? Did they want us to bear the burden of servicing those debts? On the day the incidents occurred, the 13th of January 1986, Yemen's debts did not exceed 1 billion dollars, and that has been the extent of our indebtedness since independence. Nevertheless, the debts or the loans we assumed to build the country did not constitute any restrictions on our political directions or on the course of our experiment.

I believe that during your recent visit to Aden you heard more than enough about the Aden Hotel. You've been told that it is a luxurious place and a stronghold for the bourgeoisie. Those who told you that wasted their time and yours. Although I do not wish to talk about this subject because it is a secondary subject, let me say that this was nothing more than building a respectable hotel in a capital city that receives hundreds of delegations. But it became the subject of competition and conflict. The total cost for building that hotel did not exceed 7 million pounds, and that money was offered to us as loans and assistance from some institutions and banks. Later, when we paid back the loans, we benefited from the increase in the value of the dollar and the decline in the value of the French franc.

[Question] It has been noticed that Ethiopia is the only socialist country that supports you. What are the implications of that position?

[Answer] Ethiopia was the first country to propose national reconciliation in April 1986. The Ethiopians' call for national reconciliation stemmed from their

concern for the unity of the party and the people. The Ethiopians want to preserve their relations with the regime in Democratic Yemen. Ethiopia is interested in Yemen's stability because any tension there would have a negative effect on the countries in the region including those in the Horn of Africa and those that are located on the Red Sea. My personal relationship with Mengistu is being talked about, but I believe that our relationship with Ethiopia goes beyond being a personal relationship between me and Mengistu. It is a relationship with the Yemeni Revolution. It is a relationship based on principle that may not be viewed from a narrow perspective. Aden is the key to security and stability in the region. That is why we notice that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih is concerned about this security and about the unity of the two peoples.

[Question] You have been talking about national reconciliation for 1 year and 3 months and proposing the party's bylaws as a foundation for this reconciliation. However, there has been no response from Aden to any of these reconciliation efforts. Are you still hoping for a political solution?

[Answer] People in the south know that [those who are now in power in Aden] are responsible for turning down the reconciliation and rejecting a solution to the crisis. They rejected all mediation efforts: those that came from the north, from Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, the Soviet Union and Cuba. They are not serious about reconciliation because they believe that accepting national reconciliation means their certain downfall. We made every effort, and we will continue making every effort to spare our people tragedies.

Bad Decisions Cost Millions

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[Interview with Salim Salih, assistant secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party by Hamidah Na'na': "'Ali Nasir's Behavior Was like Salmin's; Bad Decisions Cost Us Millions;" in Aden; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Before concluding its business the party congress in Aden adopted a document which criticized the revolution's experiment in south Yemen. It was called "The Analytical Document." The congress also decided to expel 26 Central Committee members who support former president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. Some of those people were abroad, but others, like Mr Muftah 'Abd-al-Rabb had elected to return to Yemen. Observers considered the ouster of 26 members of the Central Committee tantamount to the Yemeni Socialist Party's suspension of political dialogue with those who had elected to return to the country, even those who had said and done nothing to get involved in the incidents. Some of those people had been abroad during the bloody war, and ruling out political dialogue to solve the crisis of those who had sought refuge in the north on the one hand and, on the other hand, to solve the crisis of the relationship with the rest of the party's leaders meant moving closer to violence and developing the objective factors for it. If such violence were to commence, the two parts of Yemen would be torn apart and undermined at a time when Yemen desperately needs its unity.

To shed light on the events that south Yemen has been experiencing, I interviewed Salim Salih, the assistant secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist

Party. It is being said that of all the leaders he is the one who was most keenly aware of how deep the country's wound was and how dangerous its consequences were. The interview with Salim Salih took place in Aden a short time before the party congress was held. However, red tape and the lack of organization in Arab airports led to the loss of a suitcase which contained a few tapes including the one on which the interview with the assistant secretary general was recorded.

Before the party congress was held I received the lost suitcase: it had passed through three airports and a customs warehouse before finding its way back to me. The first thing I did was unpack the tape on which the interview with Salim Salih was recorded. This is because we in AL-TADAMUN go out of our way to air all points of view so that we can make at least a humble contribution to the process of creating a climate of reconciliation between fellow countrymen who are on opposite sides of the fence. Although publication of this interview comes much later than scheduled, this delay has not caused it to lose its value because what Salim Salih said sheds some light on the mind of a man who evaluated events and dealt with them. Here is the text of the interview.

[Question] My first question may seem redundant. I posed that question more than once to officials in Yemen, those who were in power as well as those who were not. What happened on 13 January is by all standards terrifying and unjustifiable. It cannot be justified in the name of any ideology or theory. What happened was unbelievable. How would you account for that conflict?

[Answer] That is a very important question; it is a question that we as well as our people and the friends of our experiment are being asked about. However, an answer to that question requires much thought. On a preliminary basis, it may be said that there were domestic and foreign reasons for what happened. We are creating a new experiment in this region of the Arab homeland, and it is one that differs completely from previous experiments. It is an experiment that we are creating under difficult and complex conditions. In the course of the revolution's 20 years we made decisions that changed the face of democracy in Yemen, but these were decisions and measures which affected the power structure. Other measures were taken for the infrastructure. Our material situation was such that we could not make the measures which affected the power structure coincide with those which affected the infrastructure. These are some of the reasons for the imbalance which we have to correct today. The foundation of the revolution has been controlled by what may be called in rural and in urban areas a petty bourgeois mentality. That mentality controlled conduct in the National Movement and in political organizations, moving later to control the Yemeni Socialist Party. In my judgment that way of thinking was the most recent breach of our experiment. It created a rift among the classes, and it affected matters within the party, those that have to do with organizational relations--that is party discipline--and those which have to do with the theoretical aspect--the party's programs and bylaws--which covered how we dealt with each other. The party's programs and bylaws also covered our relationship with our people and how we exercised the powers that were conferred upon us. This means to what extent we sought legal guidance in our daily practices and conduct from the constitution, from institutions, and from our party's bylaws.

These breaches have been with our experiment from the beginning, and solving them has not been easy. They could not be solved simply by having the political will to solve them. This is because solving such problems has to do with the objective development of our experiment and with subjective and objective factors as well. These breaches have to do with outside factors which remain beyond our power and control. And here comes the voluntary role of those forces which oppose our revolution and which have tried since day one to deal a blow to our independence, cause our experiment to fail and use everything to abort our capabilities. At first, I tried the method of military action, and we faced foreign threats for a long time. When that method did not succeed in our party, an economic siege against us was used, but that too did not work because our resistance was strong. We were counting on creating a stronghold inside the country to withstand challenges. Our enemies tried to strike us from the inside, and they almost succeeded. We are not cut off from Arab and international developments. What happened to us and its magnitude was horrible. We have always expected conspiracies and schemes that targeted this experiment, and until 13 January we managed to resist them. Although 'Ali Nasir led the regression and departure from the party's course, he was not singlehandedly responsible for them because that would have been more than he could do. In evaluating what happened we will make every effort to analyze the real reasons for that setback to prevent it from happening again.

[Question] What I heard does not explain to me or to the readers some of what we may call the riddles of the Yemeni experiment. We do not understand why things come to a breaking point in your country every 4 or 5 years. We do not understand why people are physically eliminated. I don't think we need to enumerate these incidents or list the names of those who have been killed, but does the law of your revolution stipulate now that people are to be eliminated so that the revolution can survive?

[Answer] There are circumstances and explanations for each one of these incidents. But the questions that are sometimes raised about the course of our revolution are questions which have more than one motivation. Some people ask questions because they are worried about us and concerned about our experiment. Others ask questions because they want to satisfy their thirst for revenge and because they want to prove that it is impossible to have an experiment of this kind in this region. They consider us 20th century Karmathians who must be eliminated because our experiment is incompatible with the facts.

As far as we are concerned, we are conducting an experiment under difficult conditions in this existing situation. Many of the incidents were incidents we did not want. We did not want Qahtan al-Sha'bi to fall from power. We did not want Salmin to go, and we did not want 'Abd-al-Fattah, but there were objective factors which led to everything that happened.

As far as Qahtan is concerned, unfortunately, he had become linked with forces which, after independence, did not want to take steps toward achieving the decisions and the problems which we had outlined in our programs. Nevertheless, the movement that evolved against Qahtan was not a bloodthirsty one, and it was not accompanied by killing people.

I would like to emphasize that Qahtan, 'Abd-al-Fattah, 'Ali Nasir, 'Ali al-Bayd, and Salim Salih are all people who had been chosen by the party to assume some responsibilities at a certain stage. Fellow members in the general membership had confidence in them. If one day the general membership should declare no confidence in those people, we will have to yield to their wishes. Why did 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, for example, give up his positions when the party asked him to do that? Why did he not do what Salim Rabi' 'Ali or 'Ali Nasir did? As far as I am concerned, the answer is that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il knew what party discipline meant, and he had a clear view of the party's theory, class, and ideas. The others, however, never believed in the collective mind or in the party's role because their view of the party's theory, class and ideas is distorted. 'Abd-al-Fattah always used to say that people in power are either corrupt or they govern. When Salim Rabi' 'Ali assumed power, he did not seek advice from the party, the constitution, or from institutions. He believed that he could do anything he wanted as long as he was in power. That is why he resorted to a military solution. 'Ali Nasir, however, is another matter. This is not to say that he was a historic figure. 'Ali Nasir has now emerged in the western media which want to use him against us. He attained his position because he represents a compromise. When there was a problem, he would be asked to work on a solution until an agreement was reached.

But Salim Rabi' had his own history. He was the one who led the fierce battle against Qahtan and started the uprising which the party turned into a firm position in favor of farmers and workers. Salmin's name became associated with that, and so did 'Abd-al-Fattah's whose name was also associated with an unequivocal theoretical position and with the role he played in the liberation war. When Salmin's position got weaker and he started relying on his own mind, 'Ali Nasir emerged. As far as we are concerned, we have always sought the counsel of our collective minds, which is manifested in the party. Our party may not be a leftist party in the sense that is prevalent for that word in western and industrially advanced countries. So I can't tell you now that my mother used to be a worker on a train or a woodcutter. The circumstances of our experience differ from the circumstances and experiences of other countries.

Our party cannot be held accountable for individual phenomena. Salim Rabi' made bad economic decisions which cost us millions. Ours is a poor country, and our economy cannot afford such costly mistakes because we will have to borrow money and seek aid to make up for these losses. We will have to do that under harsh circumstances and conditions. We turned to dialogue in our conflict with Salmin, and we turned to the collective mind and to the majority against the minority.

[Question] Realistically and practically speaking, what are the real reasons for the dispute with Salmin, and why was he assassinated?

[Answer] I told you why. We responded to the unilateral approach and way of thinking by resorting to a more effective method: we turned to the party. Do we follow the minority or the majority? It was only after we were fired upon that we came out of the Central Committee building. Unfortunately, Salmin resorted to the use of weapons, but the collective will won a victory, and Salmin fell.

[Question] All right, what about the question of sending the attache case to the north?

[Answer] We were against that. We oppose exporting revolutions. The major conflict we had with Salmin had to do with our relations with the north. One of the issues that expedited settlement of the conflict was sending that attache case. Another was al-Ghashmi's death. Salmin paid for that.

[Question] What about the question of Salih Muti'?

[Answer] Ask 'Ali Nasir. 'Ali Nasir killed him for different reasons. He wanted to get rid of those people who knew about his past. 'Ali Nasir has not been involved in any fierce battle, and no accomplishments can be attributed to him. Muti' became one of his victims after 'Abd-al-Fattah's resignation. 'Abd-al-Fattah was the only one who got out quietly without creating problems.

[Question] I think that 'Abd-al-Fattah's quiet departure was due to the fact that he lacked support from a tribe. The tribal question is a decisive one in your conflicts, is it not?

[Answer] I do not agree with you that the tribal factor is a main factor in our disputes. When Muhammad 'Uthman al-Sudani wrote about the incidents, he said that tribes had cast their shadows on the incidents, and I believe that to be true. For example, Salih Muti' came from a strong tribe that did not champion his cause because the party is there. Muhammad 'Ali Haytham comes from a strong tribe that did not champion him. In my judgment the tribal factor is not the factor that fuels the conflict. It is true that there is much which ails our society, and it is true that there are bitter facts which we have made every effort to change, but there is also much that is missing, and there are things whose influence is considerable. 'Ali 'Antar came from a large tribe, but what did his tribe do when his opinion differed from that of others? 'Ali Nasir was able to create hostility among people, and to stir up chauvinistic, tribal feelings. But someone else was behind the scenes pulling strings for 'Ali Nasir. This was not masterminded on a local level. The game 'Ali Nasir had been playing was exposed, but it was too late.

[Question] When we hear you making such remarks after 15 years--remarks which mean that the prime minister of your revolution and later its number one man had ties to foreign agencies--your remarks put you and your revolution in a difficult position. Such remarks induce us to ask what kind of revolution was this and what kind of a National Front you had. Such remarks provide a strong argument that induces us to accept all the charges that were leveled against you as a front during the war of liberation on the eve of the country's independence.

Don't you think that these accusations are an easy way out of looking into the real reasons for the crisis?

[Answer] First of all, we were not the only ones who were deceived for 15 years by a leader who had ties with suspect agencies. The July Revolution was also deceived by al-Sadat although there is a big difference between the two. There are many examples of individuals who deceived revolutionary experiments which may have been more important than ours. Consider well what happened in the Chinese experiment. When 'Ali Nasir began arrogating power for himself, the game he was playing was exposed. He knew quite well what he represented during

Salmin's days, and after arrogating power for himself, he became an autocrat. We had rebelled against Salmin before because he was an autocrat.

[Question] But it was you, the party, and the political leaders, who placed the state's three responsibilities on 'Ali Nasir's shoulders. You made him responsible for the party's general secretariat; and you made him prime minister and head of state. Then you proceeded to conspire against him because all the power was in his hands.

[Answer] Giving him all these responsibilities was a big mistake. We are now discussing this matter, and it will also be set forth in a document which we will present to the party congress. Yes, it is true, giving 'Ali Nasir these three responsibilities was a grave mistake.

Let us go back to your question about why matters come to a head in our country and people get killed every 4 or 5 years. I talked with you about this before. Let me emphasize that 'Abd-al-Fattah left the responsibilities which he had assumed without any problems because he had counted on the party. If 'Ali Nasir had been adequately immune to controversy and ideas, he would have spared the country the bloodbaths.

[Question] Let's leave 'Abd-al-Fattah's case alone. On the one hand, he was the exception which proves the rule. On the other hand, 'Abd-al-Fattah was almost executed before leaving the Central Committee Building. The course of the party and the revolution lead us to wonder about the strength and metal of the party you built.

[Answer] What you are saying about 'Abd-al-Fattah is not true. With regard to the party's strength and metal, let me tell you that a party which withstands the conspiracy of 13 January is a real party.

[Question] As you said at the outset of our discussion, any Marxist-Leninist party relies on the working class. Is there such a working class in Yemen?

[Answer] No. Under our present conditions the working class cannot assume leadership. But a working class is evolving, and that may be one missing link that is responsible for many problems.

[Question] Under conditions like yours and in a society whose makeup is like that of Yemen's, why don't you try looking for a framework for a special experiment that is based on Yemeni reality? Why is a working class necessary to build a revolutionary party?

[Answer] This is a complicated issue, and we are paying the price for it every day. The working class in our country is still evolving. It is what we are hoping for, and it is what our party worries about. One of the problems we are facing and one aspect of our crisis lies in the fact that labor makes up a very limited segment of our party and our society. Any experiment that wishes to build a socialist system needs a working class. We proclaimed the slogan of strengthening the party's leadership role so it can solve some of the tasks that the working class is required to take care of in advanced countries. Putting

that slogan into practice strengthens the party's leadership role in the national, democratic stage of the revolution. But the answer to the question is yes, the working class is necessary for building a socialist system. It is the principal requirement for building a socialist system.

[Question] Although Lenin and subsequently Stalin did build a socialist experiment with the Russian working class, Mao Tse Tung found that the working class in China was too weak to carry out that mission. He relied on farmers.

[Answer] Every country has its own circumstances. At any rate, the absence of a working class in our country has had an effect on many of our decrees and experiences. For example, we did not succeed in applying the agrarian reform law, nor did we succeed in leasing farms.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Ask 'Ali Nasir. He delayed all the decrees, or rather, he delayed their implementation. There is a large power station in Bayhan, and Democratic Germany had helped us build other power stations and water plants in (Lawdar), (Ibin), and Hadramawt. We started producing, and we were producing many materials that we used to import. Afterwards, 'Ali Nasir neglected everything, and he tried to allow the private sector to purchase tractors to make a contribution to agriculture.

[Question] I am not defending 'Ali Nasir; he is capable of defending his own experiment. But I am wondering why shouldn't the private sector be allowed to contribute to production, particularly if state farms cannot produce or if they turned out to be failures?

[Answer] First of all, this is a decision that the party, not one person, has to make. It is something that should have been brought to our attention. We did not prevent the private sector from becoming engaged in trade and contracting work. But the Agrarian Reform Law does not give farmers that right. Purchasing a tractor in Yemen constitutes the beginning of capitalism. A tractor costs 100,000 dinars, and that sum, compared to the resources we have in our country, makes anyone who has that kind of money a capitalist. I cannot drive a Mercedes in a country like Yemen. People are watching us: they are watching what we wear and how we act. There are areas in our country where one cannot find drinking water. How can you talk about the private sector buying tractors for 100,000 dollars?

[Question] All revolutions faced such problems. I would like to point out that because of their own special circumstances, some socialist countries like Hungary did allow the private sector to go into business. Why shouldn't the private sector be allowed to function in certain areas if the alternative is unsuitable?

[Answer] There is a policy that has been approved by the party. We have an investment law, and that law allows Yemeni emigrants who are coming back into the country to invest in some sectors which are determined by the state.

[Question] You decide where a person is to invest his money?

[Answer] Yes, the party does.

[Question] Don't you believe that laws are not sacred texts and that they may be revised?

[Answer] They may be revised by the party but not by the excesses committed by government organizations and powers. One of the points about which we disagreed with 'Ali Nasir was his disregard for existing authorities. There are agricultural cooperatives that have to be strengthened; they should not be overlooked by allowing the private sector to do the work. We are creating an experiment that is based on principles which must not be undermined.

[Question] Mr Salim, don't you think that your experiment ought to be reconsidered after everything that has happened?

[Answer] We are trying to learn from our experiences, and we are trying to study the shortcomings and the mistakes, but we are doing so in light of the same ideas and the same program. This is something for which no other alternative would be acceptable. The course we have been following so far is a proper one, and we must be steadfast in realizing all our ideas. If there is a revolutionary vanguard that associates itself with the toilers' concerns and interests, if there is mutual confidence, and if some kind of education and learning are taking place quite separately from national relations, then the experiment is proceeding properly.

[Question] Can you really maintain the same course under current economic conditions?

[Answer] The revolution's survival and success are linked to internal and external factors. That is a fact. What matters is that we build a real party. Our party withstood the conspiracy and proved its existence. It proved that it can maintain its course, and that is one of the conditions for the experiment's survival. As far as other difficulties are concerned, there are difficulties, and they are complicated. But we have a great deal of hope that our conditions will improve if only the Americans were to leave us alone. This is something that everyone has to realize: to succeed, any socialist experiment has to have its own inherent condition for success, and that is manifested in the party which leads the alliances and prods the revolution to achieve its objectives. A socialist experiment must also have an outside ally, and that condition too is available because our revolution's principal ally is the Soviet Union.

[Question] Speaking of the Soviet Union, the revolution's principal ally, can you explain to us that ally's conflicting positions during the events of 13 January?

[Answer] I would like to affirm to you that 'Ali Nasir managed to deceive the Soviets and to give them a different picture about the facts. He was trying to distort the image of those who have been fighting for the cause since 1974. When he was minister of defense, he used to leak information to the Soviets that

distorted the image of those fighters, and he used to do that in a very clever way.

[Question] The Soviets had an embassy in Aden, and they had experts and close relations with all parties. Some of you held responsible positions which allowed you to communicate with those allies. At one point you were personally responsible for foreign relations. Do you believe that the Soviets were so naive as to make 'Ali Nasir capable of deceiving them?

[Answer] Unofficially, we were trying to make matters clear, but 'Ali Nasir succeeded in persuading the Soviets that we were preparing a military operation against him, that Salih Muti' tried to carry out a coup against him, and that 'Ali 'Antar was conspiring against the legitimate government. 'Ali Nasir made other allegations against us, but despite all that the Soviet position was in our favor. As the outcome of the third party congress has shown, the party's position was also in our favor.

The Soviet position is one of the issues we have been thinking of. I believe that the Soviets knew the facts, and I believe they were going to stand against the party that had dealt the first blow. We were not considering the use of a military solution. If the Soviets had any evidence that we were the ones who had started the trouble, their position would have changed. But 'Ali Nasir and some of those who are with him, like Abu Bakr Badhib, led the Soviets to believe otherwise.

[Question] Conflicting statements have been made about 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's death. Do the leaders have any new information on this subject?

[Answer] Legends usually evolve around heroes. 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il is one of the heroes of our age. He left his mark on our experiment. That is why people do not accept his death, and they do not believe that he is dead. 'Abd-al-Fattah was killed during the battles. We, the leaders, formed a committee to investigate his death, and that committee investigated the incident carefully and submitted its report to us. That report stated that 'Abd-al-Fattah was no longer with us. We also questioned a few navy officers, and they admitted that they had taken 'Abd-al-Fattah and asked him to make a statement against us. But 'Abd-al-Fattah declined to do that, so they killed him. The military situation then was very difficult. The area was going through an awesome state of combat and chaos. That is why, at first, we were not able to assemble information which would have confirmed his death. Today, however, we are certain that he is dead.

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BOOK ON YEMENI UNIFICATION REVIEWED

44040432a Aden SAWT AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 2 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Maqalih]

[Excerpts] Professor Khalid Muhammad al-Qasimi has written a book, published by MAJALLAT DIRASAT AL-KHALIJ WAL-JAZIRAH AL-'ARABIYAH and entitled "Yemeni Unity, Present and Future." Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Maqalih has discussed the subject of this book, and because of its importance we decided to reprint what Dr Maqalih said.

The book "Yemeni Unity, Present and Future" by the Arab scholar Professor Khalid Muhammad al-Qasimi gives an objective Arab view that is partially neutral to the issue of unity between the two Yemens. To a certain degree, the book traces accurately the unification steps taken by the leaders of the divided country. It also examines, through documents provided by both sides, the facts related to the painful events and the causes that led up to them, which makes it, in my opinion, the most important book that has come out on the subject so far. If the book is not devoid of certain negative aspects, they are due not so much to the author as to the data from which he drew the material for his book. The author was careful to verify his sources in footnotes so as to relieve himself of any responsibility for errors in the information found in them.

In the preface of his book Professor al-Qasimi says: "The issue of Yemeni unification is the primary concern of officials in the two Yemens, and they believe that achieving it is the way to get rid of the problems and conflicts which plague the Yemen. The people believe that unification is their destiny, though the road is long. Even though the two Yemens have clashed at the border more than once, after these clashes they have expressed greater determination to achieve unity, and they have signed agreements aimed at unifying the two Yemens. It can be said that even though the unification process is slow, the unification committees have made tangible progress in this area, especially after the plan for a constitution was prepared. The obstacles which threaten the unification of the two Yemens are not considered to be of the type which is impossible to solve, for through democratic dialogue all differences can be solved, stumbling blocks removed, and pressure put on elements opposed to unification to get them to change their stance and convince them that the welfare of the nation is above the way to the unification of the Arab nation. In view of what has been said unification

of the Yemen would be considered as giving impetus to the unification of the Gulf and the peninsula."

With this degree of simple clarity or clear simplicity Professor al-Qasimi presents his book to the reader. This part of the preface--the most important part--raises three principal facts: first, the Yemeni unification is the primary concern of officials in the two Yemens; secondly, that the Yemeni people believe that unification is their destiny, though the road is long. The third fact is that the obstacles which threaten the unification of the two Yemens are not impossible to solve, and that democratic dialogue is the key and the way to that solution. These three facts represent an objective introduction for understanding the issue of the unification of the two halves of this nation, covering its roots, its shifts, and its recent developments. Doubtless the book has drawn these three facts from the literature and documents of unification, and from its nationalistic viewpoint which believes that the state of partition existing in the Arab nation is an unusual circumstance which will not last for long in an age of escalating strategies and of joint Arab interests.

When Professor al-Qasimi gave his book the title "Yemeni Unity, Present and Future," he did not intend by that to ignore the recent past; rather he saw this recent past as part of the present without much difference between the two, especially the recent past which belongs to the years of the Yemeni revolution, those years of unification dreams, struggles, and plans. He approaches this past in a way that presents the political and historical fundamentals of the anticipated unification. He begins the third chapter of the book, entitled "Obstacles to Yemeni Unification," with an optimistic historical introduction s follows: "During the isolation that the Imamate imposed on the Arab people in North Yemen, and under the oppressive British occupation in the southern half, unification seemed to be a beautiful, distant dream. But since the September 1962 revolution, unification and talks about unification has become the daily concern of the Yemeni people covering the various groups, orientations, and schools of thought. The September revolution in the northern half heralded the departure of the British imperialist from the southern half, so the October revolution in the South was a natural outcome of the September revolution in the North. The Yemeni people had given practical expression to the unity of the soil in the Yemeni trades-union and students' organization which had paved the way for the climate of revolution in the two halves. In Aden there was a large base of workers from the North who organized with their brothers in the South in organization so the trade-unions conference, and students' leagues and unions at home and the countries of the Arab nation and abroad included Yemenis from both its halves as a practical expression of the unity of greater Yemen. The September revolution came as the final death sentence to separatist currents such as the Aden Association, the League of Sons of the South, and others.

"The revolutionaries in the South began to set up bases from which to launch their attacks in Ta'izz and other border towns in the North. The struggle against the imperialist British presence escalated, and sons of both halves were martyred in the same trench. The escalation and unification of the

struggle guaranteed the fusing of the two halves in the same melting pot. However, the objective and subjective circumstances did not help the unification of the struggle to proceed to its logical conclusion. The truth is that if the confrontation with the British had escalated to the point that they were drawn into striking Ta'izz and Sanaa, as the Americans were striking Hanoi, the joint struggle would have certainly unified the two halves. However, we must not disagree over concepts and theories for the entire modern Arab struggle has lacked unity. This unity faltered in the Maghreb. When France became aware of the growing seriousness of the Algerian revolution and noticed the signs of cohesion with the revolutionaries in Morocco, it offered concessions to regional demands in Tunisia and Morocco. The September revolution in North Yemen had to bear the entire legacy of backwardness that it had inherited from the Imamate, and at the same time to fight on several fronts, for its enemies would not give it a chance to catch its breath."

From the preceding paragraphs and from the rest of the chapter dealing with obstacles to unity, in which the author explores the dimensions of internal and external obstacles, one sees that he is extremely optimistic about unity, and that the multiplication and growth of obstacles would not prevent the people of Yemen from realizing their great dream of unified nature.... For example, he observes that: "From a practical point of view, we see that the objective justifications even for some of the steps taken in the South 15 years later have not had a radical outcome causing the two halves to become completely different. In spite of these measures, there is no doubt that the economic structure of the South has not been turned upside down; rather when we look at the figures and the role of the public, private and mixed sectors, we see that the two halves are still very similar."

That is what Professor al-Qasimi says, and thus the elements of optimism are created and the doors to a hope common to the brothers in the two halves of a single region are also opened. Just as this presentation summarizing the book "Yemeni Unity, Present and Future" began with a preface, it should conclude with lines from the conclusion, here the author tries to examine the latest accomplishments toward unification with the same degree of objectivity and optimism. The first lines of the conclusion say:

"There is no doubt that the road to achieving unification demands much tireless and persistent effort on the part of the Yemeni people in both halves, because the legacy of partition is heavy, and it will not be easy to remove it with only emotions and wishes. In spite of what has been accomplished toward unification that has been considered positive, officials in both halves must do more, and the burden of doing more falls on the shoulders of the unification committees. When these committees understood what had to be done to meet the goals and aspirations, this led to measures being taken which brought Yemeni unification to the stage of laying the material foundations through the joint establishments that were set up as a first step. It is also necessary to pave the way for every Yemeni citizen in the two halves to live in a Yemeni environment far removed from imaginary obstacles. That was achieved as a result of the meetings of the first session of the Yemeni Council which was held in Sanaa in 1983. This session resulted

in an agreement to grant citizens the right to travel between the two halves, and to allow the joint unification committees to carry on their assigned tasks. Perhaps the accomplishment illustrated by the continuing steps toward Yemeni unification is of importance in the meetings of the second session of the Yemeni Council are taking place amidst a positive national environment which will contribute to progress in achieving more steps towards unification."

At the end of their brief review of the book "Yemeni Unity, Present and Future," it should be mentioned that the book has met with much acclaim in some circles, just as it has met with much resistance and disapproval in others. In spite of that, it remains the first and most important book that deals with the issue of unification with such clarity and optimism, and perhaps it gained some of its importance from the fact that it came from the Gulf, from the United Arab Emirates to be precise, and from a writer who was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the cradle of historical unity and the homeland of the current fragmentation.

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FULL SUPPORT FOR LIBYA STEMS FROM COMMON HERITAGE, EXPERIENCE

Sanaa AL-JAYSH in Arabic 5 Mar 87 pp 6, 7

[Text] Throughout history, the relationship between Yemen and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been characterized by sincerity and clarity. Today, this relationship is growing increasingly strong in defiance of all attempts to hamper it, regardless of the means employed, style adopted, or the manipulators operating behind the scenes. This is because the relationship is deeply rooted, resting its strong foundation on the profound and steadfast ties between the two peoples, the two revolutions, and the two leaderships. The relationship rests upon a set of factors which endow it with distinctive characteristics. Among these are the common bond of Arab heritage, and joint participation in creating the great Arab civilization which has enriched mankind with marvelous intellectual achievements, putting humanity on the road to intellectual and scientific progress.

Among these factors, likewise, is the bond of Islam; for the ancient Yemenis and Libyans participated in spreading Islam over a large area of the world. They paid dearly for conquering paganism and Christianity. There is, moreover, a similarity in historical conditions. The two peoples share a similar history of struggle to defend their right to a free and independent life. During the events preceding the two September revolutions, the two nations fought for their freedom, and the relationship between them was truly fraternal, in spite of the unjust systems [governing them].

The Yemeni people were destined to launch their immortal revolution on 26 September 1962, restoring Yemen to its glorious status as the land of civilization and splendor, the birthplace of the Arabs who changed the course of history with their great achievements. This victory imparted further strength to the new form of relationship with its nationalistic, unifying character. The revolution of 26 September was among the first to support the successful Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969 since the moment of its brilliant inception on the soil of the Jamahiriya, the land of the great Arab freedom fighter 'Umar al-Mukhtar.

Also among the unmistakable factors is the current similarity between the two political experiments in the two countries, in both countries the people's authority rules: under the banner of the People's General Congress (PGC) in the Yemen Arab Republic, and the General People's Congress (GPC) in the

Jamahiriyyah; in both countries, the finishing touches are being inscribed upon the two experiments which seek to free the two nations from dependency, underscoring [the importance of] independent will and the ability of Arabs to embark upon an intellectual path which mocks the inadequacy and distortion of the philosophy engendered by Europe at the peak of her imperialistic expansion.

Thus, this intimate and historical relationship has acquired new features and dimensions in the shared struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and in the course of national struggle to liberate the Arab will and bring about national unity among all countries of the greater Arab homeland.

From this firm basis, the relationship between the two September revolutions burst forth in Libya and Yemen affirming that the people of the two sister countries will continue their struggle, and that a sincere effort will be exerted to make this relationship a unique example of brotherhood and cooperation. The visit of Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih--president of the republic, commander in chief of the armed forces, and secretary general of the PGC--to Libya was to confirm the strong relations [between Libya and Yemen], to take a close look at the experiment of the Socialist People's Jamahiriyyah, and to see the tremendous accomplishments which propelled the citizens of that small country of 3 million inhabitants--a country of towering stature in regard to its revolutionary and nationalistic fervor--towards a decent standard of living and great progress, all of which means a great deal to every Arab nation.

This visit afforded our political leaders the opportunity to observe in the Libyan masses a spirit which defies all perils, and a great determination to continue Libya's march towards progress, prosperity, and strength; [our leaders also observed a determination] to build up the resources of a new life, replete with goodness, abundance, and contributions from the valiant Libyan, who is eager to utilize his God-given wealth in profitable ways. That spirit and that determination make each Libyan feel responsible for all accomplishments in Libya and for protecting all these commendable achievements. It is this will which has demonstrated to the world our ability to **withstand all** imperialistic and Zionist ventures.

Since our country pursues a clear political program stemming from the goals and principles of the immortal 26 September revolution and from the national charter which confirms the importance of strengthening fraternal relations between our country and our sister states, our common interests are served, Arab solidarity is strengthened, and the desired Arab unity is facilitated. Our country, thanks to this clear trend, has gained the respect and appreciation of all sister states, without exception; we have always sought to establish strong fraternal relations, based on love, brotherhood, mutual respect, non-interference in the affairs of others, and positive, productive cooperation which serves the interests of our people and the whole Arab community.

For this reason, our country has always striven to establish a link of mutual understanding and maintain a firm basis of cooperation with all our sister states. The frequent visits which our officials make to all Arab countries

are living proof of our insistence on, and deep desire for, strengthening fraternal relations and creating mutual understanding on many issues which concern the peoples of our Arab nation.

The visit of the leader president to the Libyan Jamahiriyyah occurred within this national framework which our country utilizes as a means of achieving Arab unity and strengthening the efforts to rally all Arabs against their enemies and enable them to frustrate the enemy's conspiratorial plans aimed at fragmenting and weakening the Arab nation, thus making it easy to devour and eliminate that nation. This visit was an occasion to reiterate the clear and courageous stand of the Yemen Arab Republic by the side of its sister Libya in the face of imperialistic and Zionist arrogance. The September Yemeni leadership confirmed by this visit that it places all of its capabilities and energies on the side of the **Libyan** 1 September revolution, in accordance with the charter of the Arab League and the joint Arab defense treaty. Our leadership and the people of our country consider the military and economic strength of the Libyan Arab revolution as a reserve force for the Arab nation in general and for the 26 September revolution [in particular]; [in this way] we aim to confront the schemes and malice of the enemies, and rebuff all Zionist and imperialistic conspiracies.

This fact was clearly and emphatically confirmed by the cheers of the Libyan masses in all corners of the country, unanimously expressing support for Yemen, Libya, the unity of the Yemen, the glorious 26 September revolution, and the glorious 1 September revolution. Similarly, these cheers and marches for Arab unity emphasized that all of Libya's capabilities are for the protection of Arabism and the achievement of comprehensive Arab unity.

The visit of the leader to his second homeland, Libya, and the meeting with his brother, the leader of the Libyan revolution, proved the existence of a very strong relationship which unites in struggle the two Arab peoples, their two countries, and the two immortal revolutions. It also reaffirmed the existing agreement on all bilateral, national, and international concerns, and the harmony which exists between the two countries under all circumstances. The great accomplishments of the president's visit confirmed the determination of the sister Libyan revolution and the Arab masses to maintain the economic as well as the popular democratic social structures; those accomplishments also emphasized the capability of this well-guided revolution to escalate national efforts on behalf of freedom, socialism, and Arab unity with great vigor, strength, and pride, in defiance of any mad conspiracy or imperialistic threat.

Thus the unity in struggle which binds the two Arab revolutions—that of Yemen and that of Libya—will remain an effective safeguard against suicidal Arab action, against slaughtering the Arab existence on the altars of enemies, against wasting the Arab wealth and energies which are now accumulating and which are coveted by imperialism and Zionism. Providence will certainly support the two sister revolutions: that of Yemen, the home of civilization and glorious accomplishments, and that of Libya, the land of challenge and valor. Inevitably, covetous conspirators will suffer failure and shame.

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ARTICLE DISCUSSES GORBACHEV'S POLITICS, ITS CONSEQUENCES

Paris DEFIS AFGHANS in French May-Jun-Jul 87 pp 13-14

[Interview with Jiri Pelikan]

[Text] Jiri Pelikan, architect of the "Prague Spring," and member of the European Parliament, whose resolutions in favor of Afghan resistance he actively supports, shares his views on Gorbachev's politics and its consequences for Afghanistan.

[Question] What is your interpretation of Gorbachev's politics and its foreseeable consequences outside the USSR?

[Answer] Gorbachev needs peace. His main target is to develop the Soviet economy and society, so that the USSR could catch up with the United States, Japan and the European Community. The resistance to change within the party and state apparatus and the population's indifference made him realize the need for political reform which would make economic reform possible. However, the initiated democratization in the USSR has nothing in common with pluralist democracy, democracy in the western sense. It merely means greater citizens' participation in the decisions of the party, which will retain the power, and of the state, within the framework of the system. The indications of change are undeniable: release of political prisoners and openness, which means that there are virtually no taboo questions, including the war in Afghanistan, which was not being mentioned under Brezhnev but is talked about now.

However, Gorbachev needs a stable Soviet empire. Therefore, he is unwilling to export his reforms to the Eastern countries, aware of the fact that this could destabilize them somewhat. Take just the example of Czechoslovakia, where the people frequently draw parallels between Gorbachev's reforms and those of Dubcek of 1968 (Prague Spring). Whereas those who oppose reform in the USSR would like an antireform alliance in the eastern bloc, it is essential to Gorbachev for the eastern European countries to express their support, albeit formal, of his reforms in the USSR, meanwhile ensuring stability in their own countries.

The desire of the USSR to develop its economy implies that it must not scatter its energy in activities outside its territory. This, however, does not make Gorbachev promote a withdrawal abroad. Conversely, he is tirelessly promoting

a broad diplomatic offensive, putting others in a difficult situation with his proposals.

Gorbachev gives priority to relations with the United States, to reaching a disarmament agreement on disarmament, dropping the linkage between Euromissiles and the American SDI (Star Wars), and improving relations with the EEC and, above all, with China. With the exception of the latter, he pays a great deal less interest to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

[Question] In this context, how does the development of the Afghan conflict appear?

[Answer] Things are still not very clear. I believe that Gorbachev wants to solve the Afghan problem by withdrawing the Soviet troops but that he is not sure that he has the power to do so. He has undoubtedly faced the army's opposition, and he is uncertain as to what would come out of the retreat, i.e. as to the nature of the regime in Kabul. It is clear that the USSR is unwilling to withdraw without a guarantee that the regime which will take over after the withdrawal will be friendly. The Soviets fear the establishment of an Iranian-type system, of an Islamic republic, with all the consequences for the region and possible impact in the Asian republics of the USSR. This is one of the reasons for the lack of progress in the discussions.

[Question] Could Gorbachev accept a regime not under communist control in Kabul?

[Answer] I believe this to be possible under certain conditions. He could accept a regime which would guarantee for Afghanistan the status of a nonaligned country, such as existed before the 1978 communist coup, which had given the USSR the necessary guarantees. Without engaging in futurology, one could also envisage the possibility of a Finnish- or Austrian-type solution, involving limited sovereignty in terms of relations with the USSR but total in terms of internal matters. The USSR would have preferred a Mongolian-type solution which, however, it cannot impose on the Afghans. The relative positions and roles of the various Afghan political forces can only be a strictly internal matter under the exclusive Afghan rule.

[Question] What must be done to put Gorbachev with his back against the wall?

[Answer] The situation depends on the strength of Afghan resistance and ability to resist the pressure of the Soviet forces and of the government, as well as the support of international public opinion, the Western governments especially, which could apply pressure on Gorbachev.

The resistance must become even stronger than it is today before the Soviets realize that the only solution is to compromise with it. It must be able to negotiate the withdrawal with the Soviets and even with the ruling group in Kabul because this is a reality to which the Soviets are tied, even though I can understand perfectly the feelings of the Afghan resistance when it speaks of a "puppet government."

In order to be a serious party to a negotiation, including in the eyes of the Western countries, after settling its internal differences the Afghan resistance should set up a united government which would represent all trends within the country.

All initiatives, particularly those of the europeans, in applying pressure on the USSR would be welcome. The truth, however, is that it is the Americans who are the Soviets' real partners. They are applying real pressure. There is the risk of a deal between the Big Two, but the Americans have become too involved now in the matter of Afyhan independence to be able to grant all sorts of concessions.

The position of people's China as well could be a major influence. China considers the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan an obstacle to normalizing relations with the USSR. Since today the USSR is very interested in such normalization, the hope is justified that China's view on Afghanistan would constitute a strong pressure.

Furthermore, any peace agreement would have to have an international guarantee provided by the United Nations, which should also supervise the holding of free elections, and above all by the great powers--the United States the USSR and China and, if possible, France and Great Britain.

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CSO: 4619/23

ELLAHI ON MUJAHIDIN TAKING INITIATIVE

Paris DEFIS AFGHANS in French May-Jun-Jul 87 p 7

[Interview with Dr Abdul Hai Ellahi]

[Text] Dr Abdul Hai Ellahi was jailed in 1978 for involvement with the "Young Muslims" movement and released in 1980. From 1980 to 1983 he was assistant to Major Massud in the Panjshir Valley. Since 1985 he has been member of the Executive Bureau and in charge of the Jamiat-e-Islam Education Committee.

[Question] How do you interpret Gorbachev's recent statements and offers for "national reconciliation?"

[Answer] After 7 years of war the Soviets have become truly aware of the military strength and resistance policy. It is certain that Gorbachev is more aware of the problem than were his predecessors. That is why he forced the puppet regime in Kaboul to suggest a "national conciliation" and proclaim a unilateral cease-fire. This does not mean that he is sincere and ready to withdraw his forces. It is, however, a new phase in Soviet policy.

First: the Soviets are aware of their weaknesses and this is the first time that they are suggesting a cease-fire. Second, however, is that by making this offer they have seized the initiative in terms of mediation in the face of public opinion: they would like to promote the belief that they are for peace. Third: they are trying to score points in politics, having failed to do so militarily, in order to frustrate the resistance. Their idea was for the communists to be the main figure and the other forces to rally around that government. That was the condition for their withdrawal. Its acceptance by us would have been suicidal: the country would have remained under Soviet domination without the Red Army! That is why we rejected his proposals.

The resistance did not develop exclusively against the Soviet intervention in 1979, but started in 1978 against the communist regime. That is why the withdrawal of the Soviet forces while retaining a regime rejected by the mass of the population is unacceptable.

[Question] Would you refuse to participate in any government which would include pro-Soviet forces, even though they may be in the minority?

[Answer] This is out of the question. If the pro-soviets admit to their errors we could grant them amnesty and the right to live in afghanistan, but without the right to express their views publicly. They have already shown what they can do when they hold the power. There is no point in starting all over again!

[Question] Nonetheless, some resistance organizations would be willing to let the communists take part in elections. Would this not be a way of proving openly their minority status?

[Answer] Two features must be considered: there is a question of principle. In a Muslim country, such as Afghanistan, an elections candidate must be a Muslim. However, if we want tactically to prove to the entire world the fact that very few people would vote for the communists we should not exclude the possibility of their participation.

[Question] After the 17 January communique what type of structures should the resistance set up?

[Answer] There must be a guiding committee, a parliament in which the fighters and the civilian population would be represented, and specialized executive authorities. For instance, those in charge of education from all the organizations must work together within the executive area in charge of education. The only voice in all areas must be that of the resistance.

Such an agency would sponsor a broad popular consultation which would include all parties and fronts, and the entire civilian population. It must have experts in the various areas, who would help it with advice. This is a general plan, as we see it now. We could create such an agency even before the withdrawal of the soviet forces. It would have all the features of a government except for the title.

[Question] What is your view of elections after the Soviet withdrawal? What part could the UN play in their supervision?

[Answer] There is no question of having free elections as long as there are Soviet forces present. What we expect of the United Nations is to increase its pressure on the Soviets. We have no intention of laying down our arms and waiting for the United Nations to solve the Afghan problem.

[Question] How can the resistance regain the initiative in the political area?

[Answer] In order to regain the initiative we must steadily increase the amount of information provided to the international public. We must set up a single resistance authority which should tell the Soviets that "We are ready to talk with you," and formulate proposals with a view to holding direct negotiations. It is thus that the resistance could regain the political initiative.

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EDITORIAL STRESSES NAGA COUNCIL'S LINKS WITH PRC

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 13 Jul 87 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text]

Two Chief Ministers — Manipur's Mr Rishang Kishing and Nagaland's Mr Hokishe Sema — had offered National Socialist Council of Nagaland outlaws an "open door" for talks when the NSCN band struck at an Assam Rifles Camp in Senapati district, Manipur. The NSCN killed nine (unofficial figure is 16) jawans and captured a cache of weapons and ammunition. This is said to be the biggest NSCN attack since Naga outlaws expanded their operations to Manipur. The escaping band managed to carry off two 2-inch mortars from the Assam Rifles camp, besides machine guns and SLRs.

Though the Government of India, for the sake of improving relations with China, has been under-stating the NSCN's China liaison, there is no reason why India's public opinion should be kept in the dark about this important linkage. It is odd to describe the NSCN as Maoist. Maoism was the dominant ideology of a variety insurgent groups which received from China arms and weapon-training when Mao was living and ruling the Middle Kingdom. After his demise, Maoism is a wrong tag to attach to the NSCN. Its liaison is with the Chinese government agencies and not with Maoism. Beijing's policy makers by and large regulate the measure of assistance they want to give to Naga, Manipuri or Ahom groups which, having been given training in Tibet and Yenan, have the capacity to periodically assail Indian territory from Burma. The Burmese operation against the Kachins and the NSCN GHQ at Chalam in Burma in 1986 did not quite succeed, with the result that the NSCN outfit has moved closer to Manipur's Mon district. The NSCN GHQ now has separate barracks for Ahom neophytes and Manipuri PLA

stragglers. There are reports that the Tripura National Volunteer bands are so keen on receiving NSCN support that the TNV now talks of socialism in order to come closer to Muivah and thus gain access to the guns and money the TNV believes Beijing will make available through Naga sources. It is not for us to say if the TNV's hopes for Chinese assistance is justified. Developments in north-east India will answer the query.

Meanwhile, two points need to be stressed. After the Mizoram accord, it should not be assumed that anybody who takes enough Indian lives over a period of time is bound to be rewarded eventually with the office of Chief Minister. The other point concerns the state of training available to India's para-military forces. The Central police forces are being excessively used all over the country, and for this the Centre is not to be blamed. Raw jawans of the para-military forces are pushed into situations for which they really are not prepared. While NSCN hirelings can run back to Burma for prolonged rest and training in safety, the Assam Rifles jawans surprised by them in Manipur recently in all probability were young recruits who had barely completed their mandatory training.

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KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS REPORTEDLY CAUSE DISRUPTION IN PAKISTAN

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mezbanzadeh]

[Text] In the middle of last week, a group of Shiite Muslim fundamentalists and supporters of the Islamic Republic in the city of Quetta, Pakistan clashed with anti-Ayatollah Khomeyni demonstrators and used machine-guns, grenades, and rockets. As a result of this confrontation, 5 Iranians were killed and at least 22 were injured. This bloody confrontation took place in front of the headquarters of the Iran Liberation Army (Mujaheddin-e-Khalq).

In addition to this bloody confrontation in the city of Quetta, in Karachi, members of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq confronted supporters of Ayatollah Khomeyni and 1 person was killed and at least 18 were injured. The members of the Mujaheddin organization used modern automatic weapons in this incident.

According to a report carried by the London DAILY TELEGRAPH, Pakistan has recently become the scene of face-to-face confrontations between hundreds of homeless anti-Khomeyni Iranians and some of Ayatollah Khomeyni's supporters. Every month, hundreds of Iranians cross Pakistan's borders, enter that country illegally, and take refuge there. Most of the fugitives flee the country in order to avoid the draft and being sent to the Iran-Iraq battlefield. They prefer exile and leave their homeland. The paper adds: "In addition to the Iranian youngsters who have taken refuge in Pakistan in order not to go to the battlefield, there are a notable group of Iranians who are seeking asylum in Pakistan and those who have escaped their homeland for political and religious reasons or for fear of prosecution."

Iranian Refugees Are Swarming to Pakistan for Political Asylum

James Boon, Karachi correspondent of the DAILY TELEGRAPH, writes: "Every month, some 700 Iranian refugees in Pakistan go to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and seek assistance from officials of that organization."

Each month, nearly 700 other Iranians contact the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Turkey. A large number of the Iranian refugees in Pakistan refrain from going to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees because they do not believe they are eligible for political asylum. So far, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Pakistan has registered 2,500 Iranian refugees, most of whom are Bahais. An Iranian resident in Pakistan has stated that "at present, more than 8,000 Iranian refugees are living in Karachi."

The DAILY TELEGRAPH reporter adds: "The Pakistani Government refrains from opposing the Tehran regime and is making efforts to keep a low profile and deny accepting the Iranian refugees as political refugees. In spite of these efforts, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is authorized to assist the refugees that are accepted and help them with daily allowances and living quarters." A diplomat residing in Pakistan states: "Iranian fugitives in this country are accepted as refugees and permitted to stay in Pakistan for as long as they desire."

The DAILY TELEGRAPH in another part of its report says: "Iranians residing in Pakistan are dissatisfied with the present situation and the way they are treated by government officials. This dissatisfaction is growing at a time when the Pakistani Government has provided better living conditions for more than 300,000 Afghan refugees on its soil. During the last 3 years, the Iranian refugees have held four demonstrations at the headquarters of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in order to protest their living conditions in Pakistan."

The newspaper quotes a spokesman for a secret organization called the Council of Iranian Homeless and Refugees in Pakistan as saying: "We demand that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees provide an opportunity for all Iranian refugees to acquire asylum. Since these people have escaped from the war, they should be considered refugees."

The DAILY TELEGRAPH reporter writes: "In spite of the fact that most of the Iranians in Pakistan wish to leave, during the last few months, the number of Iranians who intend to wage political campaigns against the Tehran regime has steadily increased."

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EXPORT OF REVOLUTION BY POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES REPORTED

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 16

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mezbahzadeh]

[Text] Building number 28 on "Petite Sacone" near the International Hotel in Geneva is the headquarters of the Islamic Republic mission to the United Nations. This mission to the European headquarters of the United Nations is constantly working with diplomats of other nations on the establishment of relations. Besides its routine diplomatic activities, the Islamic Republic mission to the European office of the UN in Geneva has another important duty: it is in charge of executing orders from Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, minister of intelligence and security for the Islamic Republic. He has great power among the present administrators of the Tehran regime. The headquarters of the Islamic Republic mission in Geneva, through the guidance and leadership of Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, has become the center for guiding the international network of Islamic guerrillas, intelligence officers, agents, and middlemen purchasing arms for the Islamic Republic.

Michael Sheridan, a correspondent for the London INDEPENDENT newspaper, in an extensive report titled "Islamic Republic Exports Revolution Through Its Political Representatives to Other Countries," writes: "In recent interviews, a number of experts in Iranian affairs in London, Geneva, and Rome have revealed the secrets of the European activities of the network controlled by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic.

This correspondent states: "At present, with attention to the apparent differences of views and the extensive rivalry among the leaders of the Islamic Republic in acquiring power, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic has sent its special intelligence representatives to the Islamic Republic's embassies and missions in most countries. These representatives are in charge of spreading and gathering information, purchasing arms and ammunition and also assessing the possibilities for mobilizing the protection of members of the Hezbollahi in Lebanon. The intelligence and security officials of the Islamic Republic in other countries are presently considered very

important agents for the execution of secret activities of the Tehran regime. These secret agents usually carry out secret activities such as making contact with terrorist and kidnapper groups and training guerrillas to fight anti-Islamic Republic countries."

Sadeqi Mobeydi, Official in Charge of the Intelligence Network in Europe

The INDEPENDENT newspaper writes: "Recently, the Italian news magazine PANORAMA, in revealing some of the intelligence and security agents of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammadi Reyshahri in European countries, mentioned Sadeqi Mobeydi as the official responsible for coordinating such activities in Europe. Mobeydi has the rank of third secretary and works at the Islamic Republic mission in Geneva. A diplomat residing in Geneva stated that Sadeqi Mobeydi arrived in Geneva about 6 months ago. Despite his relatively low political rank at the Islamic Republic mission, he possesses great power and influence."

The INDEPENDENT adds: "The position of Sadeqi Mobeydi at the Islamic Republic mission in Geneva is like that of Vahid Gorgji in Paris. Despite the apparent position of Vahid Gorgji as a translator at the Islamic Republic Embassy in Paris, without any diplomatic position, he has vast power and is considered the number two man at the Islamic Republic Embassy in Paris. An expert in Islamic Republic affairs believes that Vahid Gorgji is one of the other important members of the security and intelligence network of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammadi Reyshahri in Europe."

Michael Sheridan writes: "Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammadi Reyshahri, the minister of security and intelligence in the Tehran regime, operates his worldwide security and intelligence network according to region. The network center in Beirut is responsible for the Middle East, Sierra Leone is the center for West African affairs, and Geneva for European affairs. With this picture in mind, Sadeqi Mobeydi actually heads Reyshahri's security and intelligence affairs in Paris, too. Other cities that are guided by Reyshahri's intelligence network in Geneva are Bern, Cologne, Hamburg, Vienna, Brussels, and Rome."

The INDEPENDENT correspondent adds: "The Italian news magazine PANORAMA received a large part of the secret information related to Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri's security and intelligence network from someone who had been employed from the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran until sometime ago in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the regime. This person decided not to return to his country and now resides in a European country as a political refugee. Iranian affairs specialists and diplomats residing in Geneva, whether pro- or anti-Islamic Republic regime, believe that the information revealed by this person is completely true."

\$200 Million for Activities Abroad

The INDEPENDENT says: "In order to administer its network abroad, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic has an enormous budget of \$200 million a year. This ministry administers the financial affairs of the network abroad via the Iranian Central Bank."

The newspaper, in another part of the article, says: "Giving this international task to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security parallels the promotion of Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri's position among the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

"The present position of Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri is due to his role as head of the court in the mock trial of members of the Tudeh Party in 1983-84 where he played his role appropriately. In the sessions of the mock trial show of members of the Tudeh Party, Reyshahri took advantage of elaborate and complicated legal terms for conviction of the accused. The imminent propaganda advantages of these trial sessions also gave foreign observers the impression that Reyshahri was seeking an important political role for himself in the future."

British Cooperation with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security

The newspaper adds: "The success of security and intelligence officials of the Islamic Republic in suppressing the Tudeh Party was mainly due to important information furnished by a high-level Soviet official in Tehran to intelligence organizations of the West. After many years of assignment in Tehran, this Soviet diplomat took political asylum in the West. Due to the nature of his work in Tehran, he was very familiar with the activities of most of the leaders of the Tudeh Party and the manner of their activities. He released all this information to British intelligence officials, and they gave it to intelligence and security agencies of the Islamic Republic."

The INDEPENDENT goes on to say: "The experiences of Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri led Huseyn Sheikh ol-Eslam, under secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is also in charge of the Revolutionary Guards abroad, to befriend and establish close cooperation with him. According to the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, Sheikh ol-Eslam was in charge of guiding the attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in Beirut and also several Western establishments in Lebanon and other countries. By using their combined experience, these two persons embarked on a plan to employ non-Iranian supporters of the Islamic Republic among Muslim groups. Among these people are Sri Lankans, Turks, and citizens of North Africa and even Thailand. These hirelings employed by Reyshahri will arouse less suspicion from the intelligence officials of other countries."

Michael Sheridan adds: "In order to make it possible to achieve power by fundamentalist Muslims, the Islamic Republic has established several

active organizations in Lebanon. One of the most important organizations established and managed by Ayatollah Montazeri is called the "High Council of Communication Between the Islamic Revolution and other Islamic Revolution Movements Outside Iran." At the end of last year, after revealing the secrets of the Irangate events and the strong competition among the various leadership wings in the Islamic Republic, many supporters of Ayatollah Montazeri were pursued and a number of them are in prison at the present time."

At the conclusion of his article, the correspondent adds: "By administration and other means, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic assumed responsibility for the eradication, capture and prosecution of the opposition, and as a result gradually has gained power and influence on the political scene. Since the driving away of the opposition, noticeable changes have been apparent in the composition of the staff of the Islamic Republic embassies abroad, and employing Sadeqi Mobeydi is one of various examples of such changes."

At present, the leaders of the Islamic Republic, in implementation of international and foreign security and intelligence campaigns, are using both the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the coordinated policies plotted by the leaders of various groups. As long as the subject of their aims is abroad, these groups do not vie with each other and they fulfill their duties jointly.

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MANY UNIVERSITY FIELDS REPORTED CLOSED TO WOMEN

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mezbahzadeh]

[Text] University education in some fields is closed to women in Iran. Since the inception of the Islamic Republic regime, Iranian women have not been able to study some fields of their choice and, if they are single, have not been permitted to go abroad to study in their field of interest.

The present regime in Iran is probably one of the few governments in the world that has such unjustified discrimination against women.

In a letter delivered to the press, a group of candidates ready to enter higher education institutions in Iran criticize the responsible authorities of the Islamic Republic, asking: "Why, on the one hand, do these authorities claim in their lectures and speeches here and there that women have a high place in Islam and are entitled to all rights and that they consider education very useful for women, when on the other hand, they are not even capable of fulfilling their own claims?"

In this year's guidebook for entrance examinations, women are deprived of taking entrance examinations in the fields of audiovisual graphics and drawing.

In the field of industrial design, only 20 percent of the positions are designated for women. The fields of archaeological restoration of ancient monuments and handicrafts are monopolized by male students, and females are banned from registering in those fields.

The Fine Arts Department of the university, with a capacity of 230 students, is dedicated only to male students, and not even one place is allocated to a female student in classes in this department.

Women are banned from registering for movie making in colleges that teach this. To allocate these fields only to male students and deprive females from studying them is a national calamity. In the entrance examinations of universities and higher education institutions, the

number of female candidates who desire to study in the field of arts is usually equal or higher than that of male applicants.

The authors of the letter to the press ask: "In view of the fact that the number of female applicants for entrance examinations in the field of art exceeds that of males and in the face of female interest in these fields, how can the responsible authorities in the country permit themselves to make decisions in regard to people's future as in the Middle Ages?"

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MEDICAL DOCTORS REPORTEDLY ATTACKED BY HEZBOLLAHIS

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 3

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mezbahzadeh]

[Text] A small group of Hezbollahis attacked the offices of various physicians in Tehran on the occasion of the anniversary of the strike of Iranian physicians. Apparently the Hezbollahis' excuse was to protest the overcharge of fees for visits, and they disrupted the physicians' offices and injured them personally.

In these attacks that took place in several locations, some confrontations occurred between Hezbollahis and patients in the doctors' waiting rooms. The confrontation in the Doctors Building on Shah Abbas Avenue extended to the street.

The day before these incidents, a large group of physicians protested the suspension of the medical board by the Islamic regime, and, in memory of the anniversary of their strike, stayed away from their offices. This provoked the anger of the officials of the regime and instigated the Hezbollahis. Reports from Tehran indicate that in recent months, the wave of emigration of Iranian physicians to the United States and Europe has escalated. These departures began with the annulment of the medical board. About 4 months ago, the Ministry of Health decided to reduce visiting fees of medical doctors to 1,000 rials and 800 rials. The physicians consider such fees are appropriate to 10 years ago, 4 years before the Islamic Revolution, when living expenses were reasonable. Among these physicians are some who have sent their wives and children abroad but who cannot purchase dollars from the black market with the present fee rates. Therefore, during recent months, dozens of doctors have closed their offices and left for Europe.

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HIGH COST OF LIVING, SOCIAL CORRUPTION DISCUSSED

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 8

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mezbahzadeh]

[Text] "Today, anyone, anywhere can point to some who suck the blood of the people and accumulate wealth without restraint, even though they know as well as we do that the majority of people are poor and deprived. Today, under the pressure of the high cost of living, class distinctions and differences in the level of living, the people are being crushed under the feet of plundering economic middlemen."

This was propounded by Mohammad Rashi Dian, Majlis representative from Abadan, at a session of the Majlis some time ago. The Abadan deputy went on to say: "What has happened to make us so helpless in solving the vital problems of the people? Are these differences compatible with any of our religious or common laws? Is it just that a callous person can make a net profit of 500-1 million tomans daily while the vast masses of people are able to afford barely enough food to keep them alive?"

In another part of his speech, the Abadan deputy to the Majlis emphasized the social corruption for the sake of the accumulation of wealth and said: "Although the high cost of living, deception, and economic unrest are due to soaring profits, why not go after the source of corruption? Why must the vital affairs of the people be in the hands of a few wealthy capitalists? Whenever a plan or suitable solution is presented for agriculture or a campaign against inflation and the high cost of living, why do people shout that this is not Islamic? Is not the situation damaging to Islamic prestige and the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic? Do not these confusions constrain the people? Why do discussions about the questions of agricultural land and price levels meet with disapproval? Are not the savings of the people and protection of the prestige and dignity of the oppressed highly important? Are not the people disappointed with Islamic sovereignty and the government's impure morality?"

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TEHRAN CARRIES PHONE-IN ON HEALTH CARE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES**LD250946 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1202 GMT 24 Aug 87**

[Second in series of programs celebrating Government Week; studio phone-in program moderated by unidentified Tehran radio announcer with Health Minister Dr 'Ali Reza Marandi and "his deputies" Yariga-Ravesh, Niknejad, Bazargan, and Zumuni; and with Mohammad Gharazi, minister of post, telegraph, and telephone and "his deputies" Maleki-Tabar, Darab, and other "expert brothers" live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] In an overview of government activity in the health, treatment and medical training sector, while we observe that some time and interesting work has been done and measures taken, we can also see that there are some shortcomings and deficiencies. For example, sick persons all over the country do not receive enough attention and treatment from physicians. Judging from current statistics and data there is one physician for every 3,000 persons in the country, on average. What steps have been taken to eliminate this deficiency up to now and what are the long-term programs that are being implemented?

[Marandi] We have tried to move in the direction of a more just distribution of doctors but, with a fast growing population, we must train more physicians though we have also chosen to employ foreign physicians. Yet, this does not fully solve our problems. We know that in 5 years' time, God willing, about 5,000 medical students or even a few more will graduate every year which will differ vastly from the present situation where we have only 600-700 graduates per year.

[Announcer] Mr Gharazi, as minister of post, telegraph, and telephone, while comparing the operations of this ministry with what it did before the victory of the Islamic revolution, please let us know what services have been offered to deprived rural inhabitants?

[Gharazi] Thank you. I shall summarize in one sentence that before the revolution only 300 villages in the country had telecommunications coverage but today, more than 3,000 villages in the country are under telecommunications coverage, and God willing, in the course of another year, another 1,000 rural units will also come under coverage.

[Announcer] Mr Gharazi, a listener has raised a question about the recent crime of the Al Sa'ud on Bloody Friday and the Mecca tragedy. He is asking whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is giving a suitable reply to these crimes and what your ministry is doing to expose this catastrophe?

[Gharazi] To create the necessary cultural climate for confrontation with this treacherous and wicked crime by the Al Sa'ud we have started designing stamps. On 26 August one stamp will be printed and distributed for sale. Here and now I announce that we are holding a world competition for the design of the second stamp to show the Al Sa'ud crime. We have offered a prize of 100,000 tomans for the winning design.

[Question by unidentified telephone caller in Tehran] I would like to ask the telecommunications minister about the expansion of our telecommunications by satellite. How much work has been done in this field so far?

[Announcer] Could we ask Mr Gharazi to answer this question?

[Gharazi] I would like to thank the dear brother who asked this question. It seems that he is a graduate who is doing his military service now. I wish him success and would like to tell him that at present we are renting satellites. However, last year [year ending 20 March 1987] we succeeded in obtaining Majlis approval for an independent national satellite and are pursuing the matter on this year's agenda. The design is on the drawing board and we hope that by the end of this year we can put it out to tender and buy an independent national satellite on the international market, God willing. Of course, we have reserved a platform for launching our satellite into orbit. It seems that we will be able to have our satellite in space by the end of the year 1369 [20 March 1991].

Having a satellite in space is not all one needs to utilize a satellite so we require earth stations on a large scale. Our country is vast and we can only link all the regions via a satellite system. At present we have designed links for 51 points in the country and we are supplying the necessary equipment; and God willing by next year, this plan will be implemented so that such remote areas as Sistan va Baluchastan Province will be linked to other parts of the country.

First, this will be done by rented satellite but after our independent national satellite is launched this will be shifted to the independent national satellite. We hope that instead of using microwaves, we shall be able to operate our intercity telecommunications by satellite and link our cities and 70,000 villages with each other and the rest of the world via our independent national satellite.

/9274
CSO: 4600/302

TEHRAN PHONE-IN ON DOMESTIC POLICY

LD270921 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1200 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Third in the series of programs celebrating Government Week entitled "The Government and the People"; studio phone-in program moderated by unidentified Tehran radio announcer with Interior Minister Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami and "his deputies" Rahmani, Rusa-Reza, Majd-Ara, Behzadni, Sadr, and Hojjat ol-Eslam Shari' ati-Dehaqani live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Mr Mohtashami, I would like to welcome you and thank you for accepting our invitation. Would you please introduce your deputies and tell us what their responsibilities are?

[Mohtashami] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Greetings to the imam of the ummah, the martyr-nurturing ummah, the dear listeners, and all the combatants. May I offer congratulations and condolences on the martyrdom anniversary of our dear ones Raja'i and Bahonar and their comrades. Our brothers are: Mr Rahmani, the deputy interior minister and the supervisor of the State Registration Department; Mr Musa Reza, the deputy interior minister in Planning and Management Affairs; Mr Majd-Ara, the development deputy; Mr Behzadnia, the advisor to the interior minister; Mr Sadr, the political and social affairs deputy of the ministry; and Hojjat ol-Eslam Shari' ati-Dehaqani the legal and parliamentary affairs deputy of the Interior Ministry.

[Announcer] A listener has asked about the steps taken so far to house and look after those who have sought refuge in this country, particularly our Afghan and Iraqi brothers. Mr Majd-Ara, please?

[Majd-Ara] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Greetings to the imam of the ummah, and our martyr-nurturing ummah. Before answering this question, I would like to ask for an opportunity to describe my department's achievements last year. I think this will be useful and might probably answer some of the questions. But first about our listener's question. On the basis of our Islamic belief and in accordance with the Constitution, we are duty bound to support all Muslims of the world, particularly when they are subjected to oppression. We should offer all possible assistance even if these oppressed people are not Muslims. Naturally, in this respect we have greater responsibility toward Muslims and especially our neighboring Muslims.

You are aware that as a result of a military attack of the E'stern superpower, a large number of the oppressed people of Afghanistan left their homes and are now scattered all over the world. Many of these innocent people came to our country. On the other side, we have our neighbor Iraq where a criminal dictatorial regime is ruling over its Muslim people. These Muslims are suppressed, and most of them escape tyranny and come to our country; naturally we should look after them. Presently, there are about 2 million Afghans and 300,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran. We offer them plenty of services and assistance.

[Majd-Ara continues] In order to prevent any negative aspect of receiving these brothers in Iran, we have had to introduce some controls. The main objective of these measures is to identify the refugees. So far we have issued identity cards for about 1.5 million Afghans. There are controls on entering and leaving the country. Their movement is controlled too. They are issued pass permits which they should present if they want to visit certain areas. The judicial system investigates their offenses, and the security forces strictly supervise their residence permit and movement. Fortunately, the majority of our Muslim brothers are struggling and innocent. However, a few of them have been offenders and drug peddlers. [The announcer interrupts him to broadcast the provincial news and promises that he can continue his remarks afterwards.]

[Majd-Ara continues] As I was saying, a few Afghans have been involved in crimes including drug trafficking. On this basis, the supervisor of the Anti-Narcotics Court ordered that all Afghans in several districts of Tehran be rounded up. This was a measure to fight narcotics. However, due to lack of adequate planning and lack of coordination with the relevant organs, mainly the Interior Ministry, regrettably there were some problems. Fortunately later contacts removed these problems, and a large number of these brothers and sisters, who are legally permitted to stay in Iran and possess residence permits, were released. As I mentioned, a very small number of them did not have residence permits, so it was decided that they be sent to the Bardsir camps, probably to be deported. In any case we regret the event.

[Announcer] Mr Mohtashami, here is a moving case on addition from a mother. Also cases were raised [words indistinct]. Please remark on them.

[Mohtashami] Yes. For me and all the brothers, sisters, and the listeners this is a very painful problem. I must say that the problem of narcotics and addiction and those who are active in this field has been a political problem. Today too it is a political problem for the Islamic Revolution. Prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the problem of narcotics and smuggling was at the royal court's disposition. The smugglers began this movement with the participation of those related to the court. The smuggling was also being supported from abroad. Drugs were used inside the country, and some were transferred to Europe and outside the country.

[Mohtashami continues] It was precisely for the purpose of preventing our youth from movement, uprising, and rebellion against the regime related to taghut [false idol] America. It was designed to make of our youth empty, useless, and soulless beings.

After the revolution's victory this policy acquired a different color. When the Islamic Revolution and our courts throughout the country embarked on a decisive campaign against the agents of addiction, the smugglers, and when the confrontation was serious the domestic mercenaries, that is, the agents of the U.S. taghut and the despotic royal regime, thought that for the continuation of their domination they must encourage our youth to be addicts. After the victory of the revolution, they thought that our youth must not actively participate in the war, must not think of the foreign enemy, and must not fight with various kinds of imperialism and their domestic agents; therefore, they must be useless and leave the revolution.

In order to do this, they embarked on a political movement in the framework of importing narcotics from Eastern frontiers. These drug traffickers were under the protection of the opposition groups and foreign agents as well as some of the embassies in the country and neighboring countries. They are still under their protection. They are conducting this movement on a vast scale.

I must raise several problems in connection with this topic. The problem of the campaign against narcotics, addiction, and smuggling is, in my view, as important for our revolution as the war. And in the same way as in connection with the war, all the people are participating, there is a general participation. So the campaign against narcotics must enjoy the same degree of importance, and everybody must participate in this campaign.

One of our difficulties in connection with narcotics, and the campaign against addiction, addicts, and smugglers is the undeserved sense of mercy which a vast number of people feel. You see, if a familiar criminal, whether political or non-political, an ordinary criminal and one who drinks, walks in the street and shouts abuse nobody will have mercy on him; on the contrary, everybody will feel hatred towards him. It is the same with regard to the political criminal. In such cases the people come to the assistance of the security forces and the judiciary to burn out the roots of crime. But in connection with addiction and addicts this is not the case. When people see an addict in the street, in the alleys, in the marketplace, anywhere in the country, rather than fighting with addiction they invariably have mercy on the addict, they help him financially.

If anybody decides to confront the addict, it has been invariably seen that people come and protect the addict. I believe as long as addicts, narcotics, and smugglers are not recognized as criminals, as long as addiction is not recognized as a crime, as long as the people do not really hate addiction and addicts and as long as the people help the addicts and have mercy on them, it will be very difficult for any establishment--not only the Government but also the judiciary--to confront this problem decisively.

In this connection we have various establishments which deal with addiction and narcotics. The Health Ministry deals with the rehabilitation of the addicts--various departments of that ministry deal with the problem of addiction. The security forces and the judicial power join hands with each other to wage a campaign together. They have started it. But the difficulty which I mentioned is still powerful.

In this regard the Interior Ministry has had vast cultural and research work over past years. We held two seminars last year--one in Hamadan and one in Kerman. This year we held a seminar in Khorasan, Mashad. Research workers and scientists have been invited to carry out a vast and comprehensive survey on the problem of addiction and narcotics. This has taken place. Of course, all these efforts must all remain and continue side-by-side. But unfortunately we see that we are being criticized in connection with some of the right and timely movements taking place.

[Mohtashami continues] For instance, as to this very issue of holding research seminars on addiction, we hear some ask what is the use of such things. However, we know that if there is no scientific work done on a political problem--on a very important political problem such as addiction and narcotics--then security efforts will not be effective as such. Along with all these efforts we need a very powerful and decisive law.

[Announcer interrupting] Listeners have asked why the security forces are not given stronger powers.

[Mohtashami] That is what I want to say. As long as the security forces do not have any strong law, they cannot act forcefully. We hope that the Islamic Consultative Assembly shows more sensitivity with regard to this problem; they are sensitive about it. We also hope the honorable Council of Guardians will feel more than ever a sense of responsibility with regard to such decisive and revolutionary laws which the Majlis passes--with regard to any law whether narcotics, profiteering, hoarding, the problem of urban lands, and so forth. We hope that the Council of Guardians shows more than ever a sense of responsibility towards the revolution, especially the Islamic Revolution which we must try to safeguard with all our might. Hopefully these will be speedily endorsed and enacted, and the executive power's hand will be open to confront various political, social, and security issues of the country.

[Voice of unidentified telephone caller] Hello. I want to ask the interior minister a question, if possible. I was recently in the United States with my only son. People who are mostly graduates are afraid to come back here. Because: 1. There are rumors that they will be sent to the fronts straight from the airport; and 2. They say: If we go to Iran and do not find a job, because of conscription, they will not let us return. There are similar rumors and problems. I ask the interior minister to explain--by way of the radio or the mass media--to these children how they can return. Some of them are prepared to do their national service. But, the fear of going to the fronts and not being able to be active after their national service, has led them all to stay abroad. I want to ask him to clarify this matter, and if possible, to guarantee, that if they come home and then decide not to stay, they could leave again, so that they do not have to worry. I think that if this is done, many of them would return. Thank you very much.

[Mohtashami] Yes. I would like to say this [to the] gentleman, and all who may have returned from abroad, or will return in the future, that there are adverse and extremely poisonous propaganda by mini-groups and foreign radios abroad to the effect that whoever arrives at Tehran airport is immediately

arrested and sent to the fronts. There are other kinds of rumors like this. Fortunately our dear brother, who has come to Iran from the United States, has seen for himself that our security and airport officials are very friendly and brotherly.

In connection with students studying abroad, I should say that there is no difference between them and those studying at universities inside the country, regarding conscription. While studying they are exempt from national service. After completing their university education--in accordance with the law and like our country's other youths--they must do their national service. The law has been announced in all the newspapers, to the effect that, those doing their national service must spend at least 1 year in war zones. War zones does not mean on the front lines; war zones might be 200-300 km inside Iran. There are some soldiers who may spend their 1 year in Ahvaz, Dezful, or Bakhtaran. These areas have been determined as war zones. The rumors about soldiers being taken to the front line are false. Most of those who are active on the fronts are Basiji volunteers and volunteer soldiers. There is a great number of them. Of course, we do not make exceptions.

[Announcer] Mr Mohtashami, a listener has complained about nepotism. He phoned our colleagues and complained. I am summarizing what he said: I am not very well-off. My only offspring has been on the fronts for a long time, while the offspring of the wealthy drive around in colorful cars and various motorbikes. They even disturb citizens in various towns instead of doing their sacred national service. He asks: "Why is there such favoritism, and when are you going to make them do their national service?" Please answer.

[Mohtashami] A law was ratified by the Majlis, in accordance with which absentee conscripts and deserters have been recalled to national service. Those who do not come forward will be punished severely. The number of absentee conscripts and deserters has greatly decreased. We have arrested a large number of them, by way of security forces, Guards Corps, the police, Gendarmerie and the Islamic Revolution Committee. They are now doing their national service; many of them have also been dispatched to the fronts. I think that the remaining number is not very high. Here and now, I ask them to come forward. If they do not do so, and the security forces arrest them, their punishment would be very heavy.

[Announcer] Mr Mohtashami, there were two questions about un-Islamic dress and there was also one question about the future election for the next term of the Majlis.

[Mohtashami] Yes, I thank you very much. I must say that political phenomena in the country today are not similar to those in the past when they took specific form and content. Today we see various forms in connection with political problems. I have already described a sample of a political movement in relation with the regime of the Islamic Republic for the citizens and dear listeners--that was the problem of narcotics.

One other sample and form of the political movement which the enemies of the Islamic Revolution have adopted is this very problem of prostitution and forbidden deeds, and specifically the problem of violating the veil code--the

unethical dress styles and dresses which are sent to the country through various ways to be sold or displayed. There are various people who are infected and fed by the various broadcasting systems and voices of imperialism and arrogance. Such people then make or buy these various styles and various dresses from boutiques. They wear these dresses and appear in the streets with very ugly and indecent European styles. With regard to indecent dresses and violation of the veil code, I said once before in an interview that the campaign against it required the cooperation and participation of the people. The security forces cannot carry out a campaign against this political phenomenon on their own. The judicial power cannot confront it on its own. We must confront this political phenomenon in a general and popular movement.

Indecent dress is generally sold in boutiques in cities; we have seen that many of these boutiques--following our own survey--have no license and no permission. A vast number of them have been closed down by the Islamic Revolution Committees. In connection with the existing boutiques, A must say that a bill has been sent to the Majlis with regard to these dresses and in fact with regard to violation of the veil code. The bill has been approved in the Majlis with some amendments.

However, this law and this bill in my opinion cannot be sufficient for the campaign against this phenomenon. It needs a popular movement, a general mobilization. At the joint session of the Governors General with the Cabinet, a project has been tabled by the Islamic Revolution Committee. This has to do with manifestations of moral corruption, prostitution, and violation of the dress code. The details are to be approved by the cultural committee of the cabinet. The cabinet will then be advised. The Islamic Revolution Committee must have decisive action. Unfortunately, this project is still waiting in the Cabinet Cultural Committee. Because of the backlog of work, the project has been delayed.

[Announcer] Thank you, Mr Mohtashami. I am asking about the elections for the next term of the Majlis; what is the date? And also there is another question asking what stage the bill on political parties is in and why it is not being implemented.

[Mohtashami] As to the date of the Majlis elections, I must say that registration of the honorable candidates will take place next Esfand [20 February-20 March]. We hope to be able to hold the elections in Farvardin [21 March-20 April].

In connection with the bill on the political parties, the bill on political parties needed rules and regulations for its implementation. The rules and regulations of the Law of the Political Parties have been approved except for the case related to the Islamic associations. We have sent the rules and regulations for its implementation to the cabinet too. They have been approved with some amendments. But due to the fact that in the Law on Political Parties the status of the Islamic Parties is not seen in a way that our brothers in the Islamic associations want them to be. [sentence incomplete as heard]

The Islamic associations want to hold wider responsibilities inside the establishments. We cannot go beyond the Law on Political Parties and give wider powers to the Islamic associations in the rules and regulations pertaining to that law. Because of this, the Islamic associations are unhappy with these rules and regulations, though amendments have been made to them, and have not yet accepted them. Since we believe that the Islamic associations are the backbone of the Revolution inside the various establishments, whether governmental or nongovernmental, and since we believe that the Islamic associations must impart Islamic solidarity to these establishments, we believe that we must satisfy the Islamic associations as far as possible.

In connection with the Law on Political Parties, we began from the religious minorities. The Article 10 Commission of the Law of Political Parties in the Interior Ministry is working continuously. Religious minorities are referred to us. So far more than 60 cases have been surveyed and are in the stage where permits will soon be issued for activity by the religious minorities. We foresee that there will be around 130 groups or associations of religious minorities on a nationwide scale. They will gradually be issued permits. I must say that we have begun to implement the Law of Political Parties.

[Unidentified reporter, speaking to a member of public] As you know, Mr Mohtashami, the honorable interior minister and his deputies and assistants are in the broadcast studios of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is in connection with Government Week. Do you want to ask him anything?

[Unidentified man] I would like to ask brother Mohtashami, the Interior Minister, what has he done so far relating to the Mecca tragedy, what has been done to expose this horrific crime across the world, and what will the Islamic Republic of Iran's reaction be later on?

[Unidentified reporter] Could you wait a little while for your answer?
[Unidentified man] Yes, thank you very much.

[Mohtashami] I should say that the sentiment expressed by that brother prevails throughout the country; everyone is asking the same question. The crime that the House of Sa'ud committed in the Hijaz [Saudi Arabia] and next to the house of God is unprecedented in the history of mankind. The Ka'bah and the Sacred Mosque are respected by all religions. Mecca was the first house founded on this earth, and Abraham, God's friend, built it with his own hands. Various religious, including Judaism, Christianity, and other religions believe in this house. For Islam and Muslims, the Ka'bah and Mecca are recognized as a sacred sanctuary and as something to be respected.

This is a crime which cannot be overlooked or forgiven, something which the hirelings of the House of Sa'ud have committed. Of course, we believe that the House of Sa'ud received the orders from outside, from the United States. The United States wanted to avenge all its defeats throughout the history of the revolution at the expense of Islam and Muslims, which it did by the hands of the puppet House of Sa'ud forces.

Actions taken include a range of publicity to acquaint all the Muslims and Muslim nations with the depth of that crime. Initially the Saudi regime embarked upon an extensive propaganda campaign with the assistance of news and propaganda imperialism throughout the world. The United States helped the Saudis in this matter; France, Britain and the voice of Israel, as well as the Voice of Kata'ib [Lebanese phalangist radio station] and other news agencies, all joined hands to help Saudi Arabia against the Islamic Republic of Iran. But the truth cannot remain concealed.

With the hail of its bullets that pierced the manly chests of the Hajj pilgrims and God's guests next to the House of God, Saudi Arabia martyred them and rolled them in blood and dust. But it claimed that not even a single shot had been fired. The truth came out when the pilgrims returned to their home countries, and it became clear that Saudi Arabia was telling a lie. The Saudi Interior Minister Nayif has made contradictory statements at various news conferences about the matters. In his next interviews, he might produce still further inconsistencies. All these proves that "the betrayer is fearful" [Koranic quotation]. The betrayer will produce sharply inconsistent statements, helping the people to see the truth.

Through various organizations and ministries, messages have been sent to their counterparts in Islamic countries pointing out the crime to them and calling upon them to do their humanitarian and Islamic duty. As interior minister, I also sent a message to all the Islamic countries' interior ministers, describing in detail the crimes of the House of Sa'ud and offering proposals regarding the two holy mosques and security matters relating to these two sacred Islamic cities. We hope it will be fruitful.

/9274
CSO: 4600/302

TEHRAN PHONE-IN ON HEAVY INDUSTRY WAR EFFORTS

LD271511 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1140 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Fourth in the series of programs celebrating Government Week; studio phone-in program moderated by unidentified Tehran radio announced with Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi and his ministry assistants Remazanianyanpur and Safa'i--live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A listener was asked about Heavy Industries Ministry's role in the war, Mr Nabavi, and about the services rendered so far in this direction.

[Nabavi] I think Brother Safa'i, who is deputy minister for war affairs, should answer this.

[Announcer] If you please, Mr Safa'i.

[Safa'i] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Greetings to dear listeners. As for this question, I should say that the saying, an enemy may prove beneficial should God so will, has come true here. Considering the economic situation imposed on our country leading to increased demands due to the war and to foreign exchange limitations, we were forced to tighten our belts and to try to redirect our products in line with the war front requirements.

In general, I should say that at present some 50 percent of the value of our output concern the products that are directly needed by the war. Apart from the items that we supplied previously in the service of the war, over the past 2 years, owing to the economic conditions imposed upon the country, we have succeeded on an extensive scale in making use of a general mobilization of resources, as the people, with their general mobilization kept the front chock-full of people. I can safely say that most of the foundry workers, smiths, and turners who produce anything in the country, even those who had one or two machines we could use, have been put to work to produce military hardware, just over the past 2 years. Of course, we came in late to help the war efforts, for the reason contained in the saying I cited earlier.

Now that we are in, we have been doing well, we have been working on an extensive scale. As I said, most of the country's productive enterprises--from

the very small ones to very large ones--are in the service of that project. I can say that we are the most important ammunition manufacturers among the developing, among the Third World, countries. We do not have a large plant in which to concentrate the manufacturing work, so we face a problem if it is hit, because all the country's enterprises are mobilized working on this project. I can say that presently we supply all the mortars needed at the front, of whatever calibre, and all calibres of artillery shells. We supply all these through small manufacturing complexes. We produce all the parts for rockets, all the parts needed for other military hardware in these complexes.

I would like to tell our people here that for the first time, after 5 or 6 years of the war, we have succeeded over the past 2 years in building complete floating assault bridges and tactical bridges, which are not used even at advanced international level or by the advanced armies in the world. We did all this inside our own country with the very same facilities cited earlier. In other areas, we have begun altering armored personnel carriers and manufacturing various kinds of floating objects. In addition we have begun producing smaller things that our brother combatants need--something which we also supplied in the past.

With what I have said already, I cannot see any facility which we have not utilized. We have endeavoured to perfect the defense equipment products. Toward this end, we have tried to maximize our use of our manufacturing and research centers. I once again call upon our brother artisans who hear me to help us. In the same way that brother corpsmen helped us throughout the period--and our achievements have been the result of cooperation involving the country's defense personnel--we ask the country's other artisans to help us in this general mobilization. That way we will be able to do away with the areas in which we still depend on the outside world.

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CSO: 4600/342

CARTOON MIRRORS PERSIAN GULF FROGMEN

London KEYHAN in Persian 13 Aug 87 p 7

[Cartoon]



This is no 'money back' deal, Asadollah. God will provide. Besides, 100 kilos of TNT isn't so much!

/9274
CSO, 4640/0182

PAPER SAYS SRI LANKA ACCORD ENDANGERS SAARC

BK240820 Karachi DAWN in English 17 Aug 87 p 7

[Editorial: "Sri Lanka--A Surrender of Sovereignty"]

[Text] Initially hailed in many quarters as a bold move on the part of the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments to end civil strife in Sri Lanka, the Rajiv-Jayewardene peace accord has since evoked a growing sense of apprehension regarding some of its implications. Since the accord came into force on 29 July, certain provisions of the agreement and its stipulations have come to light that do not augur well either for Sri Lanka or for the region as a whole. Far from being a disinterested attempt on the part of India to help a neighbour out of a difficult situation, the agreement can be seen as a thinly-veiled attempt on the part of New Delhi to extend its influence to Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Apart from the main clauses of the agreement that specifically deal with the Tamil problem--and these can be seen as a genuine attempt to tackle the difficult Tamil problem--there are an accompanying annexure to the treaty and letters of exchange between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Jayewardene which seek to impose certain conditions on the Sri Lankan Government and virtually limit its sovereign right to decide matters of defence and foreign affairs with finality.

These documents centre around five crucial points which are palpably restrictive in their meaning and implications. First, Sri Lanka is not to make available Trincomalee or any other part of its territory to any country to be used for military purposes, in a manner which could be adjudged prejudicial to Indian interests. Secondly, it is to revise its agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations so that any facilities set up by them are not used for anti-India propaganda or for intelligence purposes. Any existing agreement would have to be revised and new ones intended to be concluded will have to be in consultation with New Delhi. Thirdly, a joint consultative machinery is to be set up to investigate the 'relevance and employment of foreign ministry and intelligence personnel' in Sri Lanka to ensure that such a presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Here, it must be noted that on the face of it these three provisions have little relevance to the solution of the ethnic problem which is what the agreement is supposedly all about. Fourthly, a representative of the Indian Election Commission is to be involved in the scheduled referendum in Sri Lanka's eastern province. Besides, India is to send an observer to oversee the Provincial Council polls. Fifthly, Colombo is to disband its homeguard

and all paramilitary forces are to be withdrawn from the east and northern provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the proposed new Provincial Councils. The disbanded units are to be merged into the regular forces. Training facilities for the Sri Lankan Army and security forces will be provided by the Government of India.

Since the terms of the treaty are unmistakably one-sided, impinging as they do on Sri Lanka's sovereign right to make decisions and pursue policies on matters vital to its interest, the agreement can hardly be called one between two sovereign equals. Mr Jayewardene's candid admission to THE NEW YORK TIMES soon after the signing of the agreement that "we can't stand up to any country... They (India) can conquer us" is revealing. Little wonder then that the agreement should have aroused fresh doubts and misgivings among the regional States, and no less among the keen observers of the South Asian scene, as to India's real intentions towards its southern neighbour.

Obviously, the 29 July accord has lent itself as a convenient cover for what is essentially a move inspired by hegemonic ambitions. Even if one were to accept for argument's sake that the landing of Indian troops in northern Sri Lanka was necessary to effect a cessation of hostilities and to disarm the Tamil guerilla, the fact remains that allowing foreign troops to become involved in an internal situation is tantamount to surrendering one's own sovereignty, however limited the scope of such an involvement may appear to be given India's past record of military and political chauvinism in dealing with its smaller neighbours, the situation cannot but cause considerable alarm. For its part, it would be imprudent for India not to be mindful of how [word indistinct] is going to be viewed in the regional context. One test of its bonafides will be how quickly it completes the task at hand and withdraws its troops from Sri Lanka. Already some differences over the timetable for the withdrawal are surfacing. Even more significant seems to be the difference in perception of India's presence between the President and Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil guerrillas. For example, responding to Mr Jayewardene's statement expressing the hope of an early withdrawal of India troops Mr Prabhakaran is reported to have said that his organisation's agreement to lay down arms and refrain from violence was conditional on the presence of Indian troops as 'protectors' of the Tamils.

However, for India to enlarge its role or prolong its military presence there and create an impression among the Tamils that their security and safety can be guaranteed only by the presence of Indian troops could, in the long run, lead to serious repercussions, going far beyond the exigencies, real or contrived, of an ethnic settlement in Sri Lanka. Such a development could be viewed as the thin end of an interventionist wedge and alter the regional situation altogether. For too long has South Asia been racked by conflicts and wars brought about as much by ethnic and racial factors as by the mutual suspicions that mar relations between the seven States of the region. The setting up of SAARC, it was hoped, would usher in a new era of peace, stability and cooperation. This goal could be seriously undermined unless the basic doctrines of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and sovereign equality of all States, irrespective of size, population and military power, are respected and made the sole basis of relations between the States of the region.

PAKISTANI DEMONSTRATORS CONDEMN SAUDI 'CRIMES'

NC180640 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 18 Aug 87

[Report by unidentified Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran correspondent from Islamabad; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Words indistinct] Pakistanis who returned to their country after performing their pilgrimage have demonstrated in the center of Islamabad against Saudi crimes, vehemently condemning the massacre of pilgrims to the house of God by the American Saudi officials. Clergymen, lawyers, students, and Pakistani Sunni and Shi'ite brothers from various strata of society participated in these demonstrations.

The protesters congregated on the main Islamabad highway and listened to clergymen and Pakistani pilgrims who had witnessed the Saudi forces' attack on the orderly ranks of the marchers disavowing pagans. One of the pilgrims to the House of God spoke about the Saudi crime of attacking the pilgrims in holy Mecca, severely condemning this atrocity. He detailed the fulfillment of the Hajj rituals, the demonstrations in disavowal of pagans, and the Saudi-U.S.-tailored attack on marchers in hold Mecca saying: After firing on many pilgrims from Islamic countries, particularly Iran, martyring them, the Saudi regime, gripped with fear, closed streets and stole the bodies of the martyrs and wounded. Stressing that Muslims from throughout the world participated in these marches, he said: We will continue to expose the United States and the Saudi regime and struggle against them until the blood of the martyrs is avenged.

A prominent Sunni clergyman also spoke, condemning the Saudi regime: We declare at this great gathering that Mecca and Medina should be recognized as centers of the Islamic world, as they are for all Muslims of the world. Addressing the Saudi officials, he said: O U.S. spies! Remember that nothing can save you. He stressed the need for unity between Sunnis and Shi'ites, adding: The United States, the Wahhabi Saudi regime, and other powers fear Sunni and Shi'ite unity.

Another speaker, a prominent Sunni clergymen, criticized the U.S.-Saudi crimes in the sanctuary of divine peace in the House of God, saying: The world movement initiated by Imam Khomeyni has caused Eastern and Western imperialism and Reagan and his associates to tremble with fear.

The U.S. flag was burned at the conclusion of the demonstrations.

HALT DEMANDED TO IRANIAN FACTION CONFLICTS ON PAKISTANI SOIL

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 11 Jul 87 p 3

[Editorial: "Stop These Activities"]

[Text] Throughout the world, nations act on the principle of noninterference in other countries' affairs. Pakistan strictly adheres to this principle, and it wants other countries to do the same. Since the onset of the Iranian revolution, a significant number of Iranians have opposed the revolution. These Iranians are active in other countries, struggling to frustrate the revolution. We have nothing to do with the rights and wrongs of these people, but the Pakistani Government cannot under any conditions allow Pakistani soil to be used for settling their disputes.

No arrests have yet been made in connection with recent attacks on the residences of Iranians with the use of rockets, hand grenades and advanced automatic weapons, but it is expected that the people involved will soon be taken into custody. Then the objectives of these attacks will be made clear to the people and the government. According to sources close to the investigating agencies, based on the circumstances surrounding the events, the statements of victims of the attacks and information received from them, the attacks were the work of trained terrorists who came or were sent as part of an organized plan. They were informed of the exact whereabouts of the opponents of Imam Khomeyni, and they were provided with information to familiarize them with the conditions and atmosphere of the city. Officials believe that these attackers are still being given protection. They have requested that the government take up this matter on a diplomatic level with the Iranian Government and raise the issue of terrorism in Pakistan.

We have brotherly relations with Iran, and we have always refrained from interfering or expressing any views on the internal affairs of the Iranian Government. Our press, too, pursues a very cautious policy toward Iran. Neither the government nor the public has ever made a negative comment against the Iranian revolution. While welcoming the Iranian revolution, our government has not granted refugee status to any Iranian group or to supporters of any Iranian faction. Notwithstanding all this caution, the Government of Pakistan cannot under any circumstances tolerate the use of our soil to settle Iranian disputes, and it will not permit any foreigner to use Pakistani soil to carry

our acts of violence against others. Action will be taken against all those who have violated the law by taking part in terrorism and attacks. These attackers have abused the offer of temporary residence and Pakistani hospitality. These people are involved in illegal activities, and this cannot be condoned under any circumstances.

The warring Iranians who have taken refuge in Karachi and Quetta have taken part in illegal and immoral activities. Here there have been organized attacks on supporters of Qayem Mujahdeen Khalk during the last few months, and following the recent attacks the chances of a bloody conflict between the two sides have increased. A few months ago, supporters of Saud Rajavi held a demonstration in front of the Office of the UN Commissioner for Refugees in connection with the provision of certain facilities. On this occasion, the supporters of the Iranian Government along with some local students attacked the demonstrators, and nine persons including one woman were injured. A second attack on opponents of the Iranian Government took place in Karachi Sadar, where they had set up a book and poster stall to publicize their cause. A third incident between these warring groups took place at the Karachi Cantt station 3 weeks ago, when the supporters of the Iranian Government injured some persons. These continuing incidents demonstrate that the warring Iranian groups have chosen Pakistani soil to settle their disputes. Our government and people will not tolerate this under any circumstances. The Pakistani Government is taking steps to end this terrorism. A government spokesman has made clear that no supporter of any Iranian faction will be permitted to engage in illegal activities on the soil of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and such people who violate Pakistani laws will be strictly dealt with. We Pakistanis do not recognize any group that opposes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These people are foreigners, and they are staying in Pakistan on a temporary basis. If they continue to violate the laws of the Pakistani Government, they will be expelled from the country. The government is investigating the conflicts between the two factions. Action will be taken soon, and undesirable activities by foreign elements will not be tolerated under any circumstances.

We appeal to the Pakistani Government to pay strict attention to the illegal activities of the Iranians. Because of police negligence in regard to tensions of such a crucial nature, the worst incident in Karachi's history took place. There should be an investigation into how such deadly weapons reached the interior of the city. Because of police incompetence and the negligence of security agencies, we have reached a situation wherein there is no longer any guarantee of the security of citizens' lives and property. Undoubtedly, the government will take firm steps to insure that such incidents are not repeated in the future and that foreigners do not have a free hand here. Furthermore, all those who reside in Pakistan on a temporary basis should be subjected to closer scrutiny so that they cannot indulge in any activity that is against the interests of Pakistan or that gives Pakistan a bad name among the nations of the world. It is also imperative that the Pakistani Government make a demarche to the Iranian Government protesting against this violence and misconduct so that the Iranian Government on its own may act to stop it.

12286/9738
CSO: 4656/098

GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF USING TELEVISION NEWS TIME FOR RULERS

Karachi AMN in Urdu 15 Jul 87 p 3

[Column: "From Jumma Khan's Pen": "22 Minutes Reserved for President and Prime Minister Out of 25 Minute Television Newscast"]

[Excerpts] After several days, on 13 July, I had the opportunity to watch the television news. The newscast started at 9 pm with Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo's tour of Japan. After the prime minister, came the report of the president's engagements. When that was over, I realized that these two news reports had taken up 22 minutes. Then in the remaining 3 minutes, seven more news items were reported. They were comprised of news about South Korea; the presidential elections in India; the Iraq-Iran war; Azad Kashmir's Martyrs Day; the burial of a religious leader, Hanif Nadvi; an arts exhibition in Islamabad; and communications regarding talks between India and Pakistan. After that came the sports news, which mentioned nothing about Pakistan. Then came the weather forecast, and the news ended at 9:30 pm.

Out of a 30-minute newscast, 22 minutes were allocated to the president and the prime minister. None of the activities of the provincial governments of Punjab, Sind, the Frontier Province, or Baluchistan was presented. In the sports news also, nothing was mentioned about Pakistan or Pakistani sportsmen.

This is the standard of Pakistani television news. If this standard is satisfactory for the present rulers and is in accordance with their policy, there is no use urging that it be changed, because they have sworn not to listen to anything reasonable. If, however, the standard of the national news under discussion is not appropriate, Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Qazi Abdul Majid Abid should set guidelines for the head of the department responsible for editing the news.

The radio and television are not meant to serve the president and the prime minister alone; they should take into account the likes and dislikes of their audience. Otherwise, the standard of their news

reports can never be elevated, nor will they be able to win the confidence of the people.

The prime minister's tour of Japan is important. The president's tour of Karachi may also be important. But during the 25-minute newscast, no more than 10 minutes should have been devoted to news of the president and the prime minister alone, no matter how important they were, so that there would have been some time available for news about the four provincial governments as well. Similarly, in the sports news, 1 minute should be assigned for Pakistan and its sportsmen. If the president and the prime minister wish to maintain radio and television as their personal property, then they should not claim that there is democracy in Pakistan.

In all democratic countries, the rulers are not granted much time on radio and television. The opposition, too, is accorded representation. In our country, however, there is a total boycott of the opposition on radio and television, which have been made an official organ of publicity for the rulers only. Through this policy, the administration itself convinces the people that there is no democracy in democratic Islamic Pakistan.

9779/9599
CSO: 4656/100

OPPOSITION DEMANDS POLLS, ZIAUL HAQ OUSTER

BK261145 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 17 Aug 87 pp 1, 8

[From Badrul Islam Butt and Aurangzeb]

[Text] Lahore, 16 Aug.—The All Parties Conference [APC] ended here today on a somewhat uncertain note. While the overwhelming majority of the parties attending the conference signed the joint declaration, there were important exceptions like the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and some of the other parties which having been invited chose not to attend.

The delegates of the all parties conference have constituted a 3-member Co-ordination Committee comprising Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Ghous Baksh Bizenjo and Maulana Fazalur Rahman which will discuss the proposals made by the speakers in the APC and work towards forging a consensus of parties within and outside the MRD for a joint action programme aimed at the restoration of real democracy.

The All Parties Conference demanded through a declaration the immediate departure of Gen Ziaul Haq from power and dissolution of his entire system including federal and provincial governments along with the Assemblies. Political parties, including those outside the MRD fold, signatory to the joint declaration are: Jamiat-i-ulema-il-islam [JUI], Pakistan Democratic Party, Pakistan National Party, Qaumi Mahaz-i-azadi [QMA], Mazdoor Kisan Party, NAP [National Awami Party] Pushtoon Khwah, National People's Party, PML [Pakistan Muslim League] (Khairuddin), Ahl-i-hadith, and Tehrik-i-nifaz-i-fiqah-i-jafria. The MRD parties which abstained from signing the declaration are: Pakistan People's Party, Awami National Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Qasim Group). The declaration demands that an interim care-taker government comprising national political parties persisting in the democratic struggle should be formed to conduct elections in Pakistan on party basis within a period of four months under the 1973 Constitution and the election rules as were prevalent before 5 July 1977. This would be the way to induct into power a democratic government having the people's support and backing. Only such a government could guarantee a stable democratic system in the country, social and economic justice to the people, safeguard people's sovereign right to power and ensure maximum autonomy to the federating units.

The declaration which was approved last night by the party leaders attending the conference included certain amendments apparently to accommodate the views

expressed by some of the parties in the MRD. These pertained to provincial autonomy and fixation of the period for holding of elections. Notable abstentions at the last night's meeting were Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Qasim Group). The PPP representatives, according to reliable sources, had objected to the inclusion of a provision in the declaration which related to the composition of an interim care-taker government. The PPP at today's conference is participating as an observer. Its three representatives Rao Abdul Rashid, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and Syed Qasim Ali Shah made their appearance in the conference hall during the first session well after the start of the proceedings. Malik Qasim's Muslim League remained unrepresented.

The declaration gave a brief account of the conditions in the country and held martial law and the present civilian rule responsible for bringing grave dangers to the country, rendering its integrity and security in grave perils. The declaration urges all democratic forces to forge unity in order to liberate the country from dictatorship by evolving a joint programme of action.

In his speech Maulana Fazalur Rahman explained the difficulties he had faced in the holding of the APC. He said the decision to hold the APC was taken in the MRD meeting it had been made clear that the APC would neither harm the integrity of the MRD nor make any move towards any larger political alliance. He referred to a party which had demanded an action plan backed by the APC. He questioned the idea of the JUI alone giving any action programme. Such an action plan he said had to be evolved through the deliberation and consensus of all parties.

He categorically affirmed that all parties that had distanced themselves from the APC would never be abandoned and their comradeship in the struggle would continue. Referring to the conference, he said, had it not been held the present day would have been the last day in the struggle of democracy.

Nazabazada Nasrullah Khan said that [the] country had reached the verge of destruction. Sectarian and ethnic riots, bomb blasts, air bombing on our western borders and corruption are unabated and no positive change was in sight. He said that the Chief of Army Staff merely, an officer of the rank of joint secretary, was nominating the Prime Minister and Governors.

Fatehyab Ali Khan, President Mazdoor Kissan Party, speaking at the APC, said that if the present illegal government was allowed to continue until 1990, a dangerous precedent would be set to be followed by others.

Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Chairman Qaumi Mahaz-i-azadi congratulated Maulana Fazalur Rahman Nawabzada Nasrullah, Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo for their successful efforts in holding the APC. He warned that if at this stage the democratic political parties did not realise the dangerous situation emerging on the internal and external fronts and threatening country's independence, a civil war could erupt.

Going into details, he said that all the three constitutions were abrogated by the army. HC said that the imposition of martial law and deprived the people of their democratic and sovereign rights. The QMA leader said that

the army leadership was interested in the sharing of power and not transfer of power. He pointed out that Gen Ziaul Haq first of all held a referendum, through which he transferred power to himself and then held partyless elections not for the transfer of power but sharing of power. All this, he said, was a conspiracy of the CIA. He said that efforts should be made for the restoration of people's sovereignty, and if this were not achieved through peaceful means then an Iran like revolution would become inevitable here. He demanded provincial autonomy and the holding of fresh elections on party basis.

Professor Sajid Mir, General Secretary Jamiat Ahl-I-Hadith [JAH], strongly criticised the government for betraying the basic objectives underlying the creation of Pakistan. He said that during the last ten years the rulers caused considerable damage to Islam, by using its name to perpetuate their rule. Criticising the Assemblies, the JAH leader said that the Eighth Amendment in the Constitution was carried out to legalise the misdeeds of the martial law period.

He said that the 1973 Constitution should be restored in its original form and that in its presence, there was no need for the Shariat Bill.

Earlier Maulana Fazalur Rahman at the opening of the conference made some introductory remarks, and said that despite various differences that existed among the political parties one thing was now clear to all that during the last decade, considerable damage had been done to the unity of the nation, and various prejudices and sectarian as well as ethnic differences had been deliberately promoted for ulterior motives. The JUI General Secretary said that the leaders of political parties participated in a meeting yesterday and had agreed upon a declaration. He said that now speaking on that declaration, the speakers would give their suggestions for implementing the declaration.

Addressing the second session of the APC, the Chief of PNP [Pakistan National Party] Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo said that people of Pakistan were still living under the old colonial order. He quoted Pakistan Resolution committing that all the units within Pakistan would be sovereign and independent. He said Pakistan was a multi-national state and if the nationalities were not given their due right, they would not join the political struggle. He said the meaning of strong centre was a weak Pakistan. He said that democracy could be protected only by decentralising the power to sub-tehsil level.

He pointed out that America had multi-purpose interests in South Asia, Gulf and Middle East and it wanted to occupy the oil routes in the Gulf and Middle East at any cost. He said that Pakistan had become the base of USA from where it would operate to fulfill its evil designs.

He called upon all the parties to join hands to secure the integrity of Pakistan.

K. H. Khurshid, addressing the conference said that the hanging of Z. A. Bhutto was a warning to the democratic forces and parties that there could not be any sovereign Prime Minister in the country, and the military rulers would not allow the democratic forces to prosper.

He said that with the landing of Indian forces in Sri Lanka a new political reality had emerged in this region, and it was indicative of new dangers for Pakistan.

Syed Fazal Hussain Moosavi, representative of Tehrik-I-Nifaz-I-Fiqah-I-Jafria said we should break those hands which had taken away the sovereignty of the nation, and these reached out from the U.S. He suggested that the All Parties Conference should condemn U.S. interference in the political, social, religious and military affairs of Pakistan. The U.S. should be held responsible for patronising an unconstitutional and undemocratic government in Pakistan he said. He added that the people of Pakistan felt greatly threatened by American military adventurism in the Gulf and that America should refrain from such activities.

Abdul Rahim Mandokhel, leader of the NAP Pushtoon Khwah Party, speaking at the conference stressed on the restoration of democratic rights of the people. He strongly criticised the supremacy of the army and other vested interests.

Chulam Mustafa Jatoi, chairman, National People's Party in his long written speech, briefly touched upon the political developments that have taken place since the reation of Pakistan. He said that the people of Pakistan were now dissatisfied with merely issuing of statements and passing resolutions against the government and wanted some practical steps to be taken to get rid of the present rulers. Mr Jatoi said that it was time that all the political parties for getting their differences and political rivalries, should wage a united struggle against the rulers.

Syed Afzal Haider, member, Pakistan Bar Council, in his address regretted the fact that the government had paid no heed to its constitutional obligation of separating the executive from the judiciary.

Mr Isaac Deen, President of the Pakistan Christian National Party, congratulated the organisers of the conference for bringing together in this common struggle Muslims as well as Christians. He strongly condemned the revival of the system of separate electorates.

Chaudhary Aitzaz Ahsan Advocate addressing the APC said that the USA could not use its own army to guard its interests in [the] Middle East. So it had gotten hold of the Pakistan army leadership to further its nefarious designs.

He said 40 F-16 air crafts were not given for the defence of Pakistan. These would be used to train Pakistani pilots to use them in the Gulf and the Middle East by the U.S., he added. She Ali Bacha Rashid Qureshi, and Ch Ashraf also addressed the APC.

/9274
CSO: 4600/301

EDITORIAL DEMANDS ACTION TO END 'UNPRECEDENTED' CORRUPTION

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 13 Jul 87 p 3

[Editorial: "Total Anarchy"]

[Text] The extent of corruption in the country is unprecedented. In addition to corruption, incidents of illegal use of authority by officials are also common, and in this the police top the list. Semiliterate, uncultured police officers with little training have been given authority that they misuse. To the police, summoning a respectable, peace-loving citizen to the police station and humiliating him is nothing. Locking up a citizen without a warrant and releasing him after taking bribery is a daily affair. Worst of all, there is no procedure for ensuring accountability. Who will call a policeman to account? The police aid and abet illegal activities in the market, and they take regular graft from pavement vendors and street peddlers. They travel without a ticket on buses, and the conductor does not dare ask them for the fare.

In the bureaucracy, incidents of dishonesty and misuse of authority by prominent leaders and by top officials in the fields of politics, economics and other sectors have become so common that those who are honest are reduced to an insignificant and ineffective minority. This is an extremely dangerous and irregular situation. The law of nature is not forgiving to society in which such conditions prevail. The principle of reward and punishment continues to operate, and a society in which dishonesty and immorality are common is destroyed sooner or later. Nature affords every nation and every society an opportunity to correct itself, but if unfortunately the society fails to avail itself of this opportunity, it has to pay a very dear price. In the past, such a fate has befallen many nations which were destroyed and fell into oblivion because of their immorality, because they acted immorally in their social and economic life, and because they had lost the power to arrest and punish the immoral and corrupt elements.

In view of the present social, economic and political conditions, it can well be asked whether the rulers are not aware of the fate that befell nations in the past which were defeated on account of their evildoing. If they still claim that their moral condition is very good and that they have the capability of getting rid of the evils, only the future can test this claim. But is Pakistan capable of tolerating this condition? Can it endure these conditions for an indefinite period? If no attempt is made to eradicate the present

evils immediately, the results could be disastrous. The extent to which evil and corruption have become entrenched in the country can be seen from the remark of retired Lieutenant General Malik, chairman of the Federal Anti-corruption Committee, that corruption has become a cancer and that a major operation to uproot and remove this tumor is urgently needed. He said that the people should not expect miracles from this committee, because eradication of the evils current in the country is no easy task. The problems facing the committee are clear: influential officials of the administration will put obstacles in its way; at every step they will try to frustrate its work. So its task is surely a very difficult one.

Although Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo has promised that he will not permit even the most influential official to interfere in the work of the committee, undoubtedly those who are affected by the committee investigations will leave no stone unturned to frustrate the committee's work. But we are certain that Gen Majid Malik will not succumb to any pressure and will not rest until he has fulfilled his mission. The entire country will prove to be his supporter and helper in the task of ascertaining how administration officials amassed wealth, how they acquired property and how they achieved a standard of living that would be impossible on their salaries.

We are sure that in the light of the committee's recommendations, laws will be enacted so that the wrongdoing, immoral and corrupt officials will not escape the clutches of the law. They will be accorded punishment for their crimes, and the society will be cleansed of these evils. We also hope that in drawing up new laws, it will be kept in mind that the officials invested with extraordinary powers must be called to account and not be allowed to cover up their misdeeds by virtue of their influence and the discretion of the law. Such evils cannot be successfully eliminated from the country and the society until the immoral and corrupt officials are removed from the rolls of investigative agencies. Because if the investigators are themselves immoral and dishonest, one can well imagine the results of these investigations. The members of the investigative agencies should first be completely screened, and only then should they be appointed to investigate other departments. If this is not done, then as in the past, the recommendations of this committee, too, will be meaningless.

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CSO: 4656/099

DECISION ON PURCHASE OF FRIGATES STILL PENDING

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 87 pp 1, 10

[Text]

KARACHI, Aug 9: A British offer to sell three ultramodern frigates to the Pakistan Navy at a cost of around 1.5 billion US dollars is currently at an "advanced stage of consideration" but negotiations on the proposed deal "have not yet got down to the hard-core point," the Minister of State for Defence, Mr Naeem Mahmud Khan, said here on Sunday.

However, no final decision had been taken yet on whether to go ahead with the proposed purchase of the three type 23 British frigates, and the Government would not be rushed on this matter, he added.

Mr Khan was talking to APP during a visit to the Pakistan Navy dockyard here. He was accompanied by nine other members of the joint Senate-National Assembly Defence Committee.

The Minister noted that in the past, the Pakistan Navy had not been assigned "the necessary priority" in meeting its needs, and now this situation should be rectified.

Asked what bearing the joint parliamentary Defence Committee's current visit to Pakistan Navy installations might have on the British offer to sell three type-23 frigates to Pakistan, he said the matter would be discussed later by the parliamentarians and they would decide whether to frame recommendations for the consideration of the Federal Cabinet or to

raise the question on the floor of the Senate and the National Assembly.

Mr Khan said the Senate and the National Assembly members of the Defence Committee would probably hold separate sittings later in Islamabad to ponder the matter before arriving at a decision.

Asked if the purchase of some different mix of vessels was being considered for the Pakistan Navy as another option (instead of the British frigate deal), the Minister said the imperative factor here was naval requirements.

The Pakistan Navy, he continued, "feels that their weakest element is their surface fleet", and it was to rectify this situation that the possible purchase of three ultramodern frigates from Britain was being considered.

In this connection he remarked that "the frigate has its own role to play", and, therefore, purchasing such vessels or (for instance) submarines, were two entirely different questions.

For its part, the Government wanted to "reach a correct decision" on the matter, and it would not be rushed in coming to a definite conclusion about it, he added.

Lt-Col (retd) W. Herbert, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, in his comments on the proposed frigate deal, said that while

there were differing views about this matter he felt that the Pakistan Navy was the best judge of its own requirements.

The frigates would be used as escort vessels, and the Pakistan Navy lacked modern vessels capable of playing such a role, he added.

He said aspects of the proposed frigate deal which were engaging the attention of the Defence Committee members, were: the question of price, terms of payment, transfer of technology and "allied factors in the defence sector."

Emphasising the "vital importance" of the gradual transfer of technology to Pakistan in any such deals, Lt-Col (retd) Herbert said the acquisition of defence-oriented knowhow by Pakistan should be a sine qua non in the purchase of weapon systems and equipment from other countries.

He also said that in the past, the Pakistan Navy had been "ignored", and it needed to be properly equipped to play its part in national defence.

Another member of the Defence Committee, Capt (retd) Gohar Ayub, stated that he felt the Pakistan Navy should be transformed into a hard-hitting force capable of achieving quick results.

For this purpose, he was of the view that frigates would be unsuitable (since they would largely play an escort role), and he advocated, instead, going for a mix of submarines, high-speed missiles and reconnaissance planes equipped with missiles. —APP.

/9274
CSO: 4600/298

FRONT FOR SERAIKI PROVINCE EXPLAINS POLICIES

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 87 p 5

[Text]

MULTAN, Aug 9: Mr Taj Mohammad Khan Langah, newly-elected President of the three-year old Seraiki Suba Mahaz, said here on Sunday that the Mahaz was a united front of various elements belonging to Awami Jamhoori Party, Pakistan National Party, Awami National Party, Jamiat-ul-Ulem-i-Islam, National People's Party, PPP and other unattached individuals.

He said the Mahaz stood for amendment of the constitution to create the fifth unit of the Federation, the Seraiki province, comprising Multan, D.G. Khan and Bahawalpur divisions and parts of Jhang, Sargodha and D.I. Khan districts. He denied the Mahaz had anything to do with the confederationists.

At a Press conference on Sunday Mr Langah explained the policies and programme of the Seraiki Suba Mahaz and said that the newly-elected office-bearers would tour the areas of the proposed province and all other areas of the country to mobilise public opinion for their demands.

He said that the Seraiki area of Punjab was highly under developed and the provincial and federal funds and international credits were only spent on a particular area surrounding the district of Lahore. Public representatives of this area, mostly zamindars, did not represent the wishes of the people

of this area and they were only agents of the Punjab bureaucracy.

Pointing out to the deprivations of Seraiki belt, Mr Langah said that the land available in this region was allotted to the bureaucrats and their relatives who belonged to central Punjab, most of the jobs were given to them, admissions in the professional colleges by dubious means were given to the sons and daughters of bureaucrats of central Punjab, while talented youth of Seraiki belt were neglected and "our higher qualified persons are serving on low posts".

He further said that the Seraiki belt produced 80 per cent cotton of the total production, 70 per cent of total wheat production, yet the rate of development in this area was highly deplorable.

The Seraiki's, he said, were the most depressed nationality and leaders of other smaller nationalities hesitated to speak about the rights of Seraiki people, about 30 millions living in all the four provinces, because those leaders did not want to annoy the ruling elite of Punjab.

Mr Langaha demanded resignation of the existing Government in view of deteriorating law and order situation in the country, free, fair and impartial elections immediately; release of political prisoners and restoration of rights of trade unions and the student unions.

/9274
CSO: 4600/298

JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI SAID TO HOLD ARMS MEANT FOR MUJAHEDDIN

Karachi AMN in Urdu 15 Jul 87 p 3

[Editorial: "Stop Arms Proliferation Within the Country First!"]

[Text] Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo said in Japan that Pakistan would not construct an atomic bomb or nuclear weapons. He further stated that the countries of South Asia would gain nothing through nuclear weapons proliferation. The problem of manufacturing an atomic bomb or nuclear weapons is so immense that Pakistan cannot possibly afford such a luxury, he said; Pakistan does not have either so much surplus wealth or other resources to be able to indulge in such an avocation. However, before the issue of an atomic bomb or nuclear weapons, the problem that needs attention is the spread of illegal arms within Pakistan, to which no one is paying attention, and this problem has repeatedly been the cause of bloodshed in the country. One can recognize the delicacy of the situation from the fact that some political parties have also resorted to making weapons and bloodshed the axis of their politics.

The administration, instead of blocking the flow of illegal arms into the country and halting their spread therein, itself is promoting the politics of arms by issuing licenses for Kalashnikovs and 7mm rifles.

Everyone is aware of the fact that the Jamaat-i-Islami Party--which was strongly against the establishment of Pakistan prior to its founding, and whose leaders used to call Pakistan "Non-Pakistan" and the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, "Kafir-e Azam"--has become infamous for hoarding arms. It has secret arsenals and weapons depots in the big cities of the nation, including one in Mansura, a district in Lahore. It started freely using weapons in politics. The task of distributing the arms that were being delivered for the Afghan Mujaheddin from foreign countries was assigned to the Jamaat-i-Islami. However, it appropriated most of these arms and stored them in its secret arsenals and depots. If the Mujaheddin had received all those arms, perhaps the issue of war in Afghanistan would have been resolved much earlier. Thus, on one hand, the Jamaat-i-Islami, by appropriating arms is harming the cause of the Afghan Mujaheddin, and on the other hand, it has introduced i.e element of terrorism into national politics.

The arms embezzled by the Jamaat-i-Islami are being used mostly through its subsidiary organization, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tuleba, that has made universities, educational institutions, and hostels the target of its terrorism. Upon seeing the Jamaat-i-Islami armed with weapons, the other political parties and organizations also dared to hoard munitions. Weapons became so common that the major cities of Pakistan looked like the streets of Chicago in the 1930's, when dacoits and robbers ruled there.

The business of illegal weapons in the country prospered so much that many times members of particular factions were massacred in Karachi and Hyderabad because of the spread of linguistic hatred. Although such a situation has benefitted no one except the administration, nevertheless, as the trend of responding to the use of weapons with the use of weapons increased, the terrifying nature of the armed activity seemed diminished.

Although for the time being the use of arms has been suspended, the weapons still exist, and those who use them are also present. Therefore, there is no reason not to recognize the present tranquillity as the calm before the storm. The situation has deteriorated so much that at any time, under the slightest pretext, the munitions may reappear. On the other hand, the administration itself continues to set bad examples of this terrorism of weapons. The law enforcement institutions have undertaken several operations in Sind under the pretext of eradicating the dacoits there. No dacoits were killed or arrested during these operations. Under this pretext, however, the political opposition was badly crushed. The population and villages were robbed. Houses and standing crops were either burned or looted. Every possible excess was deemed lawful.

In such circumstances, therefore, who would believe Prime Minister Junejo when he states in a foreign country that Pakistan does not want the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Are the foreigners stupid? Do they not comprehend that an administration that cannot stop the dissemination of illegal arms within its own country can do little to halt nuclear proliferation?

And also in such circumstances, Prime Minister Junejo's claim that Pakistan's future is in safe hands is also false. Instead, it would be more correct to say that Pakistan's future is totally unsafe in the hands of the present authority. Rather, the country has been set on a path of destruction.

9779/9599
CSO: 4656/100

BRIEFS

ZIA ON COAS ROLE--In an interview granted to a French journalist, President Zia-ul-Haq has linked his decision to retain the post of the Chief of Army Staff (along with the office of the President) to two factors. First, that he would keep the army post as long as he feels that the political government installed by him is not 'strong enough' to do without the support of the armed forces and, second, that the army as of now does not feel 'safe'. To a further question as to how long these two factors would last, his reply was that 'it can take a couple of months, it can take two years'.... None of this is likely to cheer Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, already under pressure from various quarters--terrorism, law and order and malicious rumours of search for another Sindhi leader to replace him, being some of them. He has so far supported the President in his politically controversial decision of remaining the COAS but in view of the president's latest elucidation, many eyes are likely to turn towards him. Obviously it is no longer an issue one can sweep under the carpet by saying it is not important. Because if the government accepts the implications of the President's statement it will have to forgo its claims to political legitimacy. It will also have to accept the fact that the armed forces do not feel easy under civilian rule. With that kind of an image can any political party face the electorate? [Text] [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 6 Aug 87 p 33] /9274

CSO: 4600/298

SRI LANKA

SOUTH ASIA

SOCIALIST, THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES PLEDGE SUPPORT

BK271409 Colombo LANKA PUWATH in English 1334 GMT 27 Aug 87

["OANA/POOL" item]

[Excerpts] Colombo, 27 Aug (LANKA PUWATH)--Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel, addressing newsmen after a meeting in Colombo with ambassadors of socialist bloc and Third World countries, said his appeal for aid to reconstruct and rehabilitate northern and eastern Sri Lanka had met with ready and very favorable response.

Today's meeting followed a similar one on Tuesday with ambassadors of the 16-member Sri Lanka aid consortium.

Their response, too, was described as being extremely favorable.

The minister said that the countries who were represented at the discussions held earlier in the morning were USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Maldives, Libya, Republic of Korea, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, German Democratic Republic, Egypt, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, China, Burma, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, the representatives of the IMF were also present.

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